The Right Man for the Right Job

THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE RIGHT JOB: Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige as a Military Commander

Gavin Keating

Oxford University Press 2006

While the Official Histories generally treated Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige’s performance during the Second World War favourably, other observers, notably Lieutenant Generals Herring, Berryman and Robertson and Major General Vasey, were more critical, as were books on Herring, Robertson and Vasey.  Gavin Keating’s book gives some balance to these conflicting views.  His excellent work reinforces Savige’s claim to have been a successful general and widens our understanding of the internal politics of the Australian Army during World War II.  It should be read in conjunction with Stuart Braga’s biography of ‘Tubby’ Allen, Kokoda Commander, another title in the Army History series, in which many of the same characters and issues recur.  The book complements W.B. Russell’s uncritical 1959 biography, There Goes a Man. 

There are parallels between Savige and Allen.  Both came from humble backgrounds, Savige the son of a rural meat worker, Allen of a railway worker.  Both left school early, Savige at the age of 12 to work as a blacksmith’s striker, Allen at 14, to become a messenger boy for the Postmaster-General’s Department.  Savige later completed a teacher-training course, but worked in drapery before entering business after the First World War; Allen became an accountant.  Each clashed with Berryman, Robertson and Herring, although the result was not detrimental in Savige’s case.  The health of each started to fail around the end of the Second World War, and both died relatively young.

Keating covers Savige’s early life and experience in the First World War briefly (Savige was among the last off Gallipoli, and at different times adjutant of the 24th Battalion, acting brigade major of the 6th Brigade, and a member of Dunsterforce).  Keating notes the strong influence on Savige’s development of the then Brigadier General Gellibrand, the subject of another of the Army History series, The Paladin, by Peter Sadler.  Savige seems to have developed his antagonism towards permanent officers between the wars, but paradoxically one of the sources of his antagonism was Gellibrand, a former British regular officer, who later commented on the Squires report of 1939 that they ‘will give us a Regular Army, and at the same time make it impossible to have an Army’. 

The rivalry between Australia’s regular and citizen soldiers is critical to understanding both the history of the Australian Army and Savige’s career.  The issue is unlikely ever to be resolved to the satisfaction of both groups, probably because the situation is not as ‘black and white’ as either claims.  However, Keating argues convincingly that the militia officers between the wars had little opportunity, with time constraints and under-strength units, to develop a full understanding of modern war. 

Whether most of the regular officers had better opportunities in the small permanent force is moot.  Indeed, some of the inter-war criticisms of regular officers do seem to have been justified.  In his biography of General Sir Francis Hassett, for example, Essex-Clark comments that with ‘the exception of “Red Robbie”, none of the military staff or instructors [at Duntroon during Hassett’s time as a cadet] was to prove outstanding in later years’.  However, Savige was wise enough to accept the support of regular staff officers as he moved to higher command levels.  Indeed, he did not have such support for the battle for which he was most criticized, Bardia.

Keating’s book highlights a dark obverse to this rivalry – the extent to which the Staff Corps became ‘a compact and defensive group within the army as a whole’ as a result.  This might have made them more critical of those not part of the group.  However, as Keating also shows, the rivalry was never exclusively between regulars and citizen soldiers.  There was tension also between citizen soldiers, most notably between Herring on the one side and Savige and Allen on the other.  Herring, citizen soldier and pillar of the Melbourne legal establishment, was both a strong critic of Savige and Allen’s ultimate nemesis. 

This rivalry sometimes had a detrimental effect on operations, as before Bardia, when Berryman excluded Savige from a major pre-attack conference, even though his brigade was to have a complex role in the operation.  As Keating shows, the end result of Savige’s exclusion from the conference, and what can most charitably be described as a litany of mixed messages after it, was the abortive attack on Post 11, which cost heavy casualties for no benefit.  Neither Savige nor Berryman comes out well from this incident.  Clashes with Robertson also ensued, as the 19th Brigade was brought into the battle.  In that case, Savige seems to have been more at fault.  Overall, Keating indicates that there was fault enough for all at Bardia, but that this might be expected in the AIF’s first battle of the war. 

Afterwards, however, like the Staff Corps, Savige became compact and defensive, and probably with reason.  Keating acknowledges that on at least one occasion Vasey seems to have played a vital role in ensuring priority for Robertson over Savige, and also to have worked actively for his removal.  Keating acknowledges that Staff Corps members were ‘not particularly impartial critics’.  Vasey, for one, admitted to a hope that he might replace Savige.

Savige’s involvement in Greece and Syria was limited.  In Greece, Savige displayed great personal courage, as did others of his rank.  He received better staff support there, while in Syria he commanded only a small force, albeit at an important time.  His action in forcing continuation of an advance by tired troops ensured rapid success, probably for fewer casualties, and shows that he had the strength to push an issue if needed.  In Syria Savige again clashed with Berryman, who, unaware of specific orders to Savige, interfered with units on the battlefield.

Keating makes a reasonable case that Savige, and others, were not suited physically or temperamentally for the kind of war waged in the Middle East.  He shows, however, that Savige’s skill at fostering a team sense was highly developed, as was his rapport with the ordinary soldiers, another characteristic he shared with Allen.  He was always conscious that orders from senior headquarters would ‘ultimately be carried out “by common soldiers at the point of a bayonet”’.  One photo of the senior officers of the 6th Division during the First Libyan campaign is symbolic.  Of the six officers shown, Mackay, Robertson, Berryman and Vasey wear officers’ pattern uniforms, Savige and Allen wear soldiers’ pattern.

Savige returned to Australia at the end of 1941, taking command of the 3rd Division, thus rescuing his military career from probable obscurity.  His robust approach to training focused the division on preparing for war, and led to the removal of a large number of officers.  Important support at this time was provided by Lieutenant Colonel John Wilton, Savige’s GSO1, who developed a high regard for Savige.  Later, as a corps commander in Bougainville, Savige was again supported by highly effective regular staff officers, including Brigadier Ragnar Garrett as BGS. 

The important point that Keating makes about Savige’s relationship with Wilton is that the latter was always highly regarded, so that any criticism of Savige’s conduct of the Salamaua campaign either should also apply to Wilton, his trusted GSO1, or can be dismissed as personal.  Keating also suggests that someone (probably Herring) did not want Savige in New Guinea.  Certainly, once he arrived in New Guinea, Savige found his relations with Herring, commanding New Guinea Force (NGF), trying.

Keating examines the controversy between Savige and NGF over Salamaua, and concludes that much of the fault lay with NGF.  Herring did not establish a clear command chain with the US forces operating in the area, and his guidance to Savige on wider issues, particularly the need for Salamaua not to fall too soon, was at best ambiguous.  Keating concludes that Savige played a critical part in controlling a competent and relentless campaign ‘that did much credit to those in command’.  Herring’s reputation is diminished by his failure to understand, or indeed even apparently to enquire into, the tactical and logistic problems of the campaign, a fault he also displayed during the Kokoda campaign.

Berryman was sent forward to investigate the battle’s conduct towards the end of the campaign.  Until Berryman’s arrival there had been few visits to the front by senior officers of NGF, as in the Kokoda campaign.  Berryman found that Savige had ‘done well and we had misjudged him’.  This was surely one of the strongest endorsements that Savige could have hoped for.  Berryman (not usually a supporter of either Savige or Allen) also considered that Allen’s operations on the Kokoda Trail were effective.  However, Savige’s prediction in June 1943 that he would be relieved when it became simple to capture Salamaua came true (yet another parallel with Allen, relieved by Vasey just as the Japanese defences before Kokoda broke). 

Keating discusses the choice of Savige over Vasey for promotion to lieutenant general.  Putting aside the issue of Vasey’s health, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he would not have been ‘the right man for the right job’.  Herring once famously stated that he preferred ‘Vasey tired to Allen fresh’.  Vasey (tired) launched a number of attacks at Gona and Sanananda that gained little or nothing, but left many casualties.  It is hard to see Vasey in command on Bougainville restraining activist brigade commanders like Hammer and Potts, as Savige did.  Blamey seems to have made the correct choice.  Ironically, however, Savige ended the war doing one of the things that he had criticized Headquarters 6th Division for at Bardia – giving detailed instructions to subordinate commanders as to how they should operate!

Savige’s final contribution to the regular/citizen soldier rivalry in Australia came in a statement to the press in 1946, where he commented, inter alia, that a large number of Duntroon graduates by ‘their general attitude and actions  … clearly lived in a world apart’.  His First World War and inter-war mentor, the Sandhurst graduate Gellibrand, also had an intense dislike of for the concept of a select regular army officers school, because he believed the officers produced stood aloof from the nation.   In 1995, a Parliamentary committee described the Australian Defence Force Academy as a ‘military nunnery’, suggesting that the attitude deprecated by Savige and Gellibrand existed, and has been passed on to the newer Academy.

Keating accepts that Savige’s forte was as a leader of men, a critical talent during the Salamaua campaign.  His weakest point was his limited grasp of the technical nature of modern warfare, for which he relied on good staff support.  Keating lauds Savige’s ‘ability as a trainer of raw troops’, evident throughout his command of the 3rd Division.  His greatest strength, however, remained his understanding of and concern for the soldiers.  One of his greatest weaknesses, in contrast, was his reluctance to act against ineffective subordinates, especially if he had appointed them.  His empathy for the troops was again shown at the end of his service, when, asked to be Coordinator of Demobilisation and Dispersal, he sought to ‘serve the men who fought … [but] … Salary of no interest’.

Throughout his book, Keating makes the case that militia commanders depended on their regular staff officers for advice on the technical aspects of modern war.  He regards this as a weakness in the Australian military system, occurring by default not design.  It might have been a weakness, yet all commanders rely on the support of their staff, and it was arguably the explicit intent of the Australian system, up until the end of the Second World War, that citizen commanders should receive the support of regular staff officers. 

That system worked effectively, as demonstrated by Savige’s career during the Second World War.  Whether it could have been successful in the circumstances following the war is unlikely, but not relevant to the earlier period.  Keating suggests that studies of the Australian Army in the Second World War focus too much on commanders and not enough on their staff officers.  A good first step to rectify this deficiency would be a study on Berryman, whose presence at controversial moments through much of the war seems ubiquitous.

There is a degree of irony in a couple of the quotes in the book, deliberate in one case, but perhaps unintended in another.  Given the pervasiveness of the ‘Bataan Gang’ in his court, MacArthur’s warning to Curtin about Blamey surrounding himself with favourites must be a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black.  Also, Vasey’s quoted comment, comparing a senior professional British officer to the ‘amateur soldiers we have in the senior grades’, loses some of its force when we now know that Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, spent hours poring ‘over the Army List in search of suitable divisional commanders’.  He is said to have wanted to be ‘merciless with divisional and corps commanders whom he thought not up to their job, but he did not think he could find better men to replace them’.  Neither system produced perfect results.

Keating quotes, but does not fully support, the comment by A.N. Kemsley, formerly Director of Organisation at Army Headquarters, that Savige was ‘a good brigadier-doubtful as a major general-far over-promoted as a lieutenant general’.  This has echoes of Gavin Long’s description of Allen as ‘a fine colonel, a better brigadier than divisional commander and not a suitable corps commander’.  Both descriptions reverse the order of C.E.W. Bean’s description of Monash as a leader who ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’, cited on page 588 of Bean’s Volume II.  Given that Monash often seemed somewhat cold and detached from the troops, it seems probable that Savige (and Allen) might have preferred their descriptions. 

Whatever Savige’s limitations as a military commander, Keating demonstrates that he was The Right Man for the Right Job, and that in 1959 Russell chose a good title for his biography, There goes a Man.

JOHN DONOVAN