REFORMING DEFENCE
Bureaucracy is by nature conservative, lethargic and
self-perpetuating merely for its own ends, but survives as long as public
opinion can be convinced to accept and support it.[i]
This article was originally published in QUADRANT,
April 2008
Introduction
Attempts to reform the
Defence organization, both internal and external, have been ongoing since the
late 1980s. Among the reform
programs attempted have been the Defence Regional Support Review (DRSR), the
Force Structure Review (FSR), the Defence Efficiency Review/Defence Reform
Program (DER/DRP) and several headquarters and Departmental restructures.
These reforms have generally
tried to reduce overheads to enable improvements to the combat forces. The FSR, for example, had as a specific
aim:
[m]aximising combat
capabilities by reducing the numbers of service personnel involved in
headquarters and base support functions …[ii]
The DER stated that:
the very essence of this
Review is to free up resources from support and administrative activities to
strengthen the ADF’s combat capabilities.[iii]
The evidence that
improvements to the ADF’s combat capability have been made is limited. The 2000-01 Defence Annual Report
stated that increasing personnel in the combat force from 24,300 to 31,700
represented the largest reinvestment of DRP savings, implying that this had
occurred.[iv] The Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, in its Defence Budget Brief 2002-2003, commented, however, that ‘it
is not clear where these additional personnel have been placed …’[v]
Changes within different
groups in the ADF provide evidence that at least some of the increase might be
based upon bureaucratic ‘re-categorisation’ of functions and realignment of
command chains, rather than genuine increases in the numbers in strictly
defined combat forces. Between
June 1991 and June 2006, the numbers of other ranks and trainees in the ADF
dropped by some 18,000, while the numbers of officers and officer cadets
increased by 38.[vi] The combat force has a relatively high
proportion of other ranks compared to officers. Headquarters and administrative functions, however, have a
higher proportion of officers.
Genuine increases in the combat forces, combined with reductions in
headquarters and administrative functions, should lead to greater proportional
reductions in officer numbers. The
actual changes between June 1991 and June 2006 are shown in Table 1.[vii]
Table 1
|
|
Officers and Officer
Cadets
|
Other Ranks and Trainees
|
TOTAL
|
|
June 1991
|
12,426
|
56,732
|
69,158
|
|
June 2006
|
12,464
|
38,687
|
51,151
|
|
CHANGE
|
+38
|
-18,045
|
-18,007
|
Obstacles to Reform
In a broad sense, the
Defence Organisation consists of four groups (seven if the Reserves are counted
separately). They are Navy, Army
and Air Force Regular and Reserve uniformed personnel, and civilian public
servants. To understand the
principal obstacles to reform, however, it is better to consider Defence as two
groups. These are the combat and
combat-related forces and the training forces in one group, and the bureaucrats
(uniformed and civilian) in the other.
While the quote at the head
of this article was directed at the naval forces of the major powers during the
Cold War, its import encapsulates the bureaucratic group in the current
Australian Defence Organisation, with its hierarchical structure and formal
processes. The same author also
said that bureaucracy ‘has a stifling effect on … military and naval officers’.[viii]
The combat, combat-related
and training forces group comprises largely, but not exclusively, other ranks
up to about the rank of sergeant (E) and officers up to major (E). The bureaucratic group comprises most
Defence public servants, together with many of the senior other ranks (warrant
officer equivalents) and most officers above the rank of major (E). In the ADF, the distinction is not clear-cut,
but while there is movement between the two groups, for many ADF members a
posting away from the combat/combat-related/training forces in about their late
thirties represents a clear career change to the bureaucratic element.
The problem with defence
reform is that it is essentially aimed at the bureaucrats, uniformed and
civilian, but it is those same bureaucrats who must implement it. Attempts to reduce numbers in
headquarters and support functions will impact heavily on this group, and
specifically on the key executive grades – executive levels 1 and 2 for
civilians and lieutenant colonel (E) and colonel (E) in the ADF. Those with most to lose from change are
those who have to make the change occur.
