A PRINCIPAL ROLE
FOR THE ARMY RESERVES? – A CAPABILITY FOR AUSTRALIAN HOMELAND DEFENCE
John Donovan
Part II
This article was originally published in the Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue 170. Jerry Bishop and Geoff McKergow provided valuable advice during the drafting process.
Introduction
The previous part of this article, which appeared in
ADFJ 169, reviewed the historical, strategic and administrative background to the
current posture of the Army for homeland defence. This part of the article proposes changes to that posture,
to improve capability by making greater use of Reserve forces. A first step in this direction was
taken on 18 May 2003, when the Minister for Defence announced that a Reserve
Response Force would be raised in each Army Reserve brigade, to provide ‘short
notice response to domestic security incidents including terrorist incidents as
well as quick response to other civil emergencies’.[i] Further expansion of this initiative is
desirable.
Possible Tasks for the Reserves in Homeland Defence
The Dibb Review made a number of observations about the role of the Reserves.[ii] In essence, Dibb saw the defence of vital assets as an achievable initial task for the Reserves after callout. He also saw them having a key role in maintaining the expansion base of the Army for conventional operations at higher levels of conflict, including being used as a significant (but not the sole) repository of some skills not required in lower levels of conflict.[iii]
It has been argued that the
Reserves would not be able to maintain an appropriate level of skill to operate
more complex equipment. However, a
previous Chief of Air Staff (CAS, now CAF) has proposed that reserve pilots
could operate some aircraft[iv], while the
United States maintains armoured and mechanised formations in its Army National
Guard and the United States Marine Corps Reserve. Provision of a suitable level of full-time support would be
necessary (which would also maintain such skills among full-time
personnel). As well as supporting
the use of reserve pilots by the Air Force, Air Marshal Evans described Army
thinking on the capability of reserves as ‘similar to the dubious conclusions …
by the RAAF, that modern aircraft and air warfare are too complex for part-time
personnel.’[v]
To a large degree, however, the
point could be moot, if the Israeli author Martin van Creveld’s assessment of
the likely future style of war (which is supported by experience since the 1991
Gulf War) is accepted. The need
could be less for heavy armoured and artillery units, and more for combined
arms battlegroups including infantry, reconnaissance, field engineer,
construction, integral fire support and communications, with limited heavy
support elements.
A review in the late 1980s looked
at functions to be performed by the Army.
The Wrigley report[vi] considered
that ‘sovereignty defence’ forces that would draw on community support might be
appropriate for Australia. These
forces would include ‘a core of military professionals who provide the military
planning and management expertise, direct the training, and carry out most …
peacetime constabulary tasks.’[vii]
Wrigley described two fundamental
roles for the ADF; first what he called a ‘constabulary’ role:
To provide flexible rapid reaction forces
able to protect and promote Australian interests in the region, assist regional
civil authorities on request, meet alliance obligations, support peacekeeping
and other initiatives
And second, a national [homeland]
defence role:
Within
priorities and criteria laid down by government and in concert with the
civilian agencies of government, prepare the national military defence
machinery to provide effective insurance against the uncertainties of the
future.[viii]
The ‘division of labour’ proposed
by Wrigley, with full-time forces focusing on rapid reaction tasks, alliance
obligations (collective security) and peacekeeping, and the Reserves on
insurance against the uncertainties of the future, remains broadly valid. However, more recent strategic guidance
places emphasis on ‘fully developed’ forces. This has been interpreted to give a different rationale for the
Reserves, focussing them on supporting the Regular forces when they respond to
short notice ‘constabulary’ tasks, but apparently focusing less on the need
(after September 2001) for homeland defence forces. The level of capability required of homeland defence forces,
even in the ‘fully developed’ form sought by strategic guidance, could be
different to that required for overseas ‘constabulary’ tasks.
The Voluntary Spirit in Australia
Whether sufficient personnel can
be recruited voluntarily is an issue that must be considered. However, there is a long history and
tradition of voluntary service to the community and the nation in
Australia. This has not only been
for national defence, but is also shown in the strong community spirit behind
such organizations as volunteer fire and emergency services.
