Legends of War

LEGENDS OF WAR: The AIF in France 1918

Pat Beale

Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2017, 161pp, $34.95

ISBN 978-1-925588-64-4

Pat Beale has written a passionate defence of the First AIF against claims by both ‘yarn tellers’ and revisionist historians. He starts by disentangling the confusing terminology of ‘myth’ and ‘legend’, and dismisses ‘myth’ as having a religious or quasi-religious flavour not relevant to the subject. Beale considers that ‘legend’, a ‘non-historical or unverifiable story handed down by tradition from earlier times and popularly accepted as historical’ is appropriate for his purpose.

Legends, Beale notes, ‘provide a simplified explanation for complex events, … mask unpleasant reality, … romanticize questionable behaviour, or … distort reality so that it conforms to a different agenda’. He reviews seven AIF legends in the context of the performance of the AIF. Beale makes the important point that the AIF should be judged by the standards of its time, not of today, reminding readers that its members were young, vigorous men from a society proud of its place in a great Empire. They were devoted to their nation, and confident in its future. He also notes that while much modern focus is on the hard times of 1916 and 1917, 1918’s triumphant performance is largely overlooked.

The legend of ‘Aussies, the Born Soldiers’ has endured, and many Australian soldiers might have accepted it before Gallipoli, though probably not at the end. As Beale comments, while the survivors of Gallipoli might have felt an innate superiority to British soldiers, their experience had taught them the necessity for hard individual and collective training.

‘Lions Led by Donkeys’ and ‘Fighters, not Soldiers’ are linked to this legend. Some British used the latter term patronisingly, yet, as Beale demonstrates, by 1918 both the AIF and the British Expeditionary Force at large were skilled soldiers. He claims, however, that the AIF differed from the British in its emphasis on the thinking soldier at all levels.

He uses the Battles of Hamel and Amiens to show the skill and confidence gained by the AIF in all-arms tactics. Hamel was won in 93 minutes on 4 July 1918, after an extended period of special training and rehearsal. While the Allied armies took time to learn the new mode of warfare, by 1918 they had mastered all-arms tactics, and, well supported logistically, were able to advance steadily from July onwards. While the soldiers learned new tactics, their leaders also improved radically.

Discussing ‘Sheep to the Slaughter’, Beale notes that by 1918 the AIF had young, experienced leaders at all levels from NCOs to division and corps commanders. It had both high morale and a proud esprit de corps. It had also developed its own styles of discipline and leadership. Leaders were well known to their men, often being promoted from among them. Such confident men were not sheep to be slaughtered, nor were their leaders donkeys. By 1918, a brigade commander like Glasgow could refuse an order from a British division commander, telling him that if ‘God Almighty … gave the order, we couldn’t do it in daylight’.

Beale demonstrates the inaccuracy of the ‘Loveable Larrikins’ legend, men undisciplined out of battle, but superb fighters when needed. He notes that while the AIF had high desertion and incarceration rates, and there were several minor mutinies during 1918, units advanced when ordered. Fewer than one in 250 men were involved in the 1918 mutinies.

That the First World War was ‘A Pointless Struggle’ is one of the dominant themes of modern historiography. It should be remembered, however, that the early 20th century was an era in which winners took possession of the losers’ colonies and other valuables. Beale mentions the crippling terms the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk imposed on Russia. Had Germany won, it is probable that German colonial expansion would have occurred under similar terms in our region. Papua, next to German New Guinea, would have been an obvious claim, but so also would have been Australia’s largely undeveloped north.

Although Amiens was recognised by Ludendorff as the Black Day of the German Army, the ‘Stabbed in the Back’ legend was fabricated by the German General Staff to avoid responsibility for Germany’s clear defeat on the battlefield. This legend instead blamed civilians in Germany for undermining the army. A former Bavarian corporal later took up this idea enthusiastically! Unfortunately the legend was given additional force by the failure of the Allies to recognise and proclaim their victory. As Beale demonstrates, by mid-1918, the Allies had a clear moral and tactical superiority over the Germans. They pushed the German Army steadily backward from July, and had it on the ropes by November.

There are some minor editorial problems. While the lack of accents in French place and personal names, such as Pozières and Pétain, is distracting, misspelling the name of The Nek as Neck really grates. Despite this weakness, this is a book worth reading. It bridges the gap between revisionist views on the First World War and the nationalist views found in some popular histories.

JOHN DONOVAN