Following the DER/DRP, the then Minister directed that specific
percentage reductions be made at these levels. It would be interesting to compare the numbers now with
those before the DER/DRP.
Steps to Reform
Reform in Defence is most
needed in the bureaucratic elements.
The combat and combat-related and training elements have had leadership
problems, which were exposed by adverse publicity around some events in the
1990s, but at the tactical level the ADF deservedly retains the high reputation
its predecessors bequeathed to it.
To reduce concern among these groups, the identified focus for future
reform should be clearly on the bureaucratic elements (for which many of those
at sea and in the field are likely to have little sympathy anyway).
Military Operational Level Headquarters
In the ADF, a major driver
of numbers at the higher officer grades is the demand for staff in
headquarters, both static military operational level headquarters and office
based organisations. Putting aside
for the moment the issue of the office environment in Canberra and the fixed
logistic headquarters, the first step to reform must be to resolve the genuine
requirement for operational headquarters.
With a regular combat force of around 32,000 (accepting at face value
the claim made in the 2000-01 Annual Report), and the limited reduction in
officer numbers since 1991, it may not be too harsh to paraphrase Winston
Churchill: ‘never in the history
of human conflict have so few been commanded by so many’.
When he retired, a previous
VCDF, Lieutenant General Mueller, is reported to have commented that he:
never ceased to wonder about
the complexity of the command and control overheads the ADF has for such a
small force. This factor alone
makes it vulnerable to dysfunctional incidents.
The characteristics of
contemporary conflict, the impact of information technology and the propensity
of governments to reach down to unprecedented levels in pursuit of operational
detail, have effectively compressed the strategic, operational and tactical
level. Perhaps this suggests that some simpler alternatives to our current arrangements
should be considered.
One can also wonder about
the effectiveness of … commanders in Sydney [and near Bungendore] exercising
command over relatively small force elements deployed on the other side of the
Earth, even when a national commander has been deployed in the area of
operations.[ix]
Perhaps this advice might be
a good starting point. An
essential element of command is to have clear lines of authority, with minimal
overlap and layers of bureaucracy.
This does not seem to exist at present. Certainly, there will not be a reduction in the number of
military bureaucrats until the numbers employed in operational headquarters are
controlled and markedly reduced.
This will not happen while the bureaucratic foxes are in charge of
reforming the henhouse. Only clear
external direction, followed through, will produce real change. When this happens, the flow-on effects
will reduce expensive officer and senior non-commissioned officer numbers
significantly and make funds available to increase the numbers of junior ranks
available for the combat force, even within a constant ADF personnel
ceiling. Given that officer
numbers are essentially the same now as when the ADF was some 18,000 stronger,
any future increases in ADF numbers should be only among the other ranks.
The Office Environment
The demand for high numbers
of staff at operational level headquarters has flow-on effects, in that a rank
pyramid is required to produce these numbers in the ‘closed’ ADF personnel
system. The operational level
headquarters jobs are often at major (E) to colonel (E) level, driving a demand
for increased numbers in the lower to middle level officer ranks. Jobs must then be established to employ
these personnel, even if there is no real military task for them. Indeed, the situation was apparently
reached some years ago that the number of lieutenants in the Army needed at the
base of the pyramid to support the numbers at higher ranks significantly
exceeded the number of ‘real’ jobs for them, leading to a need for combat units
to carry supernumerary junior officers.
Many jobs for middle ranking
officers at major (E) and lieutenant colonel (E) are established in Canberra
and Melbourne, in office environments.
