Air Force or Air Corps

AIR FORCE OR AIR CORPS

Squadron Leader Andrew Clark

RAAF Aerospace Centre, 2002.  105pp.

This paper is a useful addition to the body of work sponsored by the Royal Australian Air Force’s Aerospace Centre.  SQNLDR Clark prepared it in 2002, while he held a Chief of Air Force Aerospace Fellowship.  The layout and content of the paper introduce the reader logically from the background to the present RNZAF, through air power elements and options, leading to the principal element of the paper, the section on transferring strategy into structure.  The value of the paper, however, lies more in the collection of a mass of useful data in one location than in the conclusions drawn, which do not always seem to flow from that data. 

Some caution in using the paper is necessary.  Given, for example, that J.M. Spaight was both a public advocate of (indeed, almost a propagandist for) the RAF, and a civil servant in the Air Ministry, some caveats could have been added to the several quotes used from his work.  Also, the brief explanation given on page 52, of the different attitudes of Australia and New Zealand to their forces fighting against Germany and Italy during World War II is not completely accurate (but is not sufficiently inaccurate to affect the overall argument).

There are some weaknesses in the logic.  SQNLDR Clark acknowledges one possible reason for these in his introduction where he states ‘… it should be said that it is impossible for me, as a serving RNZAF officer, to be free of bias in conducting this study’.  Indeed, it would perhaps be unreasonable for readers without an Air Force background to expect that he could put aside the doctrine in which he has been trained, and the assumptions upon which he has based his career.

Some of the weaknesses are mentioned below.  The overall effect of them is that, at least for a small force such as New Zealand has, with no striking power, the case for an air force in preference to an (or two) air corps is, to use the old Scottish verdict, ‘not proven’.  However, SQNLDR Clark’s valuable work in bring together the data in this publication is justification enough for his efforts, which should enable others to draw appropriate conclusions.

The widespread moves towards environmental air arms, mentioned on page 17, are perhaps brushed aside too quickly; nor do the pressures for joint operations that arose from experience in World War II seem to receive the consideration that they merit.  The Conclusion, in fact, mentions specifically the trend for armies and navies to ‘reclaim control of the air support they need’, i.e. operate their own air arms, but the impact of such trends on a small force are not considered.  It is also a bit glib to say that air power may be used independently to effect New Zealand Government policy, or that the NZDF rarely deploys as a single cohesive force, and use this as a reason to limit the discussion of joint operations.

Indeed, in discussing the role of air power SQNLDR Clark acknowledges that the fixed wing and rotary wing transport force elements are likely especially to support land forces (albeit not necessarily New Zealand land forces).  However, despite apparently accepting that the use of naval helicopters principally to support naval forces justifies them being a ‘naval air corps’, SQNLDR Clark seems unable to consider that fixed and rotary wing transport could become an ‘army air corps’ as an acceptable option.  Yet, as he acknowledges on page 72, ‘an integrated organisation fosters a unitary doctrinal concept to suit’.  So if these forces will especially support land forces, would not making them an army air corps enable development of relevant doctrine?

In discussing the elements of air power, SQNLDR Clark places much emphasis on the importance of air power culture ‘culture’ as a significant element in applying air power, and reason for maintaining a separate air force.  However, separate cultures can exist within a single service – sitting in on discussions between submariners and surface warfare types, or infantry and tank personnel should dispel the myth that a separate service is needed to develop and maintain a separate culture!  Unfortunately, the emphasis on an air power culture seems to drive at least some of SQNLDR Clark’s conclusions.

In rejecting the concept of two environmental air corps, SQNLDR Clark comments on the adverse effects of having two air forces to manage, including smaller pools of expertise, career management challenges and duplication of infrastructure.  However, he does not seem to consider the counters, of pooling personnel management, common services and training (which might, indeed, already happen in New Zealand, with the already separate naval aviation force).

Overall, a useful paper, but not conclusive.

JOHN DONOVAN