A Different Sort of War

A DIFFERENT SORT OF WAR: Australians in Korea 1950-53

Richard Trembath

Published by Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2005

266 pages, RRP $34.95

This is not a book about the battles of the Korean War.  Richard Trembath provides a brief overview of the fighting in Korea, before turning to address background issues such as the extent of the Australian commitment, opposition to the war in Australia, the formation of K Force, and remembrance of Australia’s effort, all interesting topics, but perhaps of limited appeal to many readers.

Trembath notes that the Korean commitment was but one step in the extended move of Australia’s alliance position away from the Imperial link with Britain to the present association with the United States.  He comments that there was not a sudden change in late 1941, and that even well into the 1950s, Australian defence planning focused on the Middle East, not Asia.  The limited commitment to Korea is examined in this light.

It was at all times a political commitment, where the strength of the force was less relevant than its political effect in showing Australia as an active supporter of the war (particularly during the negotiations for the ANZUS Treaty).  Australia’s part was focused more on being operationally involved that on the direct impact of its forces.  Thus, when Sabre fighters were not available from the US, British Meteors were sent to No 77 Squadron, where they proved disappointing as fighters, and were relegated to other duties, but kept in action as a visible sign of commitment.  Wider issues such as communist activities elsewhere in the world remained of greater concern, and were the principal focus of defence expansion across the 1950s.

Trembath highlights that such figures as H.V. Evatt, Arthur Calwell, and trade union leaders were among those who called for a greater Australian commitment to Korea, while the chapter on opposition in Australia to the war shows clearly that, even in those trade unions whose leadership opposed the war, the members tended to be more supportive.  Korea was also, until 1991, the only occasion on which the United Nations Organisation supported action on one side of a conflict, rather than monitoring of whatever cease-fire might be able to be negotiated.

Trembath notes on several occasions that the ultimate failure of Australia’s broader defence expansion efforts in the 1950s ultimately ‘revealed strongly held attitudes to the army as a career, and demonstrated that the idea of action in Korea was attractive to many even while a lifetime in the forces was not’.  Many recruits sought action in Korea (or perhaps any conflict), but not a lifetime career in the regular forces.  Recent difficulties with ADF recruiting suggest that the same attitudes remain significant.  In his discussion of the formation of K Force, Trembath differentiates between those who volunteered specifically for the war, whose motivations would have been recognisable to members of the First and Second AIF, and regular soldiers, who sought ‘experience in [a] chosen career’, so as to improve their career prospects.

The germ warfare allegations made by the communist powers against the US, and the hostile rejection of those allegations by public opinion in Australia are discussed in detail.  Trembath notes that Soviet documents now available show that the allegations were concocted.  Such allegations would almost certainly be received uncritically in many quarters today, a sign of the changing nature of world society.

In his review of the opposition to the war in Australia, Trembath shows clearly the differences between the ‘elite’ leadership groups of those opposing the war and their grass roots supporters, the former often being committed to a course of action with which their broader membership, and even more so the wider Australian community, were not sympathetic.  A majority of the union movement, including the ACTU executive, supported Australian participation, as did even many members in the unions whose leaderships opposed the war.  The Opposition Leader, Ben Chifley, actually recommended (to the cheers of delegates to the NSW State ALP Conference) that the Government deal with the Seamen’s Union under the Crimes Act!

Within the religious opposition, again the mass membership did not follow the lead of those (few) ministers who formed the leadership of the Australian Peace Council.  Their claim that the Peace Council was a non-party body is negated by the historian of the Communist Party of Australia, who claims that the Council was formed only ‘after considerable groundwork by party intellectuals’.  The Council’s political influence was minimal, Trembath recording that the Victorian Peace Council complained of receiving ‘scant courtesy from Government and Opposition members alike’.  In the end, the various peace organizations suffered the indignity of public indifference.

Trembath notes that Australian soldiers held generally high opinions of their Chinese enemies, but almost unanimous negative attitudes towards the North Koreans.  He suggests that this might have been because of consciousness of atrocities they had carried out early in the war.  He is less supportive of the idea that reports from former prisoners of the Japanese, who had bad experiences with Korean prison camp guards, influenced these attitudes.  On the allied side, the British were well regarded, the US Marines were held in higher regard than the US Army, while the French-Canadians were considered to be filthy, living in their own urine and excrement.

Trembath notes that most Australian veterans view the war in a positive light, both for its effect in stopping communism, and for the long term benefit to South Korea, with its current prosperity and political freedom compared to North Korea.

A significant element of the book is devoted to remembrance of the Korean War, and particularly the concerns of its veterans that their efforts have been forgotten.  One key concern was that South Korea seemed more willing to recognise veterans’ service than Australia.  However, one (ex-regular) veteran noted that the limited recognition in Australia at the time was not inappropriate, as there were many other challenges facing the nation then.  Trembath notes that many groups in society feel that they have been forgotten.  Indeed, the reviewer’s father, who served alongside the 7th Division early in World War II, always felt that the 9th Division got more than their share of publicity, while the 7th was often overlooked.

In considering why Korea did not really impinge on the national consciousness, some veterans argued that the absence of television made contemporary reporting difficult.  Veterans of Vietnam might occasionally have wished for such a difficulty during their war!  He suggests also that Vietnam might have overshadowed Korea, and returning Vietnam veterans probably have a case for arguing that they were treated worse than those from Korea.  He comments also that no specific incident involving Australians (even Kapyong) stands out in Korea in the way that the Western Front, Singapore, the Burma Railway or Tet do in other wars.  Trembath notes the generally unsuccessful effort at making Maryang San/Operation Commando better known.

One particular complaint by many Korean veterans was that they did not get to march through city streets on their return.  Trembath notes that there were many marches at the time, but some groups such as nurses, and particularly members of 3 RAR who were replaced on an individual basis, did miss out on a march, although other units did have theirs.  He compares the views of Korean veterans who ‘missed out’ with a First World War veteran who believed that the march was a form of public recognition of service.  Given the few marches through major cities by troops returning from recent conflicts, Australia may again be building the basis for future resentment.

The long delays before a medal was issued and a Korean War memorial constructed were also causes for complaint.  The present government’s willingness (almost, at times, enthusiasm) for striking new medals may be an over-reaction to such feelings, but this seems to be a case where it is better to err on the side of enthusiasm rather than of caution.

Some post-modern attitudes appear in the book, such as the distaste Trembath shows for a description by a British officer of Australian soldiers clearing North Koreans from a paddy field ‘as though they were driving snipe’.  He also refers to Australians ‘slaying prisoners’, which may have happened, but the context suggests more a reluctance to accept surrender of an enemy regarded as cruel than the shooting of disarmed prisoners.

Trembath makes the occasional error, such as claiming (page 114) that conscription was introduced for the AIF in 1943.  This did not occur, the AIF remaining a volunteer force, however, in that year the Curtin Government extended the area of service for the militia beyond Australian territory.

If you are seeking a history of Australian military actions in Korea, this is not the book for you.  If, however, you wish to understand some of the contemporary background against which the war was fought, you will find it of interest.  Almost 30 percent of the book comprises references, bibliography and appendices.

JOHN DONOVAN.