A National Force

A NATIONAL FORCE: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000

Peter Kasurak

University of British Columbia Press, 2013, 350pp

ISBN 978-0-7748-2640-2 (pbk.)

Dr Peter Kasurak, former leader of the defence and national security sections of the Auditor General of Canada, brings the eye of an informed outsider to this study of Canada’s Army during the second half of the Twentieth Century. His story highlights missed opportunities, substantial change being implemented only after the end of the Cold War and several scandals.

Kasurak highlights several occasions when opportunities were missed. The first was immediately after the Second World War, when Lieutenant-General Foulkes became CGS. He favoured a modernised officer corps drawing on civilian university graduates receiving post-graduate training at the RMC of Canada. His successor recommended lower education standards for officers.

In the late 1960s, Major-General Rowley’s Officer Development Board reported to General Allard, the CDS. Proposed changes included delegating tactical responsibility to NCOs to reduce numbers of officers, and that officers should be recruited from the top 15 percent of school leavers, with a high proportion holding degrees. This report lapsed with Allard’s retirement. Reform of the Canadian officer corps was delayed until the Twenty-First Century, when the aim of a tertiary-educated officer corps was largely achieved by 2009.

An opportunity for organisational change came when Rowley was appointed to command 1 Canadian Infantry Division in 1962. He proposed such innovations as brigade service battalions, and conducted ‘function studies’ of arms elements, which pointed towards combining armour and infantry in tactical units for high intensity warfare. These proposals were overtaken by a short-lived move to a ‘mobile force’ and integration (later unification) of the Canadian Forces.

Masurak describes the extended process under which the Army developed plans for a mobilised force of one to two corps, focussed on attrition rather than manoeuvre. Decades were spent pursuing this goal, which took no account of the likely availability of resources, equipment, or personnel.

Although the combat development staff in 1979 prepared a paper advocating a more realistic objective, planning for a ‘big army’ continued until around 1990. The ‘big army’ Corps 96 (a reduced version of the earlier Corps 86) was abandoned in the 1990s, although the 1987 Defence White Paper had breathed short-term life into it. The Army’s Combat Development Guide was withdrawn, with the caveat that ‘the army need to balance requirements against available funds’.

Canada’s generals had sought unachievable targets, including equipment beyond the capabilities of current technology. ‘Development guided by realism’ was not a popular option, but the end of the Cold War and financial cutbacks enforced it.

Between occasional attempts to develop strategically transportable general purpose forces, and despite continuing government priority for the defence of Canada, the Army remained focussed on the mechanised brigade commitment to NATO’s Central Front, which absorbed massive resources. After decades on the Central Front preparing for high intensity war in Europe, Kasurak describes how the brigade was not ready to fight in the 1990-91 Gulf War, only a couple of years after the end of the Cold War.

The role of the part-time Militia was never resolved. The regulars sought a large Militia order-of-battle as the basis for the ‘big army’, ignoring numbers, training states, readiness and equipment deficiencies. The senior Militia officers sought an independent role, ignoring those same constraints. For a short period in the late-1950s and 1960s the Militia had a role as post-nuclear recovery force, before lapsing back into habit as part of the ‘big army’ ambition. While its primary role became to augment and sustain the Regular units, its force structure was maintained, but with no mobilisation plan.

The 1990s was a ‘decade of darkness’ for the Canadian Army. In an important chapter, Kasurak describes failures in discipline and ethics that plagued the Canadian Army, culminating in the murder of a Somali youth and disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. After major budget reductions, Canadian Forces Europe was disbanded. Its heavy equipment was redistributed to establish three brigade groups in Canada, each combining heavy tracked and lighter wheeled vehicles. Development of a ‘multi-purpose combat capable’ force commenced.

Kasurak highlights the relationship between the government and the military as ‘principal’ and ‘agent’, in which, once the military agent’s advice has been tendered and considered, the agent must follow the requirements of the civilian principal. He sees ignoring this relationship as a major failure in Canada.

This book has important lessons for armies facing imprecise threats with limited resources, and should be widely studied in Australia.

Reviewer:  JOHN DONOVAN