Compared to field command, they may seem undemanding in nature, and
often do not require extensive military skills. Giving highly trained personnel apparent ‘make-work’ duties
leads to dissatisfaction, lowered morale, increased separations, and a chain
reaction effect on recruitment (the high wastage levels at major (E) and
captain (E) have frequently been cited as a matter of concern). Also, as was noted in the DER, if
‘staffs are left in place, they will find work to do, regardless that it is
duplicative, disruptive, outside line responsibilities, and certainly not
adding value commensurate with their cost’.[x]
This problem is not new, nor
is it confined to Australia. Some
years ago, a retired senior British Army officer commented that some staff
officers develop ‘their jobs until they have become essential to the smooth
running of the army as currently organized. So much is this the case, that units are sometimes left
short of officers to ensure that [these] jobs are kept filled …’[xi] Such results are dysfunctional.
Turning to the
non-operational organisations in Canberra and Melbourne, the DER considered
that ‘removing obvious duplication within the Services, as well as with HQADF,
would be equivalent to creating three extra battalions (2,100 personnel)’.[xii] The evidence that such numbers have
actually been removed from the Defence bureaucracy is limited, despite the
claim in the 2000-01 Annual Report that the combat force had increased from
24,300 to 31,700.
In part the failure of this
initiative might have been caused by its attempt to reduce the staffs of the
Service Chiefs. This attempt was
stubbornly resisted, based at least in part on arguments relating to the
statutory responsibilities of the Chiefs.
At the same time, the CDF’s ‘joint’ staffs have remained, and probably
grown, potentially increasing the level of duplication. There would seem to be at least two
options for change.
The first would be to give
the Three Star officer positions that currently head each Service joint
responsibilities in Defence Headquarters and operational command, rather than
as Heads of their Services. The
VCDF could have the role of ADF Headquarters Chief of Staff and Deputy to
CDF. The three Service Chiefs
could become the Heads of Capability Development and of Personnel, and the
Joint Force Commander, all controlling truly joint staffs. This change would make the four
officers immediately subordinate to CDF responsible for joint, rather than
single-Service, outcomes.
The current Deputy Chiefs
could then be re-designated as the Service Chiefs, at Two Star level. Their responsibilities would be limited
only to ‘raising and training’ members and units of their Services, and
resource management. Their staffs
would advise them on establishments and the numbers/skill spreads to be
recruited, help to manage their resources, and run their Training
Commands. The (new) Chiefs would
also be tasked to advise the Chiefs of Service Committee and Defence Committee
on single Service matters, but should not participate in decisions. They would function as advisers only.
An alternative approach
would be to retain the current statutory positions and ranks of the Chiefs, but
make them ‘component’ commanders of the ADF under CDF. Each would be responsible (as now) for
advice on their specific environment, and retain the staff to do that job. However, as commander of the ADF, CDF
would direct them in the performance of that duty, make final decisions, and
rely on their staff for advice on single-Service matters. The joint staffs would be
abolished. Under this option, the
Chiefs are likely to continue to give higher priority to the interests of their
individual Services over those of the ADF as a whole, unless CDF asserts his
dominance.
Finally, the civilian staffs
must be rationalised, focussing on those tasks that must be carried out by
Commonwealth employees, with other jobs being contracted out.
Other Steps
Some other steps could be
taken to reduce the impact on Defence activities of ‘minds worn out by
attention to trifles’.[xiii] An early such step must be to restore
value to military rank in the bureaucratic environment. When the Defence Organisation was
combined after the 1973 Tange Report[xiv],
relativities were established between military ranks and civilian
classifications, essentially to enable organisational structures to be developed. The relativities selected, in today’s
terms, equate a colonel (E) to a civilian executive level 2, and a lieutenant
colonel (E) to an executive level 1.
These nominal ‘equivalences’ between chalk and cheese took on a life of
their own, and became a cause of much civilian-military friction.
One result of these
relativities is that an officer posted from unit command to a job in Defence
headquarters moves from having authority over perhaps hundreds of personnel and
equipment worth many millions, to become an assistant director in a (probably)
small directorate, with constrained decision making powers. This officer, having probably completed
single Service staff college, and possibly other advanced staff training, has
effectively lost both authority and status. This is not conducive to maintaining good morale and career
satisfaction. Given the training
and experience of military officers, it would seem reasonable to adjust the
relativities so that a lieutenant colonel equates to an executive level 2, and
a colonel to a civilian branch head, reserving the One Star rank for
operational and training postings outside the bureaucratic environment.
