The Ottoman Defence at Anzac

THE OTTOMAN DEFENCE AGAINST THE ANZAC LANDING 25 APRIL 1915

Mesut Uyar

Big Sky Publishing, 2015, 181pp

ISBN 978-1-9221322-99-4

Mesut Uyar, a former Turkish officer, but now Associate Professor of Ottoman History at the University of NSW in Canberra, has presented a clear account of the Ottoman defence on 25 April 1915. He has the advantage sometimes not available to English speakers of being able to read original documents, including those in the old Ottoman script, adding depth to the study.

Professor Uyar starts with a review of reforms to the Ottoman army after its defeats in the period 1911-13. He notes that the Ottoman forces had the advantage of experience repelling attacks on the Gallipoli Peninsula, including an attempt by the Italian Navy to enter the Dardanelles in April 1912, and preparations for ground defence during the Balkan Wars. Professor Uyar is more critical than is usual in English language sources of the German General Otto Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission to assist with the reform program. Interestingly, the major reforms to Ottoman divisional and army corps structure preceded his arrival.

Discussing the Ottoman preparations for defending the Peninsula, Professor Uyar describes the detailed defence plan for the Ariburnu area prepared by Mehmed Şefik, commander of the 27th Regiment, who believed this area was the key to the defence of the northern peninsula. Also, as commander of the corps reserve 19th Division, Mustafa Kemal conducted an exercise to counter a landing between Suvla and Kumtepe on 19 April, and had scheduled a further exercise for 25 April. Together, these should have given the Ottoman forces a major advantage on 25 April.

However, Professor Uyar explains the detrimental effect on the defences around Anzac Cove resulting from intervention by von Sanders just weeks before the landing. When von Sanders overturned Şefik’s plan, he reduced the force allocated to the Gabatepe-Anzac-Suvla region from a regiment to a battalion. Had Şefik’s plan been in place on 25 April, the Anzac landing might have faced a stronger force than the four (large) platoons actually occupying the area between Bolton’s Ridge and the Fisherman’s Hut and inland on Third Ridge.

Instead, von Sanders gave greater emphasis to the Bolay1r area, where a British diversionary force simulated a landing on 25 April, confirming his predilections at a crucial moment. Perhaps Australia and New Zealand have reason to be grateful to von Sanders for actions that made the landing easier than it might have been! The former Ottoman Empire might have had less reason to cheer his use of frontal attacks as he attempted to remove the invaders in the following weeks.

Professor Uyar shows how von Sanders’ obsession with Bolay1r, and the failure of the 9th Division commander Halil Sami to react promptly to the landings, endangered the Ottoman positions at Ariburnu and Helles. Mustafa Kemal’s initiative saved the situation around Anzac, where he sent first the complete 57th Regiment, rather than the single battalion requested by Halil Sami, and later the rest of his division. At Helles, Halil Sami’s command paralysis was also overcome by the initiative of his subordinates. Between them, Şefik, Kemal, and Halil Sami’s subordinates at Helles saved the situation for the Ottomans. While Anzac forward elements reached Third Ridge, they could not hold it. Professor Uyar follows in detail the actions that eventually stabilised the front. From there the campaign proceeded to its inevitable conclusion in December.

Professor Uyar resolves the enduring controversy about the presence of Ottoman machine guns and artillery on 25 April. He confirms that while machine gun positions had been prepared on Ariburnu, on 400 Plateau, and near the Fisherman’s Hut, the initial pre-dawn landing was not opposed by machine guns, which had been kept in reserve. The first four machine guns arrived at Scrubby Knoll on Third Ridge around 0740, and four more arrived at Chunuk Bair around 1000. Four more arrived around 1530.

As well, Professor Uyar shows that only limited Ottoman artillery was present on 25 April (only 13 operational pieces before 1030, three of which were captured near The Cup around 0700, but later re-captured). Another eight arrived around 1030, a further eight around 1600, and a final eight around sunset, but those were not actually engaged on 25 April.

This book complements that by Brigadier (Rtd) Chris Roberts (The Landing at ANZAC 1915, BSP, 2013). Read together, they provide as good a picture of events on 25 April as is likely to be available at this remove.

JOHN DONOVAN