A GREATER SUM OF SORROW: The
Battles of Bullecourt
David Coombes
Big Sky Publishing, 2016, 427pp
ISBN 9781925275650
This volume on the two Battles of Bullecourt, in early 1917,
provides a useful companion to Dr David Coombes’ earlier books on Sir Leslie Morshead,
Sir JJ Talbot Hobbs and Australian prisoners of war during World War I.
Coombes covers the two Bullecourt battles comprehensively.
First, however, he discusses the Fifth Army commander, General Gough. It would
be fair to say that Coombes does not regard him with great favour. Australians
first served under Gough at Pozières, and the unfavourable impression they
gained there of his impatience and arrogance was confirmed at Bullecourt. His
Chief of Staff, Major General Malcolm was also held in poor regard in the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF).
The original intention of the first attack was to provide a
feint to take some pressure away from the Battle of Arras. Field Marshal Haig,
however, expanded the intention to a full attack on the Hindenburg Line, but
then backed away from this. Gough decided to persist with the original plan,
despite a shortage of artillery and time. Coombes speculates that one reason
might have been that success at Bullecourt would strengthen his claim to lead
the attack planned around Ypres later in 1917.
Australian leaders also come in for criticism. Lieutenant
General Birdwood and Major General White seemed to ignore the evidence of
German machine guns covering the area chosen for the attack. Birdwood accepted
an argument that roads should “not be further damaged by ‘hurrying up guns and
ammunition’”, an unusual proposition in a war where strong artillery support
was recognised as an important element in an attack! Coombes considers that
Birdwood and White should have argued more vigorously for a ‘proper preliminary
artillery barrage’, and ensured that the machine gun positions were
neutralised.
The eventual plan for the first attack (after many confusing
changes, made right up to the last minute) was for an assault with minimal
artillery support, but accompanied by 12 tanks. The troops involved had no
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the tanks, which would approach the
start line in darkness. The postponement of the attack for a day after the
tanks failed to arrive simply warned the Germans to be alert.
Coombes records that during the first attack, Birdwood
rejected reports from his subordinates that it had failed, and that artillery
support was desperately needed, preferring to believe false reports that
Australians were in ‘Hendecourt and Riencourt’. At least 18 requests for
artillery support ‘went unanswered’. When the artillery finally intervened, it
caused heavy casualties among captured Australians being marched to the rear.
The tanks made no significant contribution to the attack.
Like the 5th Division after Fromelles in July 1916, the 4th
Division was shattered after First Bullecourt. Paralleling Lieutenant General
Haking’s comment after Fromelles that the attack ‘has done both divisions
[involved] a great deal of good’, Gough expressed his belief that ‘the Anzac
attack had been of great assistance’ even after its complete failure.
Coombes describes planning for the second attack that was
not greatly improved over that for the first. Haig and Gough both focussed on
wider political and personal ambitions, which they hoped that the attack might
help to fulfil. Birdwood succeeded in rejecting the use of tanks, and in
improving the artillery plan, but while the final orders issued were ‘clear and
comprehensive’, the machine guns near Quéant that had caused heavy casualties
during the first attack were not bombarded. Coombes blames this failure and
other planning weaknesses largely on the staffs of I ANZAC and the 2nd
Division. The second attack was also a costly failure.
While Coombes does not specifically mention it, the major
attacks carried out by the AIF during its first year in France and Flanders
were all either costly failures (Fromelles and the Bullecourt battles) or
tactical victories obtained at excessive cost (Pozières and Mouquet Farm). The
AIF’s next major attack (Messines in June 1917) was a success, as were its
early attacks during 3rd Ypres, albeit the later parts of that offensive
degenerated into a muddy blood bath.
Recent scholarship on World War I has proposed a theory of a
‘learning curve’ in the BEF on the Western Front. There seems much logic behind
that theory, but it is also clear from Coombes’ account that there were many
slow learners.
Coombes’ book takes much of the gloss off White’s reputation
as the eminence grise behind Birdwood (whose weaknesses as a tactician seem to be
well accepted). It might be time that White’s full career received a new
examination, including his role in the over-expansion of the AIF in 1916 and in
post-war planning, to replace Bean’s earlier somewhat hagiographic work.
Regrettably there are some editorial weaknesses. Coombes
seems to have some trouble with the (admittedly rather quirky) British infantry
battalion nomenclature, particularly for Territorial and new Army units. One
notable error is a reference to the Honourable Artillery Company as ‘Honorary’!
He also has some difficulty with the accents on French place (such as Pozières
and Quéant) and personal (such as Poincaré and d’Espèrey) names. At one point,
Major General Walker is named as commander of the 4th Division, rather than
Major General Holmes, while Major General Legge’s middle name appears as
‘Walker’, rather than ‘Gordon’. Some German words also are misspelled in
places, although correct elsewhere.
JOHN DONOVAN
