A PRINCIPAL ROLE
FOR THE ARMY RESERVES? – A CAPABILITY FOR AUSTRALIAN HOMELAND DEFENCE
John Donovan
Part I - Historical, Strategic and Administrative
Background
Introduction
On 1 March 1901, the Australian
Army came into being, when the Governor-General transferred control of the new
nation’s military forces from the states to the federal government.[i] The Defence Act 1903 established the
legal basis for the new force, and specified that personnel must specifically
volunteer to serve outside Australian territory. This essentially limited the function of the Army to the
defence of Australian territory.
The arguments between the
government of Prime Minister Edmund Barton and a committee of senior officers
established to draft the Defence Bill are canvassed fully by John Mordike.[ii] Suffice to say that the government
strongly rejected any proposals that would have permitted the automatic
deployment of the Army on Imperial tasks.
This restriction stood until 1950, when the Defence Act was amended to
provide for the raising of infantry units in a Regular Army whose members all
volunteer for unrestricted service.[iii] However, the government refused to
modify the section in the Defence Act requiring other members of the Army to
volunteer individually for overseas service.[iv] This position was not changed in
relation to the Army Reserve until further amendments were made to the Defence
Act in 2001.
Since World War II, the balance
between regulars and active reserves (part-time citizen soldiers) in the
Australian Army has moved decisively towards the regulars. These changes, well documented by
Albert Palazzo, were inevitable, as an essentially part-time force could not
meet the demand for forces to be available for deployment at short notice on
collective security operations.
However, what is also clear from Palazzo’s work is the extent to which,
since World War II, the Army Reserve was allowed (indeed, probably at times
encouraged) to decline in strength and military capability, and has gradually
been excluded from a specific role in national defence. This is not necessarily an optimum
solution for Australia. David
Horner has noted the need for the ‘flexibility of thought … not always found in
the professional soldier’.[v] Horner also notes the benefit that
militia (Reserve) officers gained as they ‘honed their organisational and
leadership skills in the hard school of commerce and industry’.[vi] The availability of simple numbers is
also an important issue. On 5
August 2005, CDF told the Senior Leadership Group that Defence needs to
‘concentrate on some of the very demanding longer term demographic issues here
in Australia’.[vii]
In essence, for the first half of
its history the Army, which was then essentially a part-time force, was
intended primarily to defend Australian territory. Specific forces were raised for each overseas
operation. Following changes to
the Defence Act in 1950, while the Regular Army also had a territorial defence
function, it was available to contribute to, and was used in support of,
collective security arrangements.
However, almost to the present day, the Army Reserve and its
predecessors remained committed primarily to the defence of Australian
territory.
Aim
This two-part paper reviews
current arrangements for the ground defence of the Australian people and
territory, and proposes changes to strengthen them, while still keeping forces
available for collective security in collaboration with Australia’s allies and
the United Nations.
Part I focuses on the events that
led to the current situation, and looks at the likely nature of future war,
while Part II (to be published in ADFJ 170) proposes a rejuvenated role for the
Reserves focusing on homeland defence, against the background of changes in
Australia’s demographic profile.
Strategic Guidance
Strategic guidance was set out in
the 2000 Defence White Paper. This
states that the:
priority task for the ADF is the defence of
Australia. … The second priority for the ADF is contributing to the security of
our immediate neighbourhood. … The third priority for Australia’s forces is
supporting Australia’s wider interests and objectives by being able to
contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises
beyond our immediate neighbourhood. … In addition to these core tasks in
support of Australia’s strategic objectives, the ADF will also be called upon
to undertake a number of regular or occasional tasks in support of peacetime
national tasks … as well as ad hoc support to wider community needs.[viii]
To a large degree, the priority
for the defence of Australia has remained consistent since 1901. The Army was established originally as
a territorial defence force, which could not readily be deployed overseas. While collective security was seen as
the critical factor in post-war defence planning, the requirements of
territorial defence remained important even when the Regular Army was
established.[ix]
Even when the government began to
give more emphasis to collective security, following the publication of the
1997 Defence White Paper[x], the tasks
listed on page 29 of that document remained in essentially the same order, as
‘[d]efeating attacks on Australia, defending our regional interests, and
supporting our global interests.’
However, the 1997 White Paper also advised, on page 41, that
‘preparedness levels will be determined more by the requirements of regional
operations and deployment in support of global interests … than by the needs of
defeating attacks on Australia.’
