The Hard Slog

THE HARD SLOG: Australians in the Bougainville Campaign, 1944-45

Karl James

Cambridge University Press, 2012, 319pp

Karl James has written a comprehensive account of the Bougainville campaign. Unlike some earlier historians, he rejects the notion that this was an ‘unnecessary’ campaign, arguing that Australian leaders of the period, unlike their later critics, did not know that the war would end suddenly in August 1945. Rather, they expected that it would continue into 1946, if not beyond, and that success in Bougainville would release ‘manpower for future operations against Japan’, and for the economy. However, some contemporary critics are not as easy to ignore, including at least one brigadier serving on Bougainville (Hammer), and a battalion commander who was relieved of his command for his negative attitude to the campaign.

James’ account gives greater detail of the operations on Bougainville than the Official History. A key personality in the Bougainville operations was the commander of II Corps, Lieutenant-General Stan Savige. His role as a moderating influence on his more enthusiastic brigadiers is covered well, supplementing the work of Gavin Keating in The Right Man for the Right Job. Savige was ably supported by Major-General Bill Bridgeford, commanding the 3rd Division.

Interestingly, like some other critics of the campaign, many Japanese thought that an offensive against them would be pointless. Their commander, Lieutenant-General Hyakutake, thought that a ‘slow, fanwise advance from Torokina’ would also be pointless, but this was the technique used by Savige. Somewhat unusually, Savige wrote a pamphlet on the Tactical and Administrative Doctrine for Jungle Warfare, which was used as the basis for II Corps orders and instructions.

One of its most interesting aspects of this book is the coverage of the morale and disciplinary issues that arose in the army after more than five years of war. Stress occurred at all levels. Some junior officers and soldiers were at times reluctant to carry out their duty, while a few experienced, but still relatively young, battalion commanders found the strain of a sixth year of operations too much. They had to be relieved of their commands, as did a brigadier, whose planning, judgement and personality were considered inadequate. The brigade commander was replaced by Noel Simpson, who had previously taken command of a battalion in similar circumstances, and seems to have become the ‘turn to’ man for such problems.

The AIF-militia rivalry was a constant background irritant during the campaign. The 55th/53rd Battalion, with its chequered history of the failure of the 53rd Battalion on the Kokoda Trail, responded with resentment towards the AIF, while Noel Simpson was not happy to take command of a militia brigade. Despite this friction, the militia battalions generally performed well, particularly when they had good leaders. When leaders were inadequate, or tired, problems arose.

James describes the failed landing at Porton Plantation well. He had noted earlier the deficiencies in numbers of landing craft, and the failure at Porton illustrates well the consequences of attempting too much with inadequate support. One key lesson of the campaign must be the continuing need for combined arms operations. Regrettably, Savige did not have an adequate range of supporting arms and services.

By the end of the war the Japanese forces were concentrated around Bonis in northern Bougainville, Kieta Bay and Numa Numa Plantation on the east coast, and in southern Bougainville. The 2/8th Commando Squadron and native guerrillas organised by Allied Intelligence Bureau parties operated away from the main lines of advance, where they contributed significantly to the success of the campaign.

There are some minor editorial quirks, such as mention of Gazelle Peninsula in a couple of places, when presumably Gazelle Harbour was intended.

JOHN DONOVAN