Light Horse: A History of Australia's Mounted Arm

LIGHT HORSE A History of Australia’s Mounted Arm

Jean Bou

Cambridge University Press, 2009, 361pp, $59.95

ISBN 978-0-521-19708-3

Jean Bou has written a useful institutional history of the Australian light horse. Because it is an institutional history, it focuses on the roles, tasks, development and eventual decline of the mounted arm from colonial days until the last horsed regiment was disbanded in 1944. Descriptions of battles are used to illustrate specific points in the discussion, not as the principal focus of the narrative; those seeking a full history of the mounted arm at war in South Africa or the First World War will not find it here.

  

Dr Bou records the limited success of the early colonial militias, when enthusiasm for military service receded with the waning of each perceived threat. After the 1885 Sudan expedition, however, the colonies’ willingness to maintain military forces beyond a particular crisis increased, and a belief in the potential effectiveness of part-time citizen militias grew, at least in part based on the Boer success in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880-81.

During the nineteenth century, support in the British Empire for mounted militia forces was strengthened by the writings of the Canadian-based cavalry theorist George Denison (who wanted to replace the sword or lance, the arme blanche, with a pistol). Dr Bou notes that Denison’s work influenced not only Australian colonial leaders, but also Edward Hutton, who had served in Canada, and later commanded the New South Wales colonial military forces, and then a mounted infantry brigade during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Hutton then became General Officer Commanding the forces of the new Commonwealth of Australia. The Canadian connection extended to Major General French, Hutton’s successor in the New South Wales colonial forces, who had served as commissioner of the North West (later Royal Canadian) Mounted police.

It now seems almost compulsory for books about Australian military history to criticise the myth of the ‘natural Australian soldier’, or in this case the bushman as born mounted infantryman/rifleman. Dr Bou puts this myth into a wider context. He records that this belief was frequently held by political/journalistic elements in Australia (as would perhaps be expected, although at least one senator, who was also a part-time soldier, rejected the natural soldier concept).

However, experienced British regular officers like Hutton, who played a key part in the development of the colonial and national forces of Australia, also propounded this belief, as did some former British regular officers who raised or commanded particular Australian units. Officers like Lord Roberts and Colonel Rimington, who commanded Australian mounted forces in action in South Africa, also contrasted Australian soldiers favourably with the ‘British townsmen of the later Imperial Yeomanry contingents’.

Dr Bou notes that, ‘like all good myths, [this] had some basis in fact’, and at least in South Africa ‘the supposed strength of Australia’s mounted men … was [not] completely mythological’, but lack of training remained a limitation. Most contingents took about a year to ‘become genuinely efficient’ – usually the length of their period of service. However, the Australian soldiers sent to South Africa did what was required of them.

Dr Bou records also that the natural soldier mythology was maintained alongside a strong (and continuing) emphasis on training in a soldier’s multitude of skills, suggesting that regardless of their public pronouncements, those actually responsible for developing the Australian forces recognised that while they had a good foundation on which to build, training was necessary. While the constraints of time and financial resources meant that it was never adequate, the intention was always to increase training. The belief in the potential effectiveness of part-time militias was also qualified by a focus on their use in low-level and ‘irregular’ warfare, and in theatres where defences were likely to be less developed.

Dr Bou shows that the mythology of the frontiersman as natural soldier also existed in other English speaking nations (and the Boer republics). One wonders the extent to which this mythology was used as a recruiting device to appeal to the self-image of citizens in nations that maintained a tradition of voluntary military service?

Despite Dr Bou’s defence of the role of the mounted arm on the battlefield in the early part of the twentieth century, it becomes clear from this book that its success during the First World War was found principally in secondary theatres, where the battlefield was more mobile and dynamic, and development of defensive systems was less extensive than on the Western Front.

Ultimately, the concept of the mounted citizen soldier, based on ‘hardy men from the country’ who were thought to be natural soldiers was found wanting. Yet, as Dr Bou demonstrates, this opinion was held by experienced professional soldiers as well as by political and journalistic opinion makers. Whatever its validity, for more than half a century the concept gave at least some encouragement to Australian citizens to serve in the mounted regiments of the militia and later the citizen forces.

One matter to which Dr Bou returns frequently is the role of the light horse. He provides definitions of cavalry, mounted infantry and mounted rifles in an Author’s Note, and concludes that for much of its existence the light horse operated as mounted rifles. However, there was a change to an emphasis on the cavalry role from about the time of Beersheba until almost the final disbandment.

