THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE RIGHT JOB: Lieutenant General Sir
Stanley Savige as a Military Commander
Gavin Keating
Oxford University Press 2006
While the Official Histories
generally treated Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige’s performance during the
Second World War favourably, other observers, notably Lieutenant Generals
Herring, Berryman and Robertson and Major General Vasey, were more critical, as
were books on Herring, Robertson and Vasey. Gavin Keating’s book gives some balance to these conflicting
views. His excellent work
reinforces Savige’s claim to have been a successful general and widens our
understanding of the internal politics of the Australian Army during World War
II. It should be read in
conjunction with Stuart Braga’s biography of ‘Tubby’ Allen, Kokoda Commander,
another title in the Army History series, in which many of the same characters
and issues recur. The book
complements W.B. Russell’s uncritical 1959 biography, There Goes a Man.
There are parallels between
Savige and Allen. Both came from
humble backgrounds, Savige the son of a rural meat worker, Allen of a railway
worker. Both left school early,
Savige at the age of 12 to work as a blacksmith’s striker, Allen at 14, to
become a messenger boy for the Postmaster-General’s Department. Savige later completed a
teacher-training course, but worked in drapery before entering business after the
First World War; Allen became an accountant. Each clashed with Berryman, Robertson and Herring, although
the result was not detrimental in Savige’s case. The health of each started to fail around the end of the
Second World War, and both died relatively young.
Keating covers Savige’s
early life and experience in the First World War briefly (Savige was among the
last off Gallipoli, and at different times adjutant of the 24th Battalion,
acting brigade major of the 6th Brigade, and a member of Dunsterforce). Keating notes the strong influence on
Savige’s development of the then Brigadier General Gellibrand, the subject of
another of the Army History series, The Paladin, by Peter Sadler. Savige seems to have developed his
antagonism towards permanent officers between the wars, but paradoxically one
of the sources of his antagonism was Gellibrand, a former British regular officer,
who later commented on the Squires report of 1939 that they ‘will give us a
Regular Army, and at the same time make it impossible to have an Army’.
The rivalry between
Australia’s regular and citizen soldiers is critical to understanding both the
history of the Australian Army and Savige’s career. The issue is unlikely ever to be resolved to the
satisfaction of both groups, probably because the situation is not as ‘black
and white’ as either claims.
However, Keating argues convincingly that the militia officers between
the wars had little opportunity, with time constraints and under-strength
units, to develop a full understanding of modern war.
Whether most of the regular
officers had better opportunities in the small permanent force is moot. Indeed, some of the inter-war
criticisms of regular officers do seem to have been justified. In his biography of General Sir Francis
Hassett, for example, Essex-Clark comments that with ‘the exception of “Red
Robbie”, none of the military staff or instructors [at Duntroon during
Hassett’s time as a cadet] was to prove outstanding in later years’. However, Savige was wise enough to
accept the support of regular staff officers as he moved to higher command
levels. Indeed, he did not have
such support for the battle for which he was most criticized, Bardia.
Keating’s book highlights a
dark obverse to this rivalry – the extent to which the Staff Corps became ‘a
compact and defensive group within the army as a whole’ as a result. This might have made them more critical
of those not part of the group.
However, as Keating also shows, the rivalry was never exclusively
between regulars and citizen soldiers.
There was tension also between citizen soldiers, most notably between
Herring on the one side and Savige and Allen on the other. Herring, citizen soldier and pillar of
the Melbourne legal establishment, was both a strong critic of Savige and
Allen’s ultimate nemesis.
This rivalry sometimes had a
detrimental effect on operations, as before Bardia, when Berryman excluded
Savige from a major pre-attack conference, even though his brigade was to have
a complex role in the operation.
As Keating shows, the end result of Savige’s exclusion from the
conference, and what can most charitably be described as a litany of mixed
messages after it, was the abortive attack on Post 11, which cost heavy
casualties for no benefit. Neither
Savige nor Berryman comes out well from this incident. Clashes with Robertson also ensued, as the
19th Brigade was brought into the battle.
