The Australian Army, A History of its Organisation

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY, A History Of Its Organization 1901-2001

Albert Palazzo

Oxford University Press 2001

$59.95

This is an interesting book, which provides a mass of detail.  It could, however, have been a very useful book, which might have developed the knowledge and understanding of a range of players on the Defence scene – Parliamentary back-benchers, ministers, public servants in departments involved in national security affairs, and members of the ADF (particularly the Army).  The book misses out on having this value, at least in part, because the author seems not to have considered fully the bureaucratic aspects of Army administration, and also did not analyse sufficiently the tensions between full-time and part-time soldiers.  It is unfortunate that, towards the end of the book, the author also blends advocacy with his record of events.

If Dr Palazzo had discussed the bureaucratic aspects of higher levels of Army administration, the reasons for many of the events that he describes might have been clearer.  Unless strictly supervised, bureaucracies tend to move to achieve their internal aims, and to protect their internal interests.  Such tendencies are displayed in many of the episodes discussed in the book.  For example, considering the higher administration of the Army as a bureaucracy would explain more clearly the development of the coastal defence organization of 1944, depicted in Map 7 on page 157.  It is otherwise hard to understand the deployment of such a comprehensive system of coast artillery, at a time when that technology had clearly been overtaken by airpower, the Japanese threat had substantially receded, and the Army was under pressure both to reduce its total personnel numbers and to provide infantry reinforcements for the six operational divisions. 

A bureaucracy thesis also might better explain the periodic variations in command structures, with operations and administration sometimes under one authority, and at other times being separated, and the intermittent changes from a regional to a functional command system (occasionally a mixture of both).  It could also help explain the apparent inflexibility of non-field force establishments for most of the period since World War II, almost regardless of the size of the field force, that is referred to by Dr Palazzo on page 244.  Bureaucratic processes can explain these variations at least as well as Dr Palazzo’s suggestion that money was the principal factor behind the command changes.

This thesis could also explain the reluctance of some Army leaders to conform to strategic guidance.  While Dr Palazzo suggests the fault was often with governments that were insufficiently specific in their guidance, this is not the full story.  For example, Dr Palazzo notes that in 1918 the Minister, Senator Pearce, moved to revitalize the Council of Defence to ensure that ‘… the policy of the Government should be understood by the officers responsible …[and] … strategy … should conform to the policy …’  This did not seem to solve the problem.  Indeed, Dr Palazzo demonstrates that in the late 1930s, the Army leadership simply defied clear government directions to make defence against raids the principal role of the Army, with preparation of a small expeditionary force being a lesser function. 

The Army in that period regarded the subdivision of the field force into 1st and 2nd line components merely as a method of giving priority to expenditure against Army’s preferred anti-invasion force.  The reluctance of the Army during the 1970s and 1980s to make changes to conform to the Government’s emphasis on continental defence against low-level threats is a reminder that this problem might remain extant.

Dr Palazzo clearly shows that the requirement for participation in collective defence has been an ongoing issue for the Army since World War II, and has been a key foundation for the greater emphasis on regular forces.  However, he does not follow as closely the other security requirement, for local/continental defence (including provision for expansion), that long preceded the collective security requirement, and continued alongside it.  As Dr Palazzo acknowledges, even the changes to strategic guidance in the late 1990s did not downgrade the importance of the defence of the Australian mainland. 

While Dr Palazzo recognises that the Army’s organization had to be reconsidered in the light of the requirements for overseas deployments and continental defence, he does not fully address the limited changes that were made after the Defence Minister announced in the 1976 White Paper that security policy would no longer be based on the expectation that forces would serve overseas in support of another nation’s military effort, other than to note that ‘for more than a decade there was a lack of coordination between the government’s policy of self reliance and the organization of the army’.

The government’s expectation of a two-tier approach comprising ready response troops (logically, a task primarily for the regular force) and the ability to expand the force (logically, a task primarily for the part-time force) was not met.  Instead, the Army seemed to place emphasis on using the regular force as the expansion base (against its long-favoured invasion scenario, which would justify forces suited for higher intensity warfare) while allowing the ready response function to decline for a time, until the announcement of the Operational Deployment Force in 1981.  The neglect of the reserves in this period would seem to indicate that those who saw the Pentropic reorganisation and the changes after the Millar Report as active denigration of the reserve force might have had some reason for their concern, but Dr Palazzo does not address this issue.

Dr Palazzo acknowledges that the Army’s insistence on retaining its division level formations hindered changes to meet new strategic guidance.  Having moved away from the division to the brigade level, the Army remained reluctant, while the attempt by Lieutenant General Sanderson to move further under Army 21, to combined arms units, was abandoned with apparent alacrity soon after Sanderson retired.  These actions fit well with a bureaucratic model for behaviour at the higher levels of Army administration.

Another matter that Dr Palazzo discusses is the Army’s continuing desire to be able to operate alongside major allies in an expeditionary force.  This desire was not always shared by the political leaders of the time, but Dr Palazzo has described some of the methods used by Army leaders to enable them to prepare for such eventualities.  These ranged from Hutton’s Field Force proposal of 1902 to Army’s concealment of the full implications of the Army Development Guide from the Government in the mid-1980s.  Another constant was apparent in the Hutton proposal – the insensitive style adopted in proposing changes to community based part-time units, which would be seen again during the Pentropic debacle of the 1960s and after the Millar Report.

