The August Offensive at ANZAC

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE AT ANZAC, 1915

David W. Cameron

Big Sky Publishing, 2011, 141pp

The Campaign Series version of David Cameron’s book on the August battles (Sorry Lads, but the order is to go: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, 1915) provides a readable, well-illustrated, account of those dramatic events. While Cameron does not offer any startling new revelations, he does provide a very readable account.

After reading this book, one is left with a clear understanding that the battle was doomed to failure from its inception, whatever the heroic efforts of the combatants. As Cameron demonstrates, it was simply too much to ask tired men (many of whom had been almost constantly in the front lines for over three months) to march long distances, at night, across terrain of almost indescribable complexity, with no worthwhile maps, and then expel their enemies from dominating terrain.

The difficulties of coordinating the actions of widely separated forces were insuperable in an era where a telephone was a sophisticated form of communication (if its wires had not been severed by gunfire or passing traffic), while runners had little chance of finding their way to their destination, and less of finding their way back to where they had started. Those difficulties ensured that any attempt to react to events on the battlefield would be delayed to the point of irrelevance. They were exacerbated by command failures.

Cameron is (rightly) critical of Godley’s performance during these battles. Godley did not take control, but allowed Johnston, commanding the New Zealand infantry brigade, to control some follow-up attacks involving more than his own brigade. Johnston, however, seems, at best, to have been suffering from stress during the battle, refusing to move during darkness, but ordering daylight attacks later. On one occasion he rejected proposals for the provision of machine-gun support for an attack, virtually threatening his brigade machine-gun officer with disciplinary action for persisting with an offer to ‘cover your advance and put troops up there without casualty’.

Cameron also comments adversely on Monash’s failure to move forward to see events for himself. This criticism brings to mind C.E.W. Bean’s description of Monash as a leader who ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’, (Volume II, p588). Based on Cameron’s account, Monash was not doing well as a brigade commander at this time.

All that said, Cameron’s descriptions of the events of 6 to 10 August 1915 are admirably clear, and compelling to read. He follows each segment of the offensive to a logical break point, before moving to the next, and ties them all together well. Those who have seen the film Gallipoli might note that the comment in that film about British troops at Suvla Bay not advancing while the light horsemen died at the Nek is irrelevant, as the attack at the Nek supported the New Zealand and Australian Division attack on Sari Bair Ridge, not the men at Suvla Bay.

Cameron’s final judgement on the August Offensive is that while the flaws in the plan and the weakened condition of the men ensured that the attacks could not succeed, even success on the battlefield would not have altered the outcome of the campaign, a judgement that is difficult to refute.

The many maps provided are great aids to understanding the narrative, albeit some places mentioned in the text do not always appear on the relevant map. The selected photos and the sidebars on weapons and personalities add useful background to the text.

JOHN DONOVAN