The definition of the cavalry function, which emphasised the use of the arme blanche, and included attack and defence either mounted or dismounted, is clearly different to the definitions for mounted infantry or mounted rifles. However, the differentiation between mounted infantry and mounted rifles seems at times to involve some hair splitting on functions like outpost duties and skirmishing.

Dr Bou sees mounted infantry as essentially a mobile form of traditional infantry, with the principal role of dismounted attack and defence, but which sometimes undertook outpost and reconnaissance duties. Mounted rifles undertook the duties of cavalry, but with a firearm only. Mounted rifles often operated as auxiliaries to cavalry, which in the last years of the nineteenth century had developed its skills in skirmishing, and used more open formations for mounted actions. Hutton, however, wanted his mounted rifles to be ‘capable of dealing in dismounted action with an enemy’s infantry’, which seems to be a broader mandate, more appropriate to Dr Bou’s definition of mounted infantry.

In the end, the difference between mounted infantry and mounted rifles seems to pivot on the capability to attack or defend dismounted, as mounted infantry also undertook reconnaissance and outpost duties on occasion. This difference seems to be largely a function of the dismounted strength of the different units (a dismounted light horse brigade was ‘barely equivalent in strength to an infantry battalion’). Some colonial forces (particularly in Queensland) emphasised strongly the mounted infantry function; others (New South Wales) put significant effort into the cavalry role, complete with the arme blanche.

The difference between mounted rifles and mounted infantry became a problem in the Sinai and Gaza operations in 1916 and 1917, when, as Dr Bou records, the limited numbers and firepower of dismounted riflemen reduced the effectiveness of the light horse, although their mounted actions proved relatively effective. The mounted rifles concept seemed to fit best into irregular warfare, and even in secondary theatres against poorly developed defences, often without barbed wire, and with only a fraction of the artillery that might have been met on the Western Front, mounted rifles were not as effective as hoped, though they were able to provide support to infantry divisions in an all-arms force.

Hutton’s pivotal role in the development of the light horse is a major element of the early parts of this book. Following their relative success compared to cavalry units in South Africa, Hutton preferred mounted riflemen, with a focus on dismounted action. He generally got his way, with citizen force units after Federation being organised as mounted rifles. Dr Bou shows the longevity of Hutton’s influence, with much of the First World War light horse remaining as mounted rifles, even as other light horse units were converted to cavalry.

After successes in 1917, particularly at Beersheba, the three light horse brigades in the Australian Mounted Division were issued with swords in July 1918, and effectively became cavalry. The two light horse brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle brigade in the Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) Mounted Division remained as mounted rifles.

Dr Bou mentions the Surafend incident, in which a number of Arabs were murdered in revenge for the death of a New Zealand soldier, and notes that the light horsemen in the Middle East (reflecting the era in which they lived), exhibited a deep racial contempt towards the local inhabitants, and held an even deeper antipathy towards the Bedouin, who ‘killed lone soldiers and downed airmen’ for their possessions, and desecrated graves to steal from the dead.

Dr Bou follows the institutional decline of the light horse, which started in the home-based militia regiments during the First World War. The militia regiments were reorganised in the early 1920s to continue the traditions of the wartime units, and to reflect wartime experience, and all regiments were then to ‘be trained as cavalry’. As he describes, even under the compulsory training scheme, the light horse remained essentially a voluntary force, because the soldier had to provide his own horse.

Whatever plans for the future were made after the First World War, the financial reality of the 1920s undermined them. Training time was reduced, and numbers fell. At least one change made during the 1920s, to redistribute Hotchkiss machine guns to the sabre troops, ‘to boost … tactical flexibility’ was exactly opposite to wartime practice, suggesting a degree of organisational confusion!

As Dr Bou records, the declining numbers of suitable horses ultimately spelled the end for the mounted troops (horses were also required for the artillery). Unfortunately, the Army neglected mechanisation during the 1930s. Raising an armoured car regiment in 1933 and incorporating light car (actually utility truck) elements in selected regiments were poor substitutes. A second armoured car regiment was raised in 1939, and by then six light horse regiments had become truck-mounted machine gun units. These were the principal efforts made to mechanise the light horse during the 1930s.

Dr Bou argues that by the beginning of the Second World War the importance of mounted units had waned. The existing mounted units, far from being central to Australia’s defence as they were after Federation, were returned to a mounted rifle role, and intended to operate in an irregular manner in country not suitable for mechanised operations, thus coming largely full-circle to their function in the late 1800s. The 1938 Inspector-General’s report did not even mention the mounted troops.