Although Dr Palazzo mentions often the long standing (and ongoing) tensions between Staff Corps and militia/regular and citizen soldier, he does not look deeply enough into them.  A full understanding of these tensions is fundamental to understanding many of the decisions that have brought the Army to where it is now, and would also point to the direction it is likely to prefer in the future under the bureaucracy thesis. 

This lack of understanding is also reflected in Dr Palazzo’s ‘national characteristics of army organization’, which omit the strong emphasis on voluntarism that has been particularly applicable to Australian forces deployed overseas (and he does not really emphasise the frequent enthusiasm of the Army’s leaders for compulsory overseas service, starting with General Hutton and continuing through the proposal in the late 1950s to provide almost 70 percent of the regular field force through national service, to at least the 1970s).  The issue of full-time/part-time tensions is one that could usefully be addressed by a volume in the Army History Series.  During World War II, it even had its own sub-theme among the non-regulars, with tensions between the AIF and the militia.

Dr Palazzo does cover many of the more recent incidents causing tension between the two parts of the Army.  He correctly nominates the changed strategic environment after World War II, with its requirements for higher readiness forces available to support collective security, as a valid reason for the increasing influence of the regulars.  However, Dr Palazzo does not really address the neglect of the continental defence requirement, particularly in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, when continental defence in circumstances involving longer warning time provided suitable tasks for part-time units, particularly in defence of vital installations.  Dr Palazzo could also have inquired more deeply into the Army’s apparent reluctance to rebuild the part-time force during that period, compared with the apparent enthusiasm in cutting it back from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s (after the Millar Report) when the emphasis was on collective security tasks overseas at shorter notice.

Dr Palazzo notes the drastic effect of the Pentropic reorganisation on the part-time force, but concludes that the reorganisation was not simply a plot to destroy the CMF.  Perhaps true, but he acknowledges that it is hard to find a good reason for it.  However, if the Pentropic reorganisation was an anti-CMF plot, it must be acknowledged that it also had adverse effects on the regular force, detailed on page 264, and producing units not compatible with either of Australia’s major allies.  To state, on page 251, that the most important motivation for an ill-considered reorganisation that had such adverse effects on the Army was ‘the army’s leaders simply believed that some form of reorganisation was essential’ reflects poorly on them.

Given the strategic circumstances of the 1960s, an increased reliance on the regular force was both inevitable and appropriate, and it could probably be accepted that the changes were not just a conspiracy to downgrade the citizen soldier.  However, the insensitive implementation, described by Dr Palazzo, and the approach taken to the traditional infantry units of the CMF (from an organization that usually guards its traditions jealously) were almost guaranteed to arouse resentment.  In the end, heritage has almost won, as every Army Reserve infantry battalion now uses a traditional number or linked numbers (albeit within the State Regiments).  One numbered unit (51st Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment) even operates outside the State Regiment system.  Perhaps it is time for Army to make a gesture of reconciliation to the part-time force, and return fully to the traditional infantry units. 

In contrast to the Pentropic reorganisation, the Millar Report could have had beneficial effects for the Army, if implemented sensitively.  However, as Dr Palazzo indicates, again this did not occur, with the 70 percent target being altered in a manner that made the survival of many Reserve units virtually impossible.  Such a deliberate ‘raising of the barrier’ might have disturbed even the least paranoid reservist (particularly as the regular force did not seem to wish to apply this same standard to its own units during the later ‘core force’ period).  Overall, Dr Palazzo’s phrase on page 307, ‘callous indifference’, well illustrates the approach of the regulars to the part-time force from Pentropic to Millar.

Dr Palazzo also shows clearly the lack of interest by the Army in cadets, particularly just after World War II and in the early 1970s.  However, he does not comment on the strong support in the Army for the cadets in the late 1980s/1990s, when cadets had to be revitalised, because they were found to be a cost-effective form of recruitment.  It could also be asked whether the destruction of the regionally based system of reserve infantry units will prove to be as bad an error of judgment as the downgrading of cadets, particularly post-Millar, as the Army reduced its links with the community, with the potential flow on effect on recruitment.

The development of a force of individual reserves for the Army has been another element in the tensions between full-time and part-time soldiers.  Army units seem likely always to need some additional personnel on deployment, even if only to replace those temporarily unavailable for medical or other reasons.  As Dr Palazzo shows, the issue was raised as early as General Hamilton’s 1914 visit as Inspector-General of the Overseas forces, and it was a key task placed on the Army in 1916, by the then Minister.

Despite a major review in the mid-1960s, as late as the 1980s, Army still had not developed a well-structured individual regular reserve force, and for the Timor operation used the formed units of the part-time force as a source of individual replacements.  The willingness of those reserves to serve would seem to be a tribute to people who will simply not allow themselves to be discouraged, although why a full-time force of around 24,000 needed to call on the reserves to meet a second rotation of around 5000 is perhaps worthy of further investigation.