The DER proposed that the
United States Marine Corps policy of seeking vigorous turn over at junior
levels, rather than focussing on general retention, should be examined.[xv] Adoption of such a policy would also
ease the ‘relief postings’ issue, particularly among junior personnel. This policy leads to the establishment
of jobs in the bureaucratic element of Defence, to enable personnel to be
regularly posted away from the combat and combat-related groups. It would also remove the ‘career for
life’ expectation that requires a large bureaucratic element in the Defence
Organisation to provide jobs for personnel who are unlikely ever again to serve
in the combat forces.
Changed Career Prospects
One issue that would need to
be addressed in the process of reform would be complaints about reduced career
prospects within a much smaller officer corps. However, it could be expected that future careers would be
more responsible and satisfying, while they need not be for the whole of a
working life. Many ADF members
could be encouraged to leave after 10 to 15 years of service, to use their
skills in the wider community, though preferably retaining a link with the
Services through membership of the Reserves. A transportable, fully funded, pension scheme would make
such moves more attractive.
The Key to Reform
Nothing discussed in this
paper is new. Governments have twice
in relatively recent times (in 1991 with the FSR and 1997 with the DER) agreed
that changes should be made to headquarters and administrative structures. Claims of great progress have been
made, but through all of the changes, the Defence bureaucracy seems to survive
essentially untouched (and possibly even expanded). Given that it is the bureaucracy that has been charged to
implement the changes, to itself, this should not come as a surprise.
Governments of both
political complexions have been served poorly in the reform process by the
Defence Organisation, which itself has been the principal target of
reform. If genuine reform is to
occur, it will only be as a result of bi-partisan commitment and sustained
effort, followed through at a high level.
As a first step, the Minister and his Opposition counterpart should
agree on the principal necessary actions.
This should not be difficult, as each political party has already agreed
to the necessary basic principles while in Government.
Next, they would need to
agree a process to supervise the implementation of change. Perhaps this could be through the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. This Committee is well placed to demand
accountability by the Defence Organisation to Parliament. There could be some constitutional
issues with such a process, as the Minister would still remain fully
responsible for the Department.
However, as the Committee would be supervising implementation of the
Minister’s decisions, which would (hopefully) be supported by his Opposition
counterpart, these issues should not be insurmountable.
JOHN DONOVAN
[i] Command
of the Sea, The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires, Clark G.
Reynolds, Robert Hale and Company, London, 1976, page 549
[ii] Force
Structure Review, Report to the Minister for Defence, Commonwealth of
Australia, May 1991, page 1
[iii] Future
Directions for the Management of Australia’s Defence, Report of the Defence
Efficiency Review, Commonwealth of Australia, 10 March 1997, page 7
[iv] Defence
Annual Report 2000-01, Commonwealth of Australia 2001, page 275
[v] The Cost
of Defence, ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2002-2003, Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 2002, page 69
[vi] Tables in Annual
Reports, ADF Permanent and Reserve Forces and Civilian Employees by Gender
and Employment Category, 1990-91 and 2005-06
[vii] Defence
Annual Reports, 1990-91 and 2005-06
[viii] Reynolds,
page 549
[ix] The
Bulletin cover story, 21 August 2002
[x] Future
Directions, page 13
[xi] Warfare
as a Whole, [General Sir] Frank Kitson, faber and faber, 1987, page 168
[xii] Future
Directions, page 13
[xiii] Possibly
Winston Churchill, late 1930s
[xiv] Australian
Defence, Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments,
Sir Arthur Tange, Commonwealth of Australia, November 1973
[xv] Future
Directions for the Management of Australia’s Defence, Report of the Defence
Efficiency Review, Commonwealth of Australia, 10 March 1997, Addendum, page
273
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