Dr Bou records that in 1940 the commandant of the RMC, Duntroon proposed the establishment of mounted infantry divisions, and abolition of the term ‘cavalry’. Vernon Sturdee, then General Officer Commanding Eastern Command, and later twice CGS, recommended that the light horse should become mounted infantry, while Horace Robertson proposed the abolition of the horse-mounted arm. Sturdee also wanted to abolish the term ‘cavalry’, so as to ‘eradicate the cavalry complex’ (presumably arme blanche mythology). The Military Board wanted the light horse to operate at squadron rather than regimental level, in ‘enclosed country’.

The final days of the mounted troops were spent in local patrolling. A few small horse mounted elements saw limited operational service, but most light horse regiments were converted to tank, reconnaissance or motor infantry units, before being disbanded. The last horse-mounted unit, Western Australia’s 10^th Light Horse, was disbanded in 1944. Dr Bou concludes that the military authorities between the wars had ‘abrogated their responsibilities in regard to the development of the mounted arm’. Indeed, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that there was also a certain amount of resting on the laurels of the First World War. The military horsemen, in Dr Bou’s words, ‘became a niche role’, were overtaken by events, and disappeared.

Dr Bou includes separate chapters on the citizen light horse soldiers and those who served at war. These chapters illustrate the difference between citizen soldiers, members of an institution with (in many units) significant local histories and an important social function, and wartime ‘soldiers for the working day’.

Whichever role might be emphasised, Dr Bou demonstrates the vital link with horse ownership in the part-time mounted forces. This link imposed limitations on the development of capability, and had social effects on recruitment, as the cost of owning a horse excluded many less wealthy potential recruits. Dr Bou gives credit to the ‘industriousness and keenness of that minority of men who made citizen-soldiering an earnest pastime’, and whose efforts ensured that the militia mounted units continued for so long. He notes, however, that some elements of society were less than enthusiastic about the citizen forces, to the extent that one country sub-unit had to be disbanded because the local School of Arts would not provide space for it to train. Plus ça change …

Regarding the wartime force, Dr Bou records that significant proportions of the light horsemen in some regiments came from cities, with many having a white collar or skilled labourer background, albeit it seems possible that at least some of the labourers had worked with horses in their civilian employment. A much lower proportion than in the peacetime force comprised farmers or graziers, reflecting a wider recruitment base when horses were provided. A feature of the life of a wartime light horseman when not fighting was the level of routine work involved, much of it in caring for the horses (which Dr Bou demonstrates might not all have been held in such fond regard as legend suggests).

A certain amount of arme blanche or ‘cavalry spirit’ mythology seems to creep into the book (providing a balance to the ‘natural soldier’ bushman mythology). The examples of mounted charges given often stand out as those opportunistic occasions that provide the exceptions that prove the rule. Many of the examples of successful mounted operations using the arme blanche seem to have depended on circumstances unlikely to have been found, for example, on the Western Front. Phrases such as ‘judicious use of the arme blanche’ suggest recognition that its use would not always be appropriate. Dr Bou records that too much effort during the 1920s went into training with the sword, at the expense of firearms training.

It would have been useful had this book included full lists of light horse units (with territorial titles) at selected points across the period described. This would have enabled the reader to follow the organisational changes (and the changes in numbering systems) more readily. There are maps showing the distribution of units at selected times, but as they do not include territorial titles, these do not really meet the need. They also include the occasional anomaly; Map 2 records the 14th Light Horse in both Queensland and South Australia, and the 17th in Western Australia, while the text later suggests that the 17th should have been listed in South Australia).

In an epilogue, Dr Bou mentions briefly those units currently on the Army order of battle that have light horse titles, noting that the Victorian Mounted Rifles, the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and the Australian Horse no longer appear, while the Queensland Mounted Infantry is now represented by a regular Army unit.

Dr Bou analyses in an appendix the evidence around a photograph claimed to be of the charge at Beersheba. This photograph has been the subject of some controversy, but at this remove in time, with all of the original participants dead, reaching a definitive conclusion seems improbable. While the number of copies of the photograph that have been found in returned soldiers’ photo albums with captions unrelated to Beersheba is evidence that it is of another incident, the most telling evidence is technical. It seems unlikely that a camera capable of taking such a clear photograph of moving horsemen at sunset with the film available in 1917 would have been found in a soldier’s pack.

The evidence is summarised well, and while Dr Bou is probably right that the actual event depicted cannot be identified, he seems correct in his evaluation that it was not at Beersheba. Whatever photograph was taken by Eric Elliott on that notable day, it does not seem to have been this one.

Overall, this is a very useful book, despite the limitations in details of units at different times and some editorial quirks.

JOHN DONOVAN