A constant theme in the book is Australia’s reliance on the maritime strength of a major power for the ultimate security of the continent.  Dr Palazzo traces this theme effectively, but like many critics of the inter-war reliance on the Singapore strategy, he seems to miss the reality that in the event, the Army was not the ultimate guarantor of the continent.  That role was played in World War II by the maritime strength of a major power; however, it was the US Navy at the Coral Sea and Midway, not the Royal Navy operating from Singapore.  Whether the Army’s anti-invasion force would have been effective remained untested.

Dr Palazzo has a major concern with budget pressure as a factor in Defence planning.  This concern is understandable, given the position of advocate for the Army that he sometimes takes.  However, some of the plans put forward by the Army’s leaders would have damaged the national economy if implemented (the post-World War I scheme for an Army with a war establishment of around 300,000, Lieutenant General Rowell’s for a permanent force of almost 34,000 personnel after World War II, and the bid for a post-Vietnam full time force of 55,000 to 60,000 are examples).

Dr Palazzo seems unwilling to judge these bids in a wider context, and was particularly critical of the Chifley government’s reaction to the Rowell proposal.  He seemed surprised that a government should have higher priorities at the end of an exhausting war than preparing immediately for another war.  However, he endorses the 1920 estimate of the senior officers that Australia could only support a maximum of five infantry and two cavalry divisions as being still applicable in the 1940s, and implicitly criticises the wartime Curtin government for attempting to maintain a much larger force, so apparently giving more emphasis to economic factors at a time of crisis than he does in peacetime. 

Dr Palazzo also seems to have some difficulty with the pressure placed on the Army to operate efficiently, suggesting that effectiveness is more important.  The reviewer was personally involved in many of the reform programs of the 1990s, and can attest that improving ADF capability was always the principal aim.  The target was not efficiency at all costs, but efficient effectiveness.  It is surely not unreasonable to recognize that, while strategic circumstances may set the objective, some account must be taken of economic reality if the costs of defending the realm are not themselves to cause its downfall, as eventually happened to the Soviet Union.

Again, in missing the theme of Army as a bureaucracy, Dr Palazzo may not have understood (or, at least, has not really demonstrated) why some reforms made by the Army in the latter part of the century had already been considered internally by Army, but not implemented.  In the end, reforms only took place because of strict financial pressure put on the Army (and the other Services).  To the extent that the changes might have been less than optimum because of the way they were implemented, the Army’s leadership must accept some responsibility for not moving first to eliminate waste and redirect assets to high priority tasks.  As Dr Palazzo acknowledges, many reforms that ultimately occurred did have operational benefits.

Dr Palazzo’s advocacy for the Army sometimes seems to lead him into error.  On page 348, he states that ‘it was the army that bore the brunt of the necessary cutbacks … Armies are labour-intensive institutions, whereas the other services have more inflexible personnel levels …’  However, according to the Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020, the biggest percentage cut in personnel numbers between 1990 and 2000 was in the Air Force (35 percent), with the Army being cut by 22 percent.  The cut in Navy personnel numbers, at 18.5 percent, was not far behind that for the Army. 

Some of the charts can be quite annoying, with their use of unexplained acronyms.  There are also some minor errors, such as the reference to a 39th Infantry Brigade on page 152, and to a 31st/52nd Battalion on page 177, which was probably the 31st/51st Battalion.

Dr Palazzo concludes that the Army ‘has become a a force composed of skilled, well-armed and –led professionals and an institution possessing a rich tradition of battle honour and excellence’.  The emphasis on ‘professionals’ suggests that he does not see the reserves as a full part of the Army – which might accord with the view of many regulars, but not with Government guidance.  And, in defiance of those traditions, the Army chose to treat units that earned many of its battle honours insensitively (at best) during its processes of reform.

Dr Palazzo mentions that in 1901, the committee of officers who drafted the first version of the Defence Act attempted to have the Army made independent of government control, by having the senior officer report to the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief.  In 2001, the then minister made several speeches to emphasise the accountability of the ADF to Parliament, through the minister, with the constitutional role of the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief being carried out only on the advice of ministers.  Apparently, after 100 years, strange ideas about the position of the armed forces in a democracy still persist!

An earlier volume of the Army History Series is a biography of Major General Sir John Gellibrand.  That former regular officer of the British Army, and later esteemed leader in the 1st AIF, commented on the plan in 1939 to raise a permanent combat force as follows: ‘[t]hey will give us a Regular Army and at the same time make it impossible to have an Army’ (The Paladin, OUP 2000, page 246).  He was also concerned that the change would relegate the citizen soldier to the position of an ‘also ran’.  Sixty years after Gellibrand’s comment, Australia has a small regular force, which shows signs of disdain for its part-time element, and remains at times reluctant to conform to the Government’s strategic guidelines.  One must ask whether such an Army will be able to develop the ‘Soul of Battle’ referred to by the American historian Victor Davis Hanson in his study of the armies of the Theban general Epaminondas, and the Americans William Tecumseh Sherman and George S. Patton.

JOHN DONOVAN