An effect of this somewhat
contradictory qualifier was to provide a reason to re-emphasise the readiness
of the full-time force, and give the Reserves the role of supporting the
Regular Army in regional operations and deployments in support of global
interests. This change has
probably been to the detriment of both territorial defence and an expansion
base.
The 2000 White Paper moved the
focus of the ADF further away from expansion, emphasising that we ‘need to be
realistic about the amount of warning we might receive of the need to use our
armed forces.’ The White Paper
states that ‘except in the case of a major attack on Australia we cannot assume
that we would receive enough warning … to significantly expand existing
[capabilities]’. For that reason,
White Paper guidance is to ‘maintain in fully developed form the capabilities
that would be necessary to achieve key tasks’, but ‘we do not need to keep our
forces constantly at the highest pitch of readiness for operations.’[xi]
Recent developments in government
guidance have continued this process.
The 2003 Defence Update accepted that ‘the threat of direct military
attack on Australia is less than it was in 2000 … [but] the strategic advantage
offered by our geography does not … protect Australia from the scourge of
terrorism.’[xii] The Update sees ‘ADF involvement in coalition
operations further afield as more likely than in the recent past’, and seeks a
‘more flexible and mobile force, with sufficient levels of readiness and
sustainability to achieve outcomes in the national interest’.[xiii]
Defence Against What?
While there has been a consistent
thread in strategic guidance that gives priority to the defence of Australian
territory, there has also been an ongoing debate about the scale of threat to
be countered. In 1889, Major
General Sir James Edwards proposed that the Australian colonies should be able
to collectively field a force of ‘30,000 to 40,000 men [who] could be rapidly
concentrated to oppose an attack, upon any of the chief cities.’[xiv] Clearly, a force of this size was
intended to repel a limited invasion of some part of Australia. However, by 1902, the [British]
Colonial Defence Committee expressed the belief that the only real threat to
Australian security was raids against centres of population and commerce.[xv] In 1904, the Colonial Defence Committee
confirmed its earlier opinion, basing it on the maritime dominance of the Royal
Navy.[xvi]
This advice set in place one of
the constants of Australian strategic guidance and military objectives – the
objective of controlling the maritime environment (‘sea-air gap’ since the
1980s) as a means of limiting the scale of threat to Australian territory. It also set in place another constant,
as the commander of the Commonwealth naval forces, Captain Creswell, argued for
an enhanced naval capability, at the expense of the Army, to ensure the defence
of Australia.[xvii] Since the 1940s, the Royal Navy’s
position of maritime dominance in our region has been taken over by the United
States Navy.
During the 1920s and 1930s,
defence planning in Australia was largely based on the Singapore strategy,
which proposed that the Royal Navy, operating from the new base at Singapore,
would ensure the security of the continent from invasion.[xviii] The Army’s leaders doubted the value of
this strategy from the beginning, and ‘continued to make defence against
invasion their primary planning and training priority’.[xix] There were controversies when some
senior soldiers challenged the dependence on foreign naval power.[xx] However, the government stood by the
strategy, and emphasised that the priority was for defence against raids rather
than invasion.[xxi]
The criticisms of the Singapore
strategy (particularly concerns that the Royal Navy might be occupied with a
European war when needed, and thus unable to deploy to Singapore in appropriate
strength) had validity. In the
ultimate, however, Australia’s security from invasion during World War II was
ensured by maritime power, albeit by the United States Navy at the battles of
the Coral Sea and Midway, not by the Royal Navy operating from the Singapore
base. While major Australian land
forces were prepared and deployed across the continent during World War II,
their capability to defend Australia against invasion was not tested.
Since World War II, concerns
about a major invasion of the continent have not formed part of strategic
guidance. The collapse of the
Soviet Union removed the one country that might have been able to ‘sponsor’ a
regional nation in developing an invasion capability, confirming that there is no
current requirement to prepare forces to meet a large-scale invasion of
Australian territory in either the short or medium term. The likely levels of attack discussed
in strategic guidance essentially focus on raids of varying strength, not major
invasion.
While the terminology used has
changed over the years, the different possible levels of raids can be related
to the descriptions set out in some detail in the Dibb Review[xxii]. These ranged from air harassment and
minor incursions or raids of up to company strength on isolated communities
(avoiding direct military confrontation with Australian forces) to a possible
attempt at a lodgement on Australian territory. To these must be added the enhanced threat of terrorist
attack by individuals or sub-national or non-state groups, following events
since September 2001.
