Defenders of Australia: The 3rd Australian Division

DEFENDERS OF AUSTRALIA: THE 3RD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, 1916-1991

Albert Palazzo, Australian Military History Publications, 2002, 245pp.

This book is a worthwhile addition to the body of work sponsored by the Army History Unit.  It covers the history of the 3rd Division, originally raised by John Monash in 1916, from its inception, through vicissitudes in peace and war, until its disbandment (for the third time) in 1991, following the Force Structure Review.

The treatment of the Division’s periods of wartime service is fairly conventional, being drawn from a mixture of official sources, unit histories and personal memoirs.  It provides a useful summation of the Division’s combat record, but no startling new insights.  Dr Palazzo is, however, perhaps a bit harsh in judging, that the troops of the World War I 3rd Division ‘deserved the derision of the senior divisions’ - derision received from them because the 3rd Division was new to fighting in 1916.  It should be recalled that many members of those senior divisions enlisted at the same time or later than those who formed the 3rd Division, joining their own divisions as reinforcements later in the War.

It is the coverage of the service of the 3rd Division between the World Wars and in the Cold War, however, which is most interesting, and adds some new insights to the history of the Australian Army.  Two issues stand out.  After both World Wars, the senior officers of the Army are shown to have persistently produced ‘requirements’ that in retrospect seem ill founded, and to have taken little notice of the broader national context.  Second, their treatment of the citizen soldiers in the period after World War II might well be taken as an object lesson in how not to build an effective total force.

Dr Palazzo recounts that after World War I, a committee of senior officers tasked to design the post-war Army, produced (in about a month) an order of battle to defend Australia against Japan.  It would surely not have needed much scepticism on the part of the Minister, Senator Pearce, to wonder why the proposed order of battle so closely resembled that of the Army which had just fought in two widely separated theatres of war, as a junior partner in a major alliance.  It would also surely not have taken much reflection by the senior officers to understand that a war-weary nation, with strained finances, would not be likely to support such a large force in the immediate post-war political climate (even if based on part-time service). 

Fiscal prudence was a constraint placed on the committee by Senator Pearce, but apparently ignored by it.  The criticism by Dr Palazzo, that ‘governments preferred to purchase national security as cheaply as possible’, ignores the reality that there are many competing demands on government funding, and extravagance in funding one area will impact on others.  Indeed, governments prefer to purchase everything as cheaply as possible!  Dr Palazzo demonstrates that the senior officers had some difficulty with this concept, as well with as with understanding that events like the Great Depression would inevitably impact on resource availability for less immediate problems.  The government’s failure to implement the senior officers’ scheme, and the defence budget cuts of the early 1930s, should not have come as surprises.

Again, after World War II, the Army proposed an order of battle similar in size to that maintained in the 1930s (but including a full regular division).  Again, a war weary government with strained finances would not fund the bid.  Indeed, Dr Palazzo accepts that there was no clear role determined for even the smaller Citizen Military Forces (CMF) order of battle that was approved by the Government.  These incidents show that successive generations of senior officers had proven incapable of understanding that a wish only becomes a requirement if it has a clear rationale! 

The inability (or unwillingness) of the Army to identify a clear role for the citizen soldiers persisted until the mid-1980s.  At that time, as Dr Palazzo recounts, the role of asset security was identified within Dibb’s advice on the nature of future war.  It was practised for a while, but the initiative apparently was not followed through.  The Military Board had earlier rebuffed another initiative that might have provided the citizen forces with a role, by forming a composite CMF battalion to serve in Vietnam.

Dr Palazzo recognises the need for both regular and citizen forces, and the importance of the latter in Australia’s defence hierarchy.  But he also points out that the regulars have at times failed to realise ‘that the nation needed not only an effective regular body but also a viable reserve force’.  Dr Palazzo describes as ‘callous and mean spirited’ the treatment of Australia’s citizen soldiers by the regular forces in the period since 1960.  The description seems justified, and this treatment is shown to have severely damaged the links between the Army and the community.  In this context, Dr Palazzo’s discussion of the Pentropic reforms of 1960 and the Millar Report of 1974 were the most interesting parts of the book to this reviewer.

Dr Palazzo rejects suggestions that the decline in the citizen forces that followed these reforms was a direct result of Regular Army policy.  As a former bureaucrat, the reviewer generally supports the thesis that errors are more likely to be the result of a ‘stuff-up’ than a conspiracy.  However, in discussing the Pentropic reorganisation, Dr Palazzo does not offer any good reason for it, rather noting that it was ‘the most controversial, and ultimately shortsighted, reform the army has ever attempted’.

If the ill effects of the Pentropic reforms might (charitably) be accepted to be the result of misjudgement or error, it is hard to understand why those ill effects were then compounded 14 years later, following the Millar Report.  Dr Palazzo describes clearly the repetition of the insensitive implementation processes pioneered under the Pentropic changes.  These included an arbitrary raising of the barrier for unit survival by applying regular establishments to part-time units previously operating against lower establishments.  Whether deliberately or otherwise, these two reforms are shown by Dr Palazzo to have been traumatic and emotional for citizen soldiers.  In his view, Millar became the means of destruction of the citizen force, rather than its salvation. 

Two errors in reforming the citizen forces suggest an institution (the Regular Army) that is at best slow to learn, or else displayed at least a degree of malice.  If the latter, it has probably damaged the regular force as much as the citizen forces, as each has been separated to some degree from the life of the community upon which they both depend.  As Dr Palazzo states, ‘[t]he broader army gained nothing by the regulars’ consistent disregard of CMF history, tradition and culture’.  Nor did the nation.

If reforms had to occur, they surely could have involved less disruption to the links between the Army (both Regular and citizen force) and the community.  In particular, Army Headquarters’ insistence on destroying the regional identities of the citizen force’s infantry battalions sits ill with Army’s normal jealous defence of its traditions and heritage, and is very hard to understand.

However, despite the insensitive implementation of both of these reforms, particularly the approach taken to the traditional infantry units of the CMF, in the end, heritage has almost won out.  Every Army Reserve infantry battalion now uses a traditional number or pair of linked numbers (albeit within the State Regiments).  One numbered unit (51st Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment) even operates outside the State Regiment system.  Perhaps it is time for Army to make a gesture of reconciliation to the part time force, and return fully to the traditional infantry unit titles? 

Amongst all of this, the enthusiasm of the citizen soldiers shines through in Dr Palazzo’s book.  During the 1930s, soldiers attended courses on long weekends.  Clearly, they also put in more time than was paid for.  As a small example, it is hard to imagine bands able to perform publicly without considerable effort and practice, yet the 3rd Division was able to provide nine bands for a Tattoo to celebrate the State of Victoria’s Centenary in 1934. 

In 2000, a Senate Committee found that the Army Reserve could probably only support some 16,500 active members.  After 40 years of what Dr Palazzo describes as ‘callous and mean spirited’ treatment, it is surely a tribute to their dedication that so many citizen soldiers are prepared to struggle on to serve their country.  Imagine what might be possible if they were made to feel valued by their regular colleagues, and given willing support!

JOHN DONOVAN