THE PALADIN: A Life of Major-General Sir John
Gellibrand
Peter S. Sadler
Published by Oxford University Press 2000 $43.85
This book is a very good addition to the Army
Military History series. It
focuses on the life, and particularly the military career, of Sir John
Gellibrand, but also covers both his early life and his post-military career.
The book reduces to their proper scale some myths
about Sir John. Having seen him
described as a Tasmanian apple farmer who became one of the First AIF’s best generals,
I was interested to note that he spent less than two years as an orchardist
between his separation from the British Army in 1912 and his appointment to the
First AIF in August 1914. I
suspect that the nineteen and a half years as a regular officer may well have
had more influence on his AIF performance than the 18 months as an apple
farmer!
But what would be the reaction now of an officer who
was still a captain after such an extended period of regular service? Gellibrand seems to have been sustained
during this period (and other difficult periods of his life) by his ideal of
the Paladins, who were ‘not leaders of the nation so much as exemplary public
servants’. His image of them ‘was
not on of super-men, physically, mentally or morally, but rather of men without
reproach, positive doers …’ These
are ideals to which all public employees, not just military personnel, should
aspire.
The author makes an attempt to compare the two Sir
Johns (Monash and Gellibrand), and suggests that Gellibrand, in different
circumstances, might have been a competitor for the command of the Australian
Corps in 1918. However, the
comparison ignores the very factor that caused Gellibrand to miss out on a
divisional command in 1917 – the health problems, including a certain
psychological fragility, that plagued him for much of his life. The argument therefore is interesting,
but not really convincing.
Gellibrand clearly showed great skill in the commands he held, but he
also seemed to lack the physical and psychological robustness needed to sustain
a commander during extended periods of action. This problem was also evident in his post-war life.
One area where the author is convincing about
Gellibrand is in his assessment of Gellibrand the prophet (but one who suffered
from the curse of Cassandra in not being believed). Given current concerns about maintaining an Army of a
suitable size, his comment on the Squires report of 1939, ‘They will give us a
Regular Army, and at the same time make it impossible to have an Army’ has a
certain resonance. The intense
dislike of the Sandhurst graduate Gellibrand for the concept of a select
regular army officers school, because he believed the officers produced stood
aloof from the nation, also has its resonance in the 1995 Parliamentary report
on ADFA, an organisation which one of the Committee members described as a
‘military nunnery’. Truly, a
prophet is not without honour …
In summary, a good book, both for its perspective on
Australian military history, and for the insight it gives to a man who was once
well known, but now (except for a street name in the Canberra suburb of
Campbell) has largely been forgotten.
Highly recommended.
JOHN DONOVAN
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