The
raids or harassment by state forces postulated by Dibb would have been limited
largely to the northern parts of Australia, because of the realities of
geography. Now, the threat of
terrorist attack, particularly by non-state forces, extends across the whole
nation, with major centres in southern Australia generally offering more
attractive targets. The asymmetric
form of terrorist threats means that protection must be provided for these targets. In the early 1970s, a British officer described
a function of homeland defence as follows:
‘defend[ing]
the homeland against foreign aggression’ … is taken to mean the prevention of
any person not of British [read ‘Australian’] nationality entering [the]
country in any form of military, or para-military, organisation, and using
force of arms to interfere with the daily life of the citizens of the country.[xxiii]
The term homeland defence has a
wider meaning than territorial defence, but is probably more apposite following
events since September 2001.
Homeland defence will be used in this paper when referring to the
proposed future roles of the Army, and particularly the Army Reserve.
In addition to defence against
the threat or actions of the armed forces of foreign governments, homeland
defence also includes the provision of aid to the civil power. This aid is activated only when the
problem cannot be managed within the resources normally available to the civil
police. It does not include
responding to the activities of criminal individuals or organisations, but is
limited only to those circumstances where foreign individuals or organisations
act in ways that threaten the security or stability of Australia and its
people.
Military and
police functions must be distinguished clearly when identifying a role for the
Army in homeland defence. It is
possible to end up defining everything as a police task (indeed, Baynes
discussed and rejected this option[xxiv]) but
there is a valid military role in homeland defence. In simple terms, while the ethos of the police is to
arrest the miscreant, that of the military is to kill the enemy. (However, the Australian police
services are currently the only professional bodies in Australia authorised to
use lethal force in the performance of their daily duties without reference to
a higher authority.)
These two
functions need to be kept separate, to avoid having police who are too quick to
shoot or soldiers who are reluctant to squeeze the trigger. Military force should be used only
where the task goes clearly beyond criminal activity. Baynes emphasised that:
a body must be of some size, or have a military aim, before
its entry becomes a defence problem.
Three gangsters entering the country purely in search of loot do not
constitute a defence threat; on the other hand, three highly-organised
[terrorists] bent on destruction … would constitute such a threat.[xxv]
Work by the Israeli author Martin
van Creveld supports this approach.
He sees the attempt by states to monopolise ‘official’ violence
faltering, with nation states decreasingly able to fight each other. (The capacity of most states to fight
the United States on a conventional battlefield is even more limited). In van Creveld’s view, this points to
low intensity operations as the future of warfare.[xxvi] He considers conventional military
organizations ‘hardly even relevant’ for this predominant form of contemporary
war.[xxvii] In particular, van Creveld sees the
‘professional’ model of armed forces as little better than a prescription for
defeat.[xxviii] The form of warfare foreseen by van
Creveld is likely to have more in common with medieval or tribal warfare than
with conventional war, particularly where non-state forces are involved.
Van Creveld is by no means the
first to suggest that the nature of warfare is different to that for which
major armies have prepared. As
long ago as 1974, the retired French General Andre Beaufre concluded that ‘we
are very far from a return to the conventional warfare of the pre-atomic period
… The natural modern form of conventional war is the limited war’ (emphasis
in original).[xxix] Similarly, the retired British General
Sir Frank Kitson concluded in 1987 that ‘conventional forces exist in the
nuclear age mainly for the purpose of gaining time for negotiation rather than
to win wars. … it is still possible for a country to pursue its interests by
fostering insurgency’.[xxx] The same possibility applies to
non-state organizations using terrorism.
The thesis that conventional war
is no longer a viable instrument of policy has had a long gestation, but the
evidence in its support is mounting.
That the 1991 Gulf War followed the writing of van Creveld’s book might
be considered to invalidate the thesis that conventional warfare may be ‘at its
last gasp’.[xxxi] This is not necessarily so. Rather, the Gulf War might have been a
final example of large-scale conventional war, just as the Battle of the
Surigao Strait in October 1944 was the last clash of big gun warships, adding a
footnote to the story of the battleship’s effective removal from the first line
of battle by 1942, after Taranto, Pearl Harbour and Midway.
Certainly, the patterns of
conflicts since 1991 in the Balkans, Africa and Asia have been closer to those
forecast by van Creveld than to the World Wars or the 1991 Gulf War. The capability for conventional
operations will linger on, but its usefulness, particularly against members of
the Western alliance system, is likely to be limited. In the 2003 Iraq War, the scale of conventional clashes between
the Coalition forces and Iraqi forces, even the ‘elite’ Republican Guard, was
very limited, again suggesting that likely opponents have recognised the
futility of attempting to prevail on the conventional battlefield. It is perhaps noteworthy that since
1973, the Arab ‘front line states’ have avoided battlefield confrontation with
Israel. They may have been the
first to move to ‘post-modern’ warfare.