In that case, Savige seems to have been more at fault. Overall, Keating indicates that there
was fault enough for all at Bardia, but that this might be expected in the
AIF’s first battle of the war.
Afterwards, however, like
the Staff Corps, Savige became compact and defensive, and probably with
reason. Keating acknowledges that
on at least one occasion Vasey seems to have played a vital role in ensuring
priority for Robertson over Savige, and also to have worked actively for his
removal. Keating acknowledges that
Staff Corps members were ‘not particularly impartial critics’. Vasey, for one, admitted to a hope that
he might replace Savige.
Savige’s involvement in
Greece and Syria was limited. In
Greece, Savige displayed great personal courage, as did others of his
rank. He received better staff
support there, while in Syria he commanded only a small force, albeit at an
important time. His action in
forcing continuation of an advance by tired troops ensured rapid success,
probably for fewer casualties, and shows that he had the strength to push an
issue if needed. In Syria Savige
again clashed with Berryman, who, unaware of specific orders to Savige,
interfered with units on the battlefield.
Keating makes a reasonable
case that Savige, and others, were not suited physically or temperamentally for
the kind of war waged in the Middle East.
He shows, however, that Savige’s skill at fostering a team sense was
highly developed, as was his rapport with the ordinary soldiers, another
characteristic he shared with Allen.
He was always conscious that orders from senior headquarters would
‘ultimately be carried out “by common soldiers at the point of a
bayonet”’. One photo of the senior
officers of the 6th Division during the First Libyan campaign is symbolic. Of the six officers shown, Mackay,
Robertson, Berryman and Vasey wear officers’ pattern uniforms, Savige and Allen
wear soldiers’ pattern.
Savige returned to Australia
at the end of 1941, taking command of the 3rd Division, thus rescuing his
military career from probable obscurity.
His robust approach to training focused the division on preparing for
war, and led to the removal of a large number of officers. Important support at this time was
provided by Lieutenant Colonel John Wilton, Savige’s GSO1, who developed a high
regard for Savige. Later, as a
corps commander in Bougainville, Savige was again supported by highly effective
regular staff officers, including Brigadier Ragnar Garrett as BGS.
The important point that
Keating makes about Savige’s relationship with Wilton is that the latter was
always highly regarded, so that any criticism of Savige’s conduct of the
Salamaua campaign either should also apply to Wilton, his trusted GSO1, or can
be dismissed as personal. Keating
also suggests that someone (probably Herring) did not want Savige in New
Guinea. Certainly, once he arrived
in New Guinea, Savige found his relations with Herring, commanding New Guinea
Force (NGF), trying.
Keating examines the
controversy between Savige and NGF over Salamaua, and concludes that much of
the fault lay with NGF. Herring
did not establish a clear command chain with the US forces operating in the
area, and his guidance to Savige on wider issues, particularly the need for
Salamaua not to fall too soon, was at best ambiguous. Keating concludes that Savige played a critical part in
controlling a competent and relentless campaign ‘that did much credit to those
in command’. Herring’s reputation
is diminished by his failure to understand, or indeed even apparently to
enquire into, the tactical and logistic problems of the campaign, a fault he
also displayed during the Kokoda campaign.
Berryman was sent forward to
investigate the battle’s conduct towards the end of the campaign. Until Berryman’s arrival there had been
few visits to the front by senior officers of NGF, as in the Kokoda
campaign. Berryman found that
Savige had ‘done well and we had misjudged him’. This was surely one of the strongest endorsements that
Savige could have hoped for.
Berryman (not usually a supporter of either Savige or Allen) also
considered that Allen’s operations on the Kokoda Trail were effective. However, Savige’s prediction in June
1943 that he would be relieved when it became simple to capture Salamaua came
true (yet another parallel with Allen, relieved by Vasey just as the Japanese
defences before Kokoda broke).
Keating discusses the choice
of Savige over Vasey for promotion to lieutenant general. Putting aside the issue of Vasey’s
health, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he would not have been ‘the
right man for the right job’.
