Deployment of British Infantry Divisions, First World War

FORMATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH INFANTRY DIVISIONS, FIRST WORLD WAR

While preparing the article on a separate page (see page list on right) on the Over-Expansion of the AIF in 1916, I needed to get a benchmark on the necessary timetable for deployment of a division. I used the formation and deployment of British infantry divisions for that purpose.

I looked at the British New Army, First-Line and Second-Line Territorial divisions, using Martin Middlebrook (Your Country Needs You, Pen and Sword, 2000) as the base source. He has some anomalies, and the dates of formation for some divisions are not clear, however, he has enough detail to give an indication of time taken from formation to deployment. For the five Australian divisions, I used Bean, though he also has some vagueness on the dates of formation.

When counting the time before a division went into action, I ignored the month when it was raised, then counted months either until it sailed to France for British divisions that went directly there, or until it went into action for Australian divisions, and those British divisions that went via Egypt to the Dardanelles. For the Australian divisions, I ignored the time lost on sea voyages, and any consequent disruption to training.

On that basis, the average time to get the first 18 New Army divisions into action was around 10.5 months. The quickest was seven months for the 12th, followed by eight for the 9th and 14th. Five more had ten months before going into action, the other ten took either eleven or twelve months.

Formation dates in Middlebrook for some of the last twelve New Army divisions are a bit vague, as several changed titles in April 1915. However, the lowest numbered of this group formed as the 37th in 'late 1914', becoming the 30th in April 1915, while the 36th (Ulster) Division formed in October 1914, and the 37th around September 1914, so it is probably reasonable to interpolate that those numbered in between (the 31st to 35th) also formed around September/October 1914. The 38th (Welsh) Division (Lloyd George's Army) also had a number change in April 1915, but its original date of formation is unclear. The 39th to 41st have firm dates of August and September 1915, when they were formed mostly from existing battalions.

Taking (conservatively) November 1914 as the dates for the 31st to 35th, and sticking (again conservatively) to April 1915 for the 38th, the average time to get into action for these twelve divisions was also 10.5 months, with the lowest eight and the highest 13 months. Most had eleven or twelve months before moving overseas. As an aside, Ray Westlake (Kitchener's Army, Spellmount, 1989) gives dates of December 1914 for the 33rd, September 1914 for the 36th, March 1915 for the 37th (which seems a bit late for deployment in July, certainly compared to the other divisions), and December 1914 for the 38th, but these do not change the argument significantly.

Ignoring the two sent to India in late 1914 to relieve regular garrisons there, the First-Line Territorial divisions had an average of ten months before being committed, with a minimum of six months (the 46th) and a maximum of 18 months (the 56th); the 55th also had an extended preparation, of 17 months. Both the 55th and 56th, however, had been stripped of their original infantry battalions in late 1914/early 1915, and had to re-gather their infantry component, delaying their deployment. These two push the average up noticeably, as without them the average for First-Line Territorial divisions was 8.5 months. Eight of the twelve that served in action as divisions were deployed within nine months.

The Second-Line Territorial divisions also have some anomalies. They were apparently brought into existence in late 1914, to control new recruits and the Second-Line battalions formed with non-deployable personnel from the First-Line divisions, but they were given numbers only in August 1915 (except for the 45th, also sent to India in late 1914, and numbered early in the First-Line series). I have counted August 1915 as their formation dates as divisions, 'writing off' the earlier period as draft finding duties only.

Those Second-Line divisions that went into action took an average of just over 16 months to prepare. The only two to deploy early were the 60th and 61st, after ten and nine months (in June and May 1916 respectively). The performance of the 61st at Fromelles in July might have discouraged early deployment of the others, as no other Second-Line Territorial division was deployed in less than 18 months. The 66th took 20 months. Five never left Britain, the number of one of these (the 63rd) being re-allocated to the Royal Naval Division after the original 63rd was broken up in July 1916 to provide reinforcements.

Turning to the Australian divisions, I think it is reasonable to equate them to New Army divisions, as they were formed ab initio. While the 4th and 5th have some similarities to the Second-Line Territorial divisions, being formed from cadres (albeit the cadres had some experienced personnel, unlike the Second-Line Territorial divisions), their supporting arms and services, particularly their artillery, were raised ab initio, so I think the New Army comparison remains broadly valid.

The 1st Division had about eight months from its formation to the Gallipoli landing. The 2nd was formed in Egypt in June/July 1915, but its brigades were formed in Australia around February/March, giving its component brigades about six months preparation before they moved to Gallipoli. The 3rd Division was formed in Australia in about February 1916, and went into the line in France that November, nine months later. All three lost some effective training time during their sea transits to Egypt/Britain.

The 4th and 5th Divisions had the shortest preparation periods, four and five months respectively. The average for the Australian divisions was six months, well below the 10.5 months average for the British New Army divisions, and even the 8.5 months for the First-Line Territorial divisions. Indeed, only the 1st and 3rd Divisions received more than the seven months for the fastest deploying New Army division.

Even accepting that the training time available to divisions, and their leadership, varied, these figures suggest that the 4th and 5th Divisions needed extra time before being sent into the line, and particularly into major offensive action. Leadership might have helped with the gap, but the 5th had McCay, who doesn't seem to have been one of the best and brightest. The 4th was luckier, getting H.V. Cox, formerly of the 29th Indian Brigade, and it could be argued that this explains some of the difference in the two divisions' performance in their first actions.

What does this mean? For the British, the delays in forming the last three New Army divisions (in August/September 1915), and the problems experienced deploying the Second-Line Territorial divisions, suggest that Britain probably could not maintain in action more than about 55 divisions on the twelve infantry battalion establishment. Either the Fifth New Army (the 36th to 41st Divisions) or the Second-Line Territorial divisions were 'a bridge too far'. Given that the Fifth New Army was deployable more quickly than the Second-Line divisions, and included the 36th (Ulster) and 38th (Welsh) Divisions, each of which had a strong political support base, I am inclined to consider that the Fifth New Army should (or certainly would) have proceeded.

All of the Second-Line Territorial divisions should probably have remained as draft finding organisations and/or static garrison formations (as some did), perhaps retaining their territorial designations rather than receiving numbers, to emphasise their restricted role.  That said, there were a couple of 'dodgy' divisions among the final twelve New Army divisions. Both the 35th and 40th 'Bantam' divisions needed drastic change to become effective formations.

Britain could have followed the French and Germans to divisions of nine battalions, to gain the flexibility provided by more, but smaller, divisions. If implemented in early 1917, this change would have allowed the extra battalions to be used to raise additional divisions, as the French and Germans did. Whether they could have been maintained during 1918 might, however, be questionable. When the change to a nine battalion organisation was made in 1918, it was under pressure to reduce personnel, not to raise new formations.

For Australia, while the twelve battalion establishment was in place, the 5th Division should not have been formed, and the 3rd should not have been committed to the Western Front after the failure of the first conscription referendum. By the end of 1916, the trend in recruitment without conscription was clear. It might have been possible to maintain four divisions on a nine battalion establishment with voluntary recruitment, but it is unlikely that five divisions could have been maintained at full strength without conscription, even on the lower establishment.

JOHN DONOVAN