The development of modern
conventional strategy took place at the time that crew-operated weapons began
to dominate operations in the field.[xxxii] These weapons have now evolved into the
multi-million dollar helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces
of modern armies. The cost of
purchasing and operating these weapons in militarily significant numbers now
places them beyond the reach of all but a few major powers, leaving the lesser
powers to develop different forms of warfare. Van Creveld forecasts a move away from today’s large,
expensive, powerful machines.[xxxiii] He expects that future weapons will be
less sophisticated, and that the belligerents may be intermingled with each
other and with the civilian population.[xxxiv]
Events following 11 September
2001 in the United States have shown a clear need for large numbers of trained
personnel for homeland defence against the kinds of warfare postulated by van
Creveld. The high cost of
full-time personnel, and the need to use more broadly trained full-time
personnel as mobile reaction or pre-emption forces, indicates that these
numbers will not be available from the Regular Army. As well as reductions in available numbers as Australia’s
demography changes, there is also apparently a growing reluctance to serve for
extended periods in full-time forces, leading to proposals such as that
recently mooted to recruit Pacific Islanders, effectively as mercenaries.[xxxv] While there might be a need to retain
the capability for conventional operations, it is debatable whether this should
be the first priority or be at the highest level of readiness.
The total homeland defence
function is not appropriate for the police; therefore some personnel for it
must be drawn from military organisations, including Reserve forces. The relevant level of operations should
be within the capabilities of Reserves, who in many cases will also have the
advantage of knowing the area in which they fight, and that they are defending
their families and homes. These
personnel do not need to be organised to fight conventional operations.
To meet the demands of the White
Paper, they will have to be available in the form of fully developed
units. These units might, however,
be substantially different to the current Reserve organisation. The emphasis could be on infantry,
light reconnaissance, field engineer, construction, and communications roles,
but with limited logistics support (as they might usually operate in their
local area or in a major Australian centre of population).
Strategic guidance has made it
clear that, to use the words of a former Chief of Army, the Army does not need
to prepare for a ‘100 year flood’.[xxxvi] However, to continue the weather
analogy, strategic guidance does support preparations against a cyclone or
thunderstorm.
Arrangements for the Defence of Australian Territory Since World War II
For the first half century of its
existence, the legislated role of the Army was territorial defence. Troops could be deployed beyond
Australian territory only after specifically volunteering for a
contingency. When the post-war
Regular Army was established, it included a full-time brigade group, while the
part-time Citizen Military Forces (CMF) element (predecessor to the Army
Reserve) had a force structure of two infantry divisions, an infantry brigade
group, an armoured brigade group and selected corps units.[xxxvii]
Although the Chief of the General
Staff (CGS, now CA) of the time had intended the CMF formations to be available
for overseas deployments (collective security), the government refused to make
the necessary amendments to the Defence Act, perforce confining them to
territorial defence.[xxxviii] Only the Regular brigade group was to
be immediately available for unrestricted service. After the withdrawal from Vietnam, the end of National
Service, and the return of the last Regular battalion from Malaysia, priority
for over 25 years moved from collective security towards self-reliant
territorial defence.
Thus, during the period from the
Korean War until the withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, the Regular Army
(supplemented by K Force in Korea and National Service in Vietnam) provided
Australia’s contributions to collective security, while the CMF and later the
Army Reserve remained bound by legislation primarily to the defence of
Australian territory. In 1988,
changes were made to the Defence Act to allow callout of the Reserves short of a
defence emergency, but legislation to protect their employment was not passed,
reducing the usefulness of the change.[xxxix]
There seems little evidence,
however, that specific plans were made to use the CMF/Army Reserve formations
for territorial defence before the late 1980s. For most of the 1950s, those formations were heavily
involved in the National Service Training Scheme, while the Government’s
defence policy remained one of forward defence until the early 1970s. There is almost a sense that, for the CMF
in the 1950s and 1960s, it was a case of ‘we’re here because we’re here because
we’re here’.
After the 1976 White Paper[xl],
when the Minister announced that the government would no longer base its
security policy on the expectation that Australian forces would serve overseas
in support of another nation’s military effort[xli],
there might have been the expectation that specific plans for territorial
defence would be prepared, and exercised.