Herring once famously stated that he preferred ‘Vasey tired to Allen
fresh’. Vasey (tired) launched a
number of attacks at Gona and Sanananda that gained little or nothing, but left
many casualties. It is hard to see
Vasey in command on Bougainville restraining activist brigade commanders like
Hammer and Potts, as Savige did.
Blamey seems to have made the correct choice. Ironically, however, Savige ended the war doing one of the
things that he had criticized Headquarters 6th Division for at Bardia – giving
detailed instructions to subordinate commanders as to how they should operate!
Savige’s final contribution
to the regular/citizen soldier rivalry in Australia came in a statement to the
press in 1946, where he commented, inter alia, that a large number of
Duntroon graduates by ‘their general attitude and actions … clearly lived in a world apart’. His First World War and inter-war
mentor, the Sandhurst graduate Gellibrand, also had an intense dislike of for
the concept of a select regular army officers school, because he believed the
officers produced stood aloof from the nation. In 1995, a Parliamentary committee described the
Australian Defence Force Academy as a ‘military nunnery’, suggesting that the
attitude deprecated by Savige and Gellibrand existed, and has been passed on to
the newer Academy.
Keating accepts that
Savige’s forte was as a leader of men, a critical talent during the Salamaua
campaign. His weakest point was
his limited grasp of the technical nature of modern warfare, for which he
relied on good staff support.
Keating lauds Savige’s ‘ability as a trainer of raw troops’, evident
throughout his command of the 3rd Division. His greatest strength, however, remained his understanding
of and concern for the soldiers.
One of his greatest weaknesses, in contrast, was his reluctance to act
against ineffective subordinates, especially if he had appointed them. His empathy for the troops was again
shown at the end of his service, when, asked to be Coordinator of
Demobilisation and Dispersal, he sought to ‘serve the men who fought … [but] …
Salary of no interest’.
Throughout his book, Keating
makes the case that militia commanders depended on their regular staff officers
for advice on the technical aspects of modern war. He regards this as a weakness in the Australian military
system, occurring by default not design.
It might have been a weakness, yet all commanders rely on the support of
their staff, and it was arguably the explicit intent of the Australian system,
up until the end of the Second World War, that citizen commanders should
receive the support of regular staff officers.
That system worked
effectively, as demonstrated by Savige’s career during the Second World
War. Whether it could have been
successful in the circumstances following the war is unlikely, but not relevant
to the earlier period. Keating
suggests that studies of the Australian Army in the Second World War focus too
much on commanders and not enough on their staff officers. A good first step to rectify this
deficiency would be a study on Berryman, whose presence at controversial
moments through much of the war seems ubiquitous.
There is a degree of irony
in a couple of the quotes in the book, deliberate in one case, but perhaps
unintended in another. Given the
pervasiveness of the ‘Bataan Gang’ in his court, MacArthur’s warning to Curtin
about Blamey surrounding himself with favourites must be a classic case of the pot
calling the kettle black. Also,
Vasey’s quoted comment, comparing a senior professional British officer to the
‘amateur soldiers we have in the senior grades’, loses some of its force when
we now know that Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, spent hours
poring ‘over the Army List in search of suitable divisional
commanders’. He is said to have
wanted to be ‘merciless with divisional and corps commanders whom he thought
not up to their job, but he did not think he could find better men to replace
them’. Neither system produced
perfect results.
Keating quotes, but does not
fully support, the comment by A.N. Kemsley, formerly Director of Organisation
at Army Headquarters, that Savige was ‘a good brigadier-doubtful as a major
general-far over-promoted as a lieutenant general’. This has echoes of Gavin Long’s description of Allen as ‘a
fine colonel, a better brigadier than divisional commander and not a suitable
corps commander’. Both
descriptions reverse the order of C.E.W. Bean’s description of Monash as a
leader who ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better
than a division’, cited on page 588 of Bean’s Volume II. Given that Monash often seemed somewhat
cold and detached from the troops, it seems probable that Savige (and Allen)
might have preferred their descriptions.
Whatever Savige’s
limitations as a military commander, Keating demonstrates that he was The
Right Man for the Right Job, and that in 1959 Russell chose a good title
for his biography, There goes a Man.
JOHN DONOVAN