This spirit of voluntarism has
been particularly marked during times of war. More than 16,000 colonial volunteers served in the Boer War.[ix] During World War I, over 415,000
Australians enlisted in the First AIF[x],
and about 330,000 served overseas.[xi] During World War II, around 40,000
personnel enlisted voluntarily in the Royal Australian Navy[xii],
and over 210,000 in the Royal Australian Air Force[xiii]. As well, by the end of 1941 when the
militia was called out against the threat of Japanese invasion, around 190,000
personnel had already enlisted voluntarily in the Second AIF, for service in a
war against a tyranny that was remote from Australia.[xiv] Many members of the militia had also
enlisted voluntarily, but only for restricted service. During the war, over 200,000 militia
members transferred to the AIF.[xv]
The voluntary spirit remains
alive in the Australian community.
A submission to the Charities Definition Inquiry in 2001 by the
Australasian Fire Authorities Council, on behalf of government managed fire and
emergency service agencies, advised that there were more than 240,000 fire and
emergency service volunteers in Australia, most receiving no remuneration for
their services. Together, they
contributed more than 21,000,000 hours of voluntary service annually.[xvi]
This voluntary spirit can still be
called on for national defence, if governments provide clear and visible
encouragement. For example, in the
early 1980s, the Army Reserve was increased from a strength of about 24,000 to
almost 32,000 in two years, when the government responded to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan (which did not involve a direct threat to Australia).[xvii] A call to prepare for homeland defence
should be at least as successful.
There is clearly great willingness in Australia to serve the community,
as long as the need is clear. Yet,
the strength of the Army Reserve is now less than 20,000. The Regular Army also appears to be
having difficulty in meeting its recruitment targets. What has gone wrong?
Part of the problem stems from
reductions in available numbers as Australia’s demography changes, a point
mentioned by CDF recently,[xviii] but
there also appears to be a reluctance to serve for extended periods in
full-time forces, leading to proposals such as that recently mooted to recruit
Pacific Islanders, effectively as mercenaries.[xix] In relation to the Reserves, the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has suggested
that the Reserve could maintain a strength of only around 16,500 personnel.[xx] This estimate was made, however, after
a period of over twenty-five years during which the Regular Army treatment of
the Reserves has been described as showing ‘callous indifference’ with ‘little
regard to the sensibilities of the citizen soldier’.[xxi] By way of contrast, the emergency
services of New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia together have more
than 17,000 volunteers.[xxii] The reluctance to serve does not,
therefore, seem to affect part-time organisations to the same extent.
What stands out from the examples
of voluntary service cited above is that each responds to a clear need. The wartime enlistments were to meet
identifiable threats. Members of
the volunteer fire and emergency services also have a clear role, to protect
their fellow Australian citizens from the threat of natural disaster, and to
assist them to recover from its consequences. Both groups provide a function analogous to what was
formerly called ‘defence of hearths and homes’. However, the Army does not seem at present to emphasise
homeland defence as a role. This
has the effect of down playing any community belief that preparations should be
made in peacetime for homeland defence.
There has rarely been a clearly
defined role for the Reserves, and in recent years, they have been used only as
individual fillers for Regular units, not being deployed with their own
units. Even the deployment of a
Reserve company to East Timor in 2002 was as a sub-unit of a Regular unit, not
as an identifiable Reserve element.
As Palazzo states, the ‘Army did not employ any Reserve units in East Timor,
despite their presence on the order of battle’.[xxiii]
However, simply to use Reserve
units as pools of personnel risks repeating the error made in 1941, when three
units (the 39th, 49th and 53rd Battalions)
were raised for service in Port Moresby.
As David Horner notes, the ‘way in which these units were formed
demonstrates the lack of appreciation of the value of regimental pride. They were formed … by obtaining batches
of men from a number of units’.[xxiv] Horner quotes Gavin Long (the official
historian) as suggesting that cabinet was responsible for the organisational
deficiencies of the militia battalions during the early campaigns in New
Guinea.[xxv] It seems unlikely, however, that
cabinet, often reluctant to intervene in substantive military matters, would
have prescribed how to raise units.
