The Royal Australian Corps of Transport

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN CORPS OF TRANSPORT: A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN ARMY TRANSPORT 1973-2000

Albert Palazzo, Australian Military History Publications, 2001, 181pp.

It is hard to approach a unit or corps history without some trepidation.  The genre is too often marred by uncritical historiography and a desire to ensure that as many individuals as possible are mentioned, generally in circumstances of interest only to an ‘in’ group of current or former members.

Dr Palazzo has largely avoided the first of these pitfalls in this book on the Royal Australian Corps of Transport.  He has cast a critical eye on events related to both the gestation of the Corps, and its development in the organisationally turbulent years of the 1980s and 1990s.  In relation to the second potential pitfall, there are (as expected) many mentions of individuals in the book.  These are often in a context that assists the reader to understand the development of the Corps, its problems, and its experiences since being raised in 1973.  However, the ‘naming of the parts’ does afflict the chapters on the roles of the Corps overseas and in the community.

The chapters on the establishment, development, various reorganisations, functions and education and training of the Corps were the most interesting to the reviewer.  Unfortunately, they do little to engender confidence in some of the higher institutional arrangements for command and management of the Army.  Rather, they show an organization that seems to have too little appreciation of the words of Field Marshal Lord Wavell, quoted on page 1, on the importance of logistics as the foundation of all operations.  From the beginning, the tale recounted by Dr Palazzo shows a narrowness of outlook in Army Headquarters that has hopefully been broadened following the ADF’s development of a joint approach to operations across the 1990s.  Dr Palazzo’s discussion of the East Timor operation, however, does give cause to doubt that the problem has been entirely eliminated.

Dr Palazzo’s discusses the limited knowledge displayed by non-logistics officers of matters outside their specialisation during the establishment and later reorganisations of the Corps of Transport, and during exercises and operations.  His account suggests an endemic failing in the development of many of those officers.  In many cases recounted by Dr Palazzo, the Army’s leaders emphasised operational objectives, while minimising logistic constraints in their planning.  This might be acceptable during an exercise, but risks disaster in an operation. 

Dr Palazzo details occasions during which the success of exercises or operations could have been jeopardised by a reluctance of the operational planners to bring logisticians into the planning process at an early stage.  In many cases, the activity (exercise or operation) seems to have succeeded more as a result of the tactical level effectiveness for which the Australian Army is justly renowned, rather than the efficiency of the planning process.  Dr Palazzo highlights the role of reserves in ensuring the success of the East Timor operation.  That the logistics system was also less than perfect is shown starkly in Dr Palazzo’s description of the loading of HMAS Jervis Bay and Tobruk for the Somalia operation.

Dr Palazzo discusses the various rationalisations that have occurred in the Army, particularly across the 1990s.  He accepts that the removal of fragmented command structures associated with a multiplicity of small specialised units should have improved the effectiveness of logistics support, and considers that replacement of the extensive network of uniformed fourth line support by civilians or contract support has not affected capability.  Rather, it has allowed the logistics Corps to concentrate their limited resources on operational functions. 

There is an undercurrent through the book that the process that forced the Army to rationalise (financial constraint) was somehow unfair.  It might have been more relevant to ask why a professional organization needed to be forced to improve its efficiency and effectiveness and reduce organisational complexity.  The correctness of some of the decisions made is, however, brought into question.  As an example, Dr Palazzo notes that a clear lesson of World War II is that there will be a need to move troops and materials by sea in the archipelagic areas to Australia’s north and northeast.  However, the means to carry out this function have been drastically reduced. 

Dr Palazzo also discusses the insensitivity with which Army Headquarters approached many changes, particularly to unit titles.  He expresses surprise that an organization that normally shows a tremendous respect for tradition and heritage chose to eliminate the transport units’ titular numbers within the Brigade Administrative Support Battalions, severing their tie to the Corps, and to their own history.  Suggesting that the Army might have found a less heavy-handed way to deal with its concerns about tribalism seems to miss the point.  Many of the problems raised by Dr Palazzo, in relation to planning processes, seem themselves to be the result of tribal nature of the Army’s structure.

Logistics personnel should not, however, feel that they are the only ones to suffer in this manner.  Another recent book by Dr Palazzo (Defenders Of Australia: The 3rd Australian Division, 1916-1991) details similar insensitive treatment of Army Reserve units during the Pentropic and Millar reorganisations. 

If this review sounds critical, it should be noted that Dr Palazzo’s book does tell an inspiring story of the successes of the troops of the Royal Australian Corps of Transport in support of the community, during many an exercise, and more recently, on operations.  These successes came regardless of the obstacles that the higher Army organization might have placed in their way.  For that story alone, the book is worth reading.

JOHN DONOVAN