THE LANDING AT ANZAC 1915
Chris Roberts
Big Sky Publishing, 2013, 192pp,
$19.95
ISBN 9781922132208 (pbk.)
Chris Roberts’ book had an extended gestation, starting as
an Army Staff College paper in 1978, and developing via articles in the Journal of the Australian War Memorial and Wartime. The wait, however, has been worthwhile.
Roberts has provided a clear description of the landing at
Anzac and its immediate aftermath, concentrating on the first day. He has
resolved some misconceptions about the landing (to the extent that these can be
resolved definitively at this remove). The issue of Ottoman artillery, however,
remains unclear, with markedly different accounts in this book and Peter
Williams’ The Battle of ANZAC Ridge (AMHP, 2007).
Roberts describes the limited training received by pre-war
members of the Australian citizen forces (and the New Zealand equivalent, the
Territorial Force). RMC Duntroon, founded in 1910, was intended to provide
professionally trained officers for both nations, but the short time available
before the war restricted its immediate effectiveness. He compares the rushed
training of the AIF with the systematic training provided to Australian
soldiers preparing for deployment to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
Roberts discusses the actions of the principal leaders of
the ANZAC: half of the eight brigade commanders and above were British
regulars, Bridges was an Australian regular, who had partially completed
training at the Canadian RMC, the other three were Australian citizen soldiers.
The battalion commanders were all citizen soldiers. Apart from Johnston of the
NZ Brigade, who was ill, the influence of most of the more senior officers on
the battle, including Johnston’s replacement ‘Hooky’ Walker, another British
regular, was negative.
Sinclair-Maclagan made the fatal decision to change the plan
soon after the landing, without referring to Bridges. McCay accepted this
change, deferring to the regular soldier. Sinclair-MacLagan’s ‘actions, rather
than the misplaced landing’, destroyed the plan. Bridges let this decision
stand, and Godley later supported Bridges’ recommendation to evacuate the
force. Birdwood supported them, and the force was saved only by Hamilton’s
refusal to consider evacuation. Walker sent the Auckland Battalion by a
roundabout route to Baby 700, ‘seriously affect[ing] their eventual
deployment’. MacLaurin remained on the beach, and Monash did not come ashore
until 26 April, neither having any impact on 25 April.
Some battalion commanders, including Braund, Weir and
Elliott, performed well, others ‘lost control of their units’, collapsed under
the strain, or were simply ineffective. In contrast, Roberts shows that many of
the junior soldiers and officers fought hard, despite their limited training,
often showing a higher level of discipline, resolution, and initiative than
their seniors. While stragglers did drift back to Anzac Cove, others held their
ground, often unto death.
Roberts explains satisfactorily the misplaced landing and
incorrect reports of Ottoman machine guns opposing the landing. In the latter
case, inexperienced soldiers probably confused rapid rifle fire for machine
guns, a common error. Further confusion came from the fire of Maxim guns
mounted on the steamboats towing the landing boats.
The issue of Ottoman artillery support remains unclear.
Roberts and Williams come to different totals of Ottoman artillery pieces
available by the evening of 25 April (44 for Williams, 16, increasing during
the night to 32, for Roberts). By the end of 26 April they have similar totals
(44 for Williams, 40 for Roberts, the difference probably being the guns at
Gaba Tepe and behind Palamutlu Ridge, apparently not counted by Roberts). On
balance, Roberts seems more likely to be correct. Given the difficulties of moving
artillery into the broken terrain, not all those guns present might have been
brought into action.
There is some confusion in the book between the Ottoman
2/27th and 2/57th Battalions, with the latter seemingly the battalion that
slipped from First Ridge down to the beach near Fisherman’s Hut, although the
former, the original defenders of the Anzac Cove/Gaba Tepe area, sometimes
appears in that position. Also, the 1/27th is referred to in one map caption
(but not on the map) as being on Baby 700, when the 1/57th seems intended.
A minor point, Major Henry Bennett of the 6th Battalion is
more commonly known by his middle name, Gordon.
JOHN DONOVAN