It is more likely that the failure was in the Army system. Events surrounding the Pentropic
reorganisation, implementation of the Millar Review of 1974 and the use of
Reserves in East Timor suggest that the lesson has not been learned.[xxvi]
Air Marshal Evans considers that
the ‘best conditions in the world will not be persuasive in retaining people if
they dislike their work’.[xxvii] By
denying Reserves a clear role, and treating them insensitively, the Army has
almost guaranteed that their numbers will decline. However, it seems highly likely that Reserve numbers could
exceed the Joint Parliamentary Committee’s estimate, if Reserves are given a
clear role and active encouragement by both the government and the Army.
The Way Ahead
While the collective security
role preoccupies the Army in peacetime, its leaders should remember the
requirement to prepare for the defence of Australia. The 2003 Defence Update accepted that ‘the threat of
direct military attack on Australia is less than it was in 2000 … [but] the
strategic advantage offered by our geography does not … protect Australia from
the scourge of terrorism.’[xxviii] It sought a ‘more flexible and mobile
force, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve
outcomes in the national interest’.[xxix]
In Project Army 2003, the Army
reviewed its roles, tasks, force structure and preparedness, mobilisation and
expansion requirements and combat force development planning. Possible generic tasks for reserves considered
under that project were:
Hold personnel or force elements at very high
levels of readiness to meet Defence Aid to the Civil Community tasks;
Hold
personnel or force elements at high levels of readiness to provide round out to
Ready Deployment Force (RDF) and Enabling Component Regular units;
Hold
personnel at high levels of readiness to provide reinforcement to RDF units;
Hold
sub-units and units at longer readiness levels to provide forces to rotate with
force elements of the RDF; and
Develop and
maintain mobilisation plans to meet Defence of Australia scenarios and tasks.[xxx]
Defence Update 2005 states
that the ‘Government has also accepted that the ‘role of the Army Reserve needs
to be refined to provide a focus on high readiness individuals and teams to
contribute to operational deployments’.[xxxi] In developing a concept of different
readiness levels for individuals, sub-units and units, the Reserves should not
be seen just as a personnel source for the Regular Army. Reserve units or sub-units must also have
discrete roles, to give them a sense of purpose in meeting a clear national
need. The Hardened and Networked
Army concept proposes such roles.[xxxii] Further, Reserve units must be able to
deploy as identifiable elements, after reasonable post-call out training, to
maintain their esprit de corps.
Only the last possible task in
the Project Army 2003 list focuses on the defence of Australia, and it does not
focus on protecting against terrorism.
It therefore seems likely that under current plans, the emphasis for
Reserves will continue to be supporting the Regular Army in meeting collective
security responsibilities, with lower priority for homeland defence. However, the requirement in strategic
guidance to defend Australia remains.
If the full-time force is to concentrate on collective security tasks,
this role could be allocated to the Reserves.
To a degree, the Project Army
2003 proposals seem to recognise that it is not practicable (nor necessary) for
Reserves to always match the training and readiness levels of Regulars, by
scaling the readiness of Reserve individuals, sub-units and units. Indeed, if Reserves could match the
training and readiness levels of Regulars, there would be no need to maintain a
Regular Army, with its very high ongoing personnel costs. The Reserves should be structured for a
range of achievable readiness levels, generally lower than for the full-time
forces, but sufficient to meet specific roles and tasks and to maintain the
skills necessary for ‘continental-based operations with longer warning
timings’.[xxxiii]
There is also evidence from the
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)[xxxiv]
and Parliament[xxxv] that
attempting to match Regular training standards has an adverse impact on Reserve
recruiting and retention. It seems
strange, therefore, that the Army persisted with the system of seven weeks
Common Induction Training, in the face of clear evidence that it damaged
recruiting. Like their Regular
counterparts, Reserves have families.
In addition, they also have jobs (or may be students who must put time
and effort into their studies).
