ALAMEIN The Australian Story

Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley

Oxford University Press 2002

It is a sad commentary on the state of history teaching in Australia that very few people under the age of around forty would be likely to recognise the word ‘Alamein’, much less know its significance.  This book might go some distance towards rectifying that deficiency.  However, its value is not just for the historically uninitiated.  It also includes some lessons for the Army of today, particularly in relation to the way it ‘selects its talent’.

The book covers more than the battle that commenced on 23 October 1942.  It ranges across the whole period from July to early November 1942, during which there were three periods of intense action.  In July occurred the battle sometimes referred to as First Alamein, which was dubbed by the British Battle Honours Committee the Battle of Ruweisat, but which to many Australians of the era was known as Tel el Eisa: they did not fight at Ruweisat.  Then came Rommel’s last attempt to break through, at Alam Halfa at the end of August/early September, and finally the culminating battle, from 23 October to early November 1942.

While these three periods are often described as separate battles (particularly the October period, which Montgomery effectively claimed as his own, and attempted to separate from the earlier engagements), the authors show how they were parts of a single campaign.  By bringing the whole period into focus, Johnston and Stanley put Montgomery’s offensive in a better context (albeit one that probably detracts from Montgomery’s self-image of the October battle). 

For example, we can see that the British tactical deficiencies of the earlier period were continued into the October battle, despite Montgomery’s claims to have rectified them.  Indeed, as far back as late 1941, the British were apparently disconcerted to find that Australian units were ‘tending to draw away … in matters of … doctrine’.  Somehow the obvious solution, to correct their faulty doctrine, did not seem to occur to them!

The whole matter of tactical doctrine illuminates the issue of the selection of a new commander for XXX Corps, where Leese was selected over Morshead, Freyberg and Tuker – although the authors do not emphasise the point.  Montgomery’s belief that Morshead was unsuitable because in his view only generals who had ‘devoted [their] entire life to soldiering’ were suitable for higher command overlooked the fallibility, indeed unsuitability, of too many such officers. 

It was, after all, such generals who had produced the defective defensive dispositions at Gazala, and initially at Alamein, where positions were sited too far apart for mutual support.  They also often proved unable to coordinate effectively the action of the different arms on the battlefield, not just before Montgomery’s arrival, but also during the October battle.  Given the problems he had during that battle with some of his [regular] generals, Montgomery might then have done better to select commanders on the basis of proven performance, rather than ‘old school tie’.  However, not only the British were prey to poor coordination.  German counterattacks against 9th Division on 1 November were not concentrated, and were ‘beaten in detail’ – as the British had been at Gazala.

The different views of regulars and wartime citizen soldiers are perhaps also shown by the reaction of the GOC of 51st Highland Division to the less than formal approach of the 9th Division personnel who mentored the Highlanders after their arrival in the desert.  He did not like their standards of battle discipline, and instructed his brigade and unit commanders to ensure they were not copied.  Thus, as the battle commenced, the Highlanders were observed advancing with ‘brasses polished’ – all the easier for Axis troops to spot them!  Their casualties, particularly in officers, were heavy during the initial attacks.

The book highlights some tragedies that were probably unnecessary, particularly the loss of the 2/28th Battalion at Ruin Ridge, after another failure of inter-arms coordination, and the casualties in the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions during the attack towards Thompson’s Post on 30-31 October.  This latter was a complicated plan that, in retrospect at least, had little chance of achieving its stated objectives.  The comments of the British commander of the tanks involved to Colonel Wells of the 9th Division suggest that this was not only in retrospect!  Such tragedies also affected other troops, particularly the New Zealanders.

Overall, this is an interesting book that provides a good description of the Australian contribution to some important events ‘in far away places with strange sounding names’.  Victory at Alamein helped to transform allied fortunes.  Twenty-five years after the battle, Montgomery said that winning was only made possible by the bravery of the 9th Division.  For that achievement, their actions deserve to be better known.

The different styles of Johnston and Stanley show through, with Johnston’s frequent inclusion of personal anecdotes giving a feel for the cutting edge of the battle.  There are occasional inaccuracies, such as not including the 4th Indian Division in XXX Corps.  The editor seems also to have done some strange things with military terminology, with lieutenants and sergeants at different times said to have been commanding infantry sections.  These minor issues do not, however, detract seriously from the quality of the book.

JOHN DONOVAN