Again, there seems little evidence of this happening until the late
1980s, when, following the Dibb Review, vital asset protection became for a
time the primary focus of Army’s planning for its Reserves.[xlii] However, this function does not seem to
receive much emphasis now.
The Army’s current limited focus
on territorial defence is surprising, in view of its long-standing interest in
the subject (which amounted at times during the 1930s to insubordinate defiance
of Government directions[xliii]). During the 1930s, senior Army officers
regularly challenged Australia’s reliance on the Singapore strategy, and at
least one officer was transferred to a more junior position for publicly doing
so.[xliv]
Implications for the Army of Strategic Guidance and Recent Events
The principal strategic reasons
for the increased emphasis on the Regular Army since World War II are the
second and third priority tasks set out in strategic guidance, contributing to
the security of our immediate neighbourhood and supporting Australia’s wider
interests and objectives. The
short notice likely for these tasks (exemplified by East Timor and the War on
Terror) effectively mandates that the initial response must be made primarily
by fully trained forces. For that
reason, there is an ongoing requirement for a Regular Army of significant size. However, some redistribution of
functions between the Regular and Reserve elements of the Army might be
appropriate.
A review in the later 1980s
looked at the functions to be performed by the ADF. The Wrigley report[xlv]
considered that ‘sovereignty defence’ forces drawing on community support might
be appropriate for Australia.
These forces would include ‘a core of military professionals who provide
the military planning and management expertise, direct the training, and carry
out most of the peacetime constabulary tasks which arise.’[xlvi]
While Wrigley proposed that
‘peacetime and constabulary tasks could be met … by full-time regular forces’,[xlvii]
it would be a retrograde step to move away from a system that permits Reserves
to be used to supplement and support Regular forces deployed on collective
security activities. There are
clear roles for Reserves in these activities. Indeed, some specialists whose skills cannot be maintained
readily in the full-time forces may be required for early deployment
(specialist doctors are an example).
There is also a valid role for the Reserves in providing rotation
forces.
Palazzo’s book has used the East
Timor experience to ‘raise, once again, the question of the ultimate purpose
and utility of the reserve organization.’[xlviii] This was in the context of the Army not
having deployed any formed Reserve units in East Timor. However, this suggestion ignores the
ongoing priority in strategic guidance for a homeland defence force. If the Regular Army is to focus
principally on short notice collective security tasks, some other force must
focus on homeland defence.
Reserves are the obvious choice.
Under strategic guidance, the
priority task for the ADF (including the Army) remains the defence of
Australia, as it has since 1901.
The 2000 White Paper sets out clearly the requirement for land forces:
that can
operate as part of a joint force to control the approaches to Australia and
respond effectively to any armed incursion on to Australian territory (emphasis
added). These forces will also
have the capability to contribute substantially to supporting the security of
our immediate neighbourhood and to contribute to coalition operations further
afield, in lower intensity operations.[xlix]
A conventional attack on
Australia is currently very unlikely.
Responding to an armed low-level incursion on to Australian territory,
particularly by non-state terrorist groups, and providing security against the
threat of terrorist action, are tasks that suit Reserve forces. The level of threat is unlikely to be
equivalent to that which would be met in a conventional war, and there is a
range of tasks in homeland defence that can be carried out with less initial
training than that received by full-time forces, which must be ready for short
notice deployment to high threat areas.
These tasks could be assigned to
Reserve forces as a primary role, or on initial call out while they complete
their training to unrestricted deployment standard. Within a few months after call out, there should be no
remaining distinctions in training standards between Regular and Reserve units.
The Problem
No democracy has shown itself
able in recent years to maintain full-time forces of sufficient size to meet
all likely contingencies, both on cost grounds, and for lack of people willing
to spend extended periods of full-time service waiting for the occurrence of a
contingency. For example, the 1987
Canadian Defence White Paper concluded that Canada’s all-volunteer full-time
force had become too expensive.[l] Our principal allies have all concluded
that there are definite roles for part-time forces, at a range of readiness
levels. These forces both support
full-time forces on short notice deployments and prepare for less likely or
less demanding contingencies, at a reasonable cost. Part II will discuss a proposal for the greater use of Reserves
by the Australian Army for homeland defence.
John Donovan worked in the Department of Defence for
over 32 years, principally in the fields of intelligence, force development and
resource management. He also
served for several years in the Australian Army Reserve, rising through the
ranks from Private to Lieutenant.
NOTES
[i] Albert Palazzo, 2001, The
Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901-2001, Oxford University
Press, South Melbourne, page 14.
[ii] John Mordike, 1992, An
Army for a Nation, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, Chapter 4.
[iii] Jeffrey Grey, 2001, The
Australian Army Volume I, The Australian Centenary History of Defence,
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, page 178.
[iv]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 206.
[v] D.M. Horner, 1978, Crisis
of Command, Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943, Australian
National University Press, Canberra, page xvii.
[vi]
Horner, Crisis of Command, page 273.
[vii] ACM A. Houston, October
2005, Address to the Defence Senior Leadership Group, published in
Defence Force Journal, Number 168.
[viii] Commonwealth of Australia,
2000, Defence 2000 Our Future Defence Force, pages XI-XII.
[ix]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 194.
[x]
Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, Australia’s Strategic Policy.
[xi]
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000, page 55.
[xii] Commonwealth of Australia,
2003, Australia’s National Security A Defence Update 2003, page 9.
[xiii]
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security, pages 23, 24.
[xiv]
quoted in Mordike, An Army for a Nation, page 13.
[xv]
Mordike, An Army for a Nation, page 119.
[xvi]
Mordike, An Army for a Nation, page 168.
[xvii]
Mordike, An Army for a Nation, pages 167 and 168.
[xviii]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, pages 111 to 123.
[xix]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 118.
[xx] Gavin Long, 1952, To
Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, pages 19, 20.
[xxi]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 123.
[xxii] Paul Dibb, 1986, Review
of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian Government Publishing
Service, pages 52 to 55.
[xxiii] LTCOL J.C.M. Baynes, 1972, The
Soldier in Modern Society, Eyre Methuen, London, page 14.
[xxiv]
Baynes, The Soldier in Modern Society, page 15.
[xxv]
Baynes, The Soldier in Modern Society, page 14.
[xxvi] Martin van Creveld, 1991, The
Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York, page 192.
[xxvii]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 20.
[xxviii]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 191.
[xxix] Andre Beaufre, 1974, Strategy
for Tomorrow, Macdonald and Jane’s, London, page 11.
[xxx] Frank Kitson, 1987, Warfare
as a Whole, Faber and Faber, London, page 11.
[xxxi]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 205.
[xxxii]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 208.
[xxxiii]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 210.
[xxxiv]
van Creveld, The Transformation of War, page 212.
[xxxv]
The Australian, 14 September 2005.
[xxxvi]
Lieutenant General F. Hickling, cited in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, From Phantom to Force, Towards a
More Efficient and Effective Army, Commonwealth of Australia, page 181.
[xxxvii]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 206.
[xxxviii]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 206.
[xxxix]
Grey, The Australian Army, pages 238, 239.
[xl] Commonwealth of Australia,
1976, Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service.
[xli]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 311.
[xlii]
Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, page 154.
[xliii]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 119.
[xliv]
Long, To Benghazi, page 19.
[xlv] Alan Wrigley, 1990, The
Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defence,
Australian Government Publishing Service.
[xlvi]
Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, page 499.
[xlvii]
Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, page 501.
[xlviii]
Palazzo, The Australian Army, page 370.
[xlix]
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000, page 54.
[l]
Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, page 247.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
LTCOL J.C.M.
Baynes, 1972, The Soldier in Modern Society, Eyre Methuen, London
Andre
Beaufre, 1974, Strategy for Tomorrow, Macdonald and Jane’s, London
Commonwealth
of Australia, 1976, Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing
Service
Commonwealth
of Australia, 2003, Australia’s National Security A Defence Update 2003
Commonwealth
of Australia, 1997, Australia’s Strategic Policy
Commonwealth
of Australia, 2000, Defence 2000 Our Future Defence Force
Paul Dibb,
1986, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian Government
Publishing Service
Jeffrey Grey,
2001, The Australian Army Volume I, The Australian Centenary History of
Defence, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne
D.M. Horner,
1978, Crisis of Command, Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat,
1941-1943, Australian National University Press, Canberra
ACM A.
Houston, October 2005, Address to the Defence Senior Leadership Group,
published in Defence Force Journal, Number 168
Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, From Phantom
to Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, Commonwealth
of Australia
Frank Kitson,
1987, Warfare as a Whole, Faber and Faber, London
Gavin Long,
1952, To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra
John Mordike,
1992, An Army for a Nation, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney
Albert
Palazzo, 2001, The Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901-2001,
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne
Martin van
Creveld, 1991, The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York
Alan Wrigley,
1990, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s
Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service
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