If other options for initial
training are not available, the bulk of established workers in the community
will be excluded from Reserve service, to the detriment of national defence and
the ADF’s links with the wider community it exists to serve. A range of initial entry schemes, from
short periods (two to four weeks), through the Common Induction Training
scheme, perhaps to something like the former Ready Reserve scheme, where
soldiers received not just initial recruit training, but also initial
employment training and spent time in full-time units before moving to
part-time service, widens the pool of potential recruits. Follow-on training should also be set
at reasonable levels, related to readiness needs for particular tasks. At a time of demographic decline in the
younger age groups, restricting options for recruitment is less than sensible.
Reserves at the highest readiness
level[xxxvi]
would normally have civilian skills that are largely exclusive to the Reserves,
which can be immediately applied in a military environment, such as medical and
dental specialisations. As well,
individuals who could provide additional training time or former full-time
personnel might be available as individual reinforcements to support the
Regular Army on collective security tasks, so contributing to the security of
our immediate neighbourhood, and providing support for Australia’s wider
interests and objectives beyond it.
Personnel at the next level of readiness should provide
the ability to deploy in sub-units as elements of the combined arms
battlegroups required under the Hardened and Networked Army concept,[xxxvii]
or for reinforcement or rotation at medium notice. Each sub-unit should be drawn from a single longer notice unit,
using its best-trained and most ready personnel. They should normally deploy together, under their unit
title. Such sub-units were used
routinely to fill out under-strength Regular units for exercises in the
1970s. While these groups would
generally support the Regular Army in collective security contingencies, they
could also contribute to more demanding homeland defence tasks, given their
higher readiness level. This would
extend the Reserve Response Force system to each major unit rather than only
each brigade. These individuals
and sub-units would comprise High Readiness Reserves (HRR).
The third readiness level would
provide full units, not just to ‘raise, train and sustain HRR soldiers’,[xxxviii]
but also sub-units, and support rotation at longer notice, or basic homeland
defence tasks. These would be the
‘parent’ units that provided the individuals and sub-units discussed
above. Finally, there could be
cadre units for national mobilisation in the event of a major or extended
conflict. These would be comprised
largely of officers and non-commissioned officers, and have the task of
generating additional brigades on longer notice, as envisaged in the report of
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: From
Phantom to Force – Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army. This would ‘provide depth and
sustainability to full-time forces while maintaining those skills necessary to
generate larger follow on forces if required’.[xxxix]
The ANAO noted that conflict with
work, family and study commitments plays an important part in Reserves’
decisions to separate. Job
satisfaction and career prospects appear to be primary motivators for remaining
with the Reserves. Job
satisfaction seems most likely to be achieved if there are clearly defined
roles and tasks for the unit (as well as the individual) and if there is
realistic and challenging training linked to those roles and tasks.[xl] In addition, people must be able to
derive some enjoyment and satisfaction from Reserve service – they are giving
up their free time for it.
Strategic guidance requires the
defence of Australia, but the events that occur most frequently relate to
collective security, often well away from the Australian mainland. Presumably for this reason, the 2003 Defence
Update saw a higher likelihood of ADF ‘involvement in coalition operations
further afield’. [xli] While that Update considered
that ‘there is less likely to be a need for ADF operations in defence of
Australia’,[xlii]
security of the Australian homeland remains essential. The Regular Army is not large enough to
meet both tasks, and the tendency seems to be to neglect homeland defence in
favour of collective security tasks.
Using the Reserves meets the guidance in Defence Update 2005,
that ‘[c]ost pressures will remain and will demand increasing efficiencies
across the portfolio’.[xliii]
A role as the principal homeland defence force would give
a sense of purpose to the Reserves that now seems to be lacking. It would also meet a requirement that
seems to be neglected under the pressure of day-to-day events. The role of principal homeland defence
force (a role likely to be highly valued by the community) should help to
attract and retain substantial numbers of committed personnel, as it so
effectively does for the volunteer fire and emergency services. It is noteworthy that largely unpaid
volunteer fire and emergency services can attract many more volunteers than
paid Reserve units can. Perhaps
having a role that is valued by the community they are drawn from, and being
seen by that community carrying out that role, assists them?
Beyond homeland defence and
collective security tasks, making Reserve units the first call ADF units for
disaster assistance and relief, and other aid to the civil community tasks,
would further enhance their sense of purpose (and increase the Army’s links
with the local communities from which the Reserves in particular, but also
Regulars, are recruited).
Symbiotic peacetime roles for the Reserves, alongside the volunteer fire
and emergency services, should have benefits for Reserve recruiting. In 1972, Baynes proposed that the
United Kingdom should develop a Home Security Force with four component parts:
1.
Civil Defence
2.
Auxiliary Fire Service;
3.
Disaster Relief Organisation
4.
Military Branch[xliv]
Australia already has
organisations to cover the first three functions, but lacks the fourth. The Army Reserve could fill that role,
providing a ‘Whole of Government’[xlv] response.
The task of assisting the civil
community falls within strategic guidance, which includes ‘ad hoc support to
wider community needs’.[xlvi] It is one of the possible generic tasks
for Reserves considered in Project Army 2003 (although making the Reserves
principally responsible for this task might not have been under consideration).
Giving the Reserves the primary
responsibility for assisting the civil community would allow the Regular Army
to focus on high readiness, short notice, collective security tasks.
Under these changes, capabilities
that are primarily for homeland defence would be maintained principally in the
Reserves, unless there are compelling reasons that they are not suitable for
part-time soldiers (aviation is an obvious case unless the part-time members
have already had extensive full-time service, as discussed by Air Marshal Evans[xlvii]). A review of deployments in the last
decade would suggest that most artillery needed for future warfare could be
maintained in the Reserves, while there may be a case for additional infantry,
special forces and engineers in the Regular Army. They could be raised within current staffing levels, using
the personnel now in capabilities that would move to the Reserves.
Summary
In the first part of this
argument for a rejuvenated role for the Army Reserves (see ADFJ 169), I
outlined how the balance between Regulars and Active Reserves has moved towards
the full-time force. While this
was inevitable and essential, the requirements of the War on Terror demand a
significant homeland defence force.
Given the heavy demands on the full-time element of the Army, it is
probably not able to provide this capability.
This paper proposes that the
Regular Army should focus on the requirements of short notice contingencies and
collective security, and the Army Reserve should be the principal homeland defence
force, but continue to support the Regular Army in collective security
operations, where there are clear roles for Reserves. Indeed, some specialists whose skills cannot readily be
maintained in the Regular Army may be required for an initial deployment
(specialist doctors are an example).
There is also a valid role for Reserves in providing rotation forces.
However, Reserves should focus on
homeland defence, providing forces to defend against a range of threats,
ranging from minor incursions and raids, through the enhanced threat of
terrorist attack by individuals or small sub-national or non-state groups, to
any attempt at a limited lodgement on Australian territory. The emphasis in forces for homeland
defence should be on infantry, light reconnaissance, field engineer and
communications roles.
There could also be a range of
cadre units for expansion in the event of major or extended conflict. These would be comprised largely of
officers and non-commissioned officers, and would have the task of generating
additional brigades on longer notice, as envisaged in the August 2000 report of
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: From
Phantom to Force – Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army.
A role as the principal homeland
defence force would give a sense of purpose to Reserve units. It would also meet a requirement that
seems to receive lower priority under the pressure of day-to-day events. This role is role likely to be highly
valued by the community. Giving it
to the Reserves should help to attract and retain substantial numbers of
committed personnel, as the role of assisting the community does so effectively
for the volunteer fire and emergency services. Beyond homeland defence, making Reserve units the first call
ADF units for disaster assistance and relief, and other aid to the civil
community tasks, would further enhance their sense of purpose (and increase the
Army’s links with the local communities from which the Reserves in particular,
but also the Regulars, are recruited).
It is noteworthy that the largely unpaid volunteer fire and emergency
services can attract many more volunteers than paid Reserve units can. Perhaps having a role that is valued by
the community they are drawn from, and visibly carrying out that role in the
community, assists them?
John Donovan worked in the Department of Defence for
over 32 years, principally in the fields of intelligence, force development and
resource management. He also
served for several years in the Australian Army Reserve, rising through the
ranks from Private to Lieutenant.
NOTES
[i] Minister for
Defence, 2003, Defence Media Release MIN 64/03 of 18 May 2003.
[ii] Paul Dibb,
1986, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian Government
Publishing Service, pages 56, 80-81, 85-87, et al.
[iii] Dibb, Review
of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, page 87.
[iv] AM David
Evans, 1990, A Fatal Rivalry, MacMillan Australia, South Melbourne,
Chapter 13.
[v] Evans, A
Fatal Rivalry, page 147.
[vi] Alan
Wrigley, 1990, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in
Australia’s Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service.
[vii] Wrigley, The
Defence Force and the Community, page 499.
[viii] Wrigley, The
Defence Force and the Community, page 318.
[ix] Joan
Beaumont, (editor), 2001, Australian Defence Sources and Statistics Volume
VI, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Oxford University Press,
South Melbourne, page 261.
[x] Beaumont, Australian
Defence Sources and Statistics, page 109.
[xi] Gavin Long,
1963, The Final Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, page 636.
[xii] Beaumont, Australian
Defence Sources and Statistics, page 181.
[xiii] Beaumont,
Australian Defence Sources and Statistics, page 218.
[xiv] Dudley
McCarthy, 1959, South West Pacific Area First Year Kokoda to Wau,
Australian War Memorial, page 9.
[xv] Jeffrey
Grey, 2001, The Australian Army Volume I, The Australian Centenary History
of Defence, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, page 155.
[xvi] Australasian Fire
Authorities Council, 2001, submission to the Charities Definition Inquiry, 1013
Whitehorse Rd, Box Hill, Victoria 3128, page 3.
[xvii] Beaumont,
Australian Defence Sources and Statistics, page 128.
[xviii] ACM A.
Houston, October 2005, Address to the Defence Senior Leadership Group,
published in Defence Force Journal, Number 168.
[xix] The
Australian, 14 September 2005.
[xx] Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, From Phantom
to Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, Commonwealth
of Australia, page 139.
[xxi] Albert
Palazzo, 2001, The Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901-2001,
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, page 307.
[xxiii] Palazzo,
The Australian Army, page 370.
[xxiv] D.M.
Horner, 1978, Crisis of Command, Australian Generalship and the Japanese
Threat, 1941-1943, Australian National University Press, Canberra,
page 81.
[xxv] Horner, Crisis
of Command, page 81.
[xxvi] Palazzo, The
Australian Army, pages 249-265 and 292-302.
[xxvii] Evans, A
Fatal Rivalry, page 144.
[xxviii]
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2003, page 9.
[xxix]
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2003, page 24.
[xxx] Quoted in
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2001, Recruitment
and Retention of ADF Personnel, Commonwealth of Australia, page 72.
[xxxi] Commonwealth
of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2005, page 22.
[xxxii]
Department of Defence, www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/army_reserve_62785.htm.
[xxxiii]
www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/welcome_62693.htm.
[xxxiv]
Australian National Audit Office, 2001, Performance Audit Australian Defence
Force Reserves, Commonwealth of Australia, pages 92-93.
[xxxv] Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to
Force, pages 136, 144-145.
[xxxvi] This
discussion is inspired by an article ‘Making Sense of the Territorial Army’ in
the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,
October 1992, by Lieutenant Colonel C.J.R. Day.
[xxxvii] www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/welcome_62693.htm.
[xxxviii]
www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/army_reserve_62785.htm.
[xxxix]
www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/welcome_62693.htm.
[xl] Australian
National Audit Office, 2001, Australian Defence Force Reserves, page
139.
[xli]
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2003, page 23.
[xlii]
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2003, page 23.
[xliii] Commonwealth
of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2005, page 25.
[xliv] LTCOL
J.C.M. Baynes, 1972, The Soldier in Modern Society, Eyre Methuen,
London, page 86.
[xlv] Commonwealth
of Australia, Australia’s National Security 2005, page 10.
[xlvi]
Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, Defence 2000 Our Future Defence Force,
page XII.
[xlvii] Evans, A
Fatal Rivalry, pages 145-146.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Australian
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Houston, October 2005, Address to the Defence Senior Leadership Group,
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Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, Commonwealth of Australia
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Dudley
McCarthy, 1959, South West Pacific Area First Year Kokoda to Wau,
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Albert
Palazzo, 2001, The Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901-2001,
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