SIR JAMES WHITESIDE McCAY

Christopher Wray

Published by Oxford University Press 2002

This is an interesting addition to the Army History series.  It covers the life of Major General Sir James McCay; at different times schoolmaster, Victorian and Federal parliamentarian, militia officer, Minister for Defence and member of the First AIF.

While Christopher Wray’s research was clearly hampered by the destruction of McCay’s papers just before his death in 1930, there is sufficient in the book to establish McCay’s place in history (and also to show how much Australia has changed in the century since federation).  As an example of the latter, it is hard to imagine now any circumstance in which a Minister for Defence would also be an active member of the ADF reserves – although during the 1980s, one United States Secretary for the Navy was simultaneously a Commander in the naval reserves.

McCay’s major role in the early development of the Australian Army, as a militia officer and as Minister for Defence, is recounted well in the book – indeed, some of the issues of the first decade of the Twentieth Century resonate now, with active debate on the priorities for continental defence (nationalist) versus overseas roles (imperialist) still occurring, as does debate on the priority of maritime versus land defence and the role of citizen (reserve) forces.  As Minister, McCay argued that the armed forces should be responsible to the Australian Parliament through ministers, not to [a foreign] British Government.  If McCay returned now, perhaps he could still contribute to current discussions without needing too much briefing?

McCay’s strengths and his weaknesses become clear from this book.  His strengths were in administration and training.  As an officer in the militia and a member of Parliament, both before and after Federation, his significant contributions to the development of both the Australian nation and its Army stand out.  While, as Wray points out, others did much of the original work on the Army, McCay as Minister ‘played an important role’ in putting their work into effect to provide the structure for a citizen Army responsible to the people through Parliament. 

His strengths as a trainer were demonstrated in the period after he lost command of the 5th Division in late 1916, when McCay became Commandant AIF Depots in Britain.  There, as Wray recounts, McCay worked effectively to produce well-trained and disciplined troops for the Western Front.  In 1918, when the flow of reinforcements from Australia was reduced, he wound back the depots in a timely manner, to move training staff to operational duties and so limit the number of units disbanded before the war ended.

A large part of this book covers McCay’s service in the First AIF.  After being selected as an original brigade commander in the 1st Division, McCay supervised the training of the 2nd Brigade, and led it to Gallipoli on the first ANZAC Day.  The circumstances of the landing, when McCay accepted the need to ignore his orders so as to meet the demands of the actual situation, are covered well.  However, as the book relates, in the two battles with which his name is particularly associated (Krithia and Fromelles), he seemed unable to see as clearly that his orders were impracticable. 

These two battles, and the ‘desert march’ of March 1916, caused many of his troops forever to condemn him as indifferent to their lives and welfare.  Ironically, while his troops considered him too ready to obey orders unquestioningly to their cost, many of his superiors deprecated his tendency to debate orders!  Even more ironically, while in Australia after the Gallipoli campaign, McCay had forecast the difficulties likely to be encountered in attempting to break the trench line in France, but still attempted to do so, using the methods then standard (and generally unsuccessful).

Wray demonstrates that McCay was to a large extent controlled by circumstances in the two battles, being newly arrived at each location, and without the knowledge of the ground and enemy that might have enabled him to challenge the practicability of the tasks.  However, he also shows that some aspects of McCay’s personality, particularly his use of inappropriate language and actions to ‘encourage’ his troops, and his difficulties in working with his peers, probably rendered him unfit for command at high level.  These deficiencies could not be outweighed by his technical knowledge and undoubted personal courage under fire, both testified to by ‘Pompey’ Elliott.

In some ways, McCay seems to have had much in common with those other two ‘difficult’ Australian generals, Gordon Bennett and Horace Robertson.  Like Bennett, McCay had problems working with other commanders.  Like Robertson, his strengths as a trainer of troops and an administrator stand out.  Like both of them, his ambition for higher positions was clear, and potentially dangerous.  In the opinion of this reviewer, it was for the better that the ambitions of all three (McCay for command of the Australian Corps or the administrative command of the AIF, Robertson and Bennett to replace Blamey) were not realised.

Wray records McCay’s participation in the committee to advise on the organization of Australia’s post-war Army.  Perhaps McCay’s political experience failed him on that occasion, as the recommendations did not meet the Minister’s requirement to ‘[bear] in mind the financial constraints facing the government’.  Although the report became the Army’s ‘most important strategic planning document for the next two decades’, it was never fully implemented (in the post-war climate of war weariness and through the depression years, it was never likely to be implemented).

Finally, the book records that McCay ‘did leave significant legacies … a structure that conformed to his belief in an Australian citizen army owing responsibility to parliament, and through it, the people … the forerunner of the Australian Army General Staff … and the need for a flexible army structure capable of fighting outside Australia’s borders’. 

Yet, as Wray also records, most of these legacies were quickly forgotten after his death.  Now, the citizen element of the Army is treated, in the words of one historian, with ‘callous indifference’.  Emphasis is sometimes placed on the issue of officers’ commissions by the crown as a focus for their loyalty, but a statement by a Minister that the government is the Army’s ‘owner’ (a gauche phrase, but not inconsistent with McCay’s view of parliamentary accountability) as a counter to this implied direct line of responsibility to the crown caused a furore.  And the Army struggles to maintain a battalion group overseas from a strength of over 20,000.  Truly a prophet is not without honour, save in his own country.

JOHN DONOVAN