Conducting Counterinsurgency

CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY: Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan

David Connery, David Cran and David Evered

Big Sky Publishing, 2013, 159pp

ISBN 9781921941771 (pbk.)

This is the second in the Army History Unit’s Australian Military History Series, which has been added to the Campaign Series and the Combat Support Series of short, well illustrated, books on aspects of Australian military history. All three series provide excellent introductions to the Army’s history. Some are genuine ‘condensed books’, being edited versions of full-length books, aimed at a different readership.

The authors (all named David, can Goliath be far away?) use ‘the experience of Reconstruction Task Force 4 (RTF4) … as the basis for … analysis’ of the principles of counterinsurgency. They do not claim that the operations of RTF4 were ‘textbook examples’ of those principles, but ‘emphasise the value of the principles … in understanding responses to the insurgency’. They have succeeded admirably in this aim.

After detailing the principles of counterinsurgency and providing a summary of the Australian military commitment to Afghanistan, the authors discuss the principles as they were applied by RTF4. These are discussed in three chapters, each covering a group of principles.

One chapter covers the political aspects of counterinsurgency. The differences between Afghan and Western societies are emphasised, leading into a discussion of the major cultural issues that faced RTF4. Members of the task force had to work at the local level, discovering quickly that the influence and relevance of the national government were limited.

The local population actively resisted some developments desired by the central government (such as new police stations, which they saw as means to enforce taxation, rather than elements in an impartial rule of law). Members of RTF4 found aligning funding to local needs was essential to avoid waste of money and effort, but experienced frustration when the definition of ‘need’ was set by the central government, or even by authorities outside Afghanistan.

The waste of a million Euro on a failed solar lighting system was an example of poor alignment between local needs and the ambitions of some aid organisations, as were hospital latrines built in a location locals did not consider appropriate. The batteries installed for the lighting system failed in the extreme climate, while the latrines were demolished once payment was made!

An important chapter emphasises that counterinsurgency is not primarily a military activity, but requires a comprehensive approach. RTF4 members saw weaknesses here, one commenting that ‘coalition partners weren’t working together for a common aim’. The final chapter on counterinsurgency principles focuses on the reality that insurgents exist among the people. RTF4 noted that when the Taliban were not receiving support, they could blend back in, re-starting active operations once conditions became more favourable. This made assessment of progress difficult.

Physically and morally isolating the insurgents is essential, but was not a primary role of RFT4, which built infrastructure to support the Afghan government, while providing its own security. Construction funds, however, could be used to attract potential insurgents to take up regular employment on construction projects. For this approach to work, a balanced force is required, under the mantra ‘Clear, hold, build’.

The key lesson in this book is the need to temper theory (the principles of counterinsurgency) with reality (the physical, cultural and military environment in which counterinsurgents are operating). Without this, the probability is that the counterinsurgency will not be successful.

Two interesting aspects of this book are the comfort that the Army has with using unit-level combined arms task forces, and the degree of integration of female soldiers into units that, if not in the forefront of battle, are deployed into areas where the probability of face-to-face combat exists.

JOHN DONOVAN

Lonesome Pine: The Bloody Ridge

LONESOME PINE The Bloody Ridge

Simon Cameron

Big Sky Publishing, 2013, 176pp

ISBN 9781922132307 (paperback)

Simon Cameron’s book on the Battle for Lone Pine in August 1915 will appeal to a readership seeking descriptions of the detailed events during the battle, and of the personