The Ottoman Defence at Anzac

THE OTTOMAN DEFENCE AGAINST THE ANZAC LANDING 25 APRIL 1915

Mesut Uyar

Big Sky Publishing, 2015, 181pp

ISBN 978-1-9221322-99-4

Mesut Uyar, a former Turkish officer, but now Associate Professor of Ottoman History at the University of NSW in Canberra, has presented a clear account of the Ottoman defence on 25 April 1915. He has the advantage sometimes not available to English speakers of being able to read original documents, including those in the old Ottoman script, adding depth to the study.

Professor Uyar starts with a review of reforms to the Ottoman army after its defeats in the period 1911-13. He notes that the Ottoman forces had the advantage of experience repelling attacks on the Gallipoli Peninsula, including an attempt by the Italian Navy to enter the Dardanelles in April 1912, and preparations for ground defence during the Balkan Wars. Professor Uyar is more critical than is usual in English language sources of the German General Otto Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission to assist with the reform program. Interestingly, the major reforms to Ottoman divisional and army corps structure preceded his arrival.

Discussing the Ottoman preparations for defending the Peninsula, Professor Uyar describes the detailed defence plan for the Ariburnu area prepared by Mehmed Şefik, commander of the 27th Regiment, who believed this area was the key to the defence of the northern peninsula. Also, as commander of the corps reserve 19th Division, Mustafa Kemal conducted an exercise to counter a landing between Suvla and Kumtepe on 19 April, and had scheduled a further exercise for 25 April. Together, these should have given the Ottoman forces a major advantage on 25 April.

However, Professor Uyar explains the detrimental effect on the defences around Anzac Cove resulting from intervention by von Sanders just weeks before the landing. When von Sanders overturned Şefik’s plan, he reduced the force allocated to the Gabatepe-Anzac-Suvla region from a regiment to a battalion. Had Şefik’s plan been in place on 25 April, the Anzac landing might have faced a stronger force than the four (large) platoons actually occupying the area between Bolton’s Ridge and the Fisherman’s Hut and inland on Third Ridge.

Instead, von Sanders gave greater emphasis to the Bolay1r area, where a British diversionary force simulated a landing on 25 April, confirming his predilections at a crucial moment. Perhaps Australia and New Zealand have reason to be grateful to von Sanders for actions that made the landing easier than it might have been! The former Ottoman Empire might have had less reason to cheer his use of frontal attacks as he attempted to remove the invaders in the following weeks.

Professor Uyar shows how von Sanders’ obsession with Bolay1r, and the failure of the 9th Division commander Halil Sami to react promptly to the landings, endangered the Ottoman positions at Ariburnu and Helles. Mustafa Kemal’s initiative saved the situation around Anzac, where he sent first the complete 57th Regiment, rather than the single battalion requested by Halil Sami, and later the rest of his division. At Helles, Halil Sami’s command paralysis was also overcome by the initiative of his subordinates. Between them, Şefik, Kemal, and Halil Sami’s subordinates at Helles saved the situation for the Ottomans. While Anzac forward elements reached Third Ridge, they could not hold it. Professor Uyar follows in detail the actions that eventually stabilised the front. From there the campaign proceeded to its inevitable conclusion in December.

Professor Uyar resolves the enduring controversy about the presence of Ottoman machine guns and artillery on 25 April. He confirms that while machine gun positions had been prepared on Ariburnu, on 400 Plateau, and near the Fisherman’s Hut, the initial pre-dawn landing was not opposed by machine guns, which had been kept in reserve. The first four machine guns arrived at Scrubby Knoll on Third Ridge around 0740, and four more arrived at Chunuk Bair around 1000. Four more arrived around 1530.

As well, Professor Uyar shows that only limited Ottoman artillery was present on 25 April (only 13 operational pieces before 1030, three of which were captured near The Cup around 0700, but later re-captured). Another eight arrived around 1030, a further eight around 1600, and a final eight around sunset, but those were not actually engaged on 25 April.

This book complements that by Brigadier (Rtd) Chris Roberts (The Landing at ANZAC 1915, BSP, 2013). Read together, they provide as good a picture of events on 25 April as is likely to be available at this remove.

JOHN DONOVAN

To Kokoda

TO KOKODA

Nicholas Anderson

Big Sky Publishing, 2014, 236pp, $19.95

ISBN 978-1-9221322-95-6

Australian military history has enjoyed something of a revival in recent years, and no doubt this will continue as the anniversaries associated with the Centenary of the First World War occur. Within that revival, some battles (Fromelles, but mainly around the time of the discovery of the Pheasant Wood burials, most battles on the Western Front, Greece, Crete and Syria, Alamein, the 1943-44 campaigns in New Guinea, and those in 1945 on Borneo and Bougainville) receive only occasional attention. Some others, notably Gallipoli, Tobruk and Kokoda, are regularly the subjects of books.

Nicholas Anderson has produced an informative history of the campaign up until the recapture of Kokoda, with some useful summary judgements on its place in the history of the war against Japan. The style of recent books on Kokoda varies from popular ‘yarns’ to detailed academic studies. This book, like others in the Australian Army Campaign Series, is academically rigorous, but written and published in a highly readable style.

The descriptions of events during the Australian retreat and subsequent advance are well written, enabling the reader to understand events as they occurred. Anderson avoids the temptation to over-analyse events, which led one recent author (Peter Williams, The Kokoda Campaign 1942, Myth and Reality, CUP, 2012) to produce somewhat artificial estimates of the numbers engaged at specific times.

Anderson’s account describes the logistic problems of operating along a tenuous foot track, with air dropped supplies capable of providing only a limited supplement to the work of Papuan carriers. As an illustration of the difficulties of the Kokoda Trail, some wounded from the early part of the Australian advance back across the mountains could not be evacuated until weeks after the battle had moved on. These difficulties did not seem always to be understood by senior officers in Port Moresby, leading to friction between them and the commanders on the Trail.

Anderson’s summary of the significance of the campaign is balanced. Kokoda did not save Australia from invasion, however, as Anderson notes, the information available at the time suggested that a ‘Battle for Australia’ was underway. There might not have been an actual Battle for Australia, but it probably seemed at the time as if there was. That the Japanese had already decided against invasion was recorded in Japanese archives that were not then available to Australia’s intelligence authorities (but some recent historians seem to ignore this reality).

Pre-war strategy held that the Singapore strategy would ensure Australia’s safety. In the event, however, Australia’s security from invasion during the Second World War was ensured by the maritime power of the United States Navy at the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, not by the Royal Navy operating from the Singapore base. After those battles, the Japanese ability to land troops at Port Moresby was minimal. This led to the Kokoda campaign, as the Japanese attempted an overland advance.

As Anderson points out, Guadalcanal was more important than Kokoda (or Milne Bay) because the Japanese made it so. Japanese power could not support both campaigns, particularly if they gave priority to holding Guadalcanal. They did this, easing the pressure on the Australian forces on the Kokoda Trail. Success at Kokoda, however, did keep space between the Japanese and the Australian mainland. The campaign also provided the opportunity for the army to learn jungle-fighting skills, which were valuable well beyond the end of the Second World War.

Anderson deals fairly with the relief of senior officers during the campaign. Brigadier Potts lost his command in part because under pressure he was insufficiently informative in his reports; he might have been reinstated had Lieutenant General Rowell remained in command, but Rowell’s successor Lieutenant General Herring would not accept Potts. The impact of his sacking on the 21st Brigade was exacerbated by poorly worded (to put it tactfully) speeches by Herring and General Blamey to the brigade at Koitaki, implying that the troops had not fought bravely.

Rowell allowed his personal dislike of Blamey to overcome his discipline, and was sacked; even lieutenant generals cannot persistently be insubordinate! Major General Allen was replaced in large part because of his poor relationship with Blamey and Herring. His successor, Major General Vasey arrived just as the Japanese withdrew from Eora Creek, leaving the way to Kokoda open. Vasey then gained the credit for Allen’s work.

Anderson sees the experiences of the individual soldiers along the Kokoda Trail as the most significant legacy of the campaign. It is invidious to select any one soldier to exemplify those who fought on the Kokoda Trail, but Sergeant Bede Tongs of the 3rd (Militia) Battalion stands out.

On 17 October 1942, the 3rd Battalion was preparing to attack strong Japanese positions at Templeton’s Crossing. Tongs identified a Japanese machine gun post as a potential obstacle to the attack. He crawled forward alone and threw a hand grenade into the post, destroying it. Tongs then ran ‘like a Stawell Gift runner’ back to his platoon, where the company commander ordered him to ‘Get that attack going Sergeant Tongs’ He then led his platoon forward in their successful attack. Thousands of such young Australians combined to win the campaign.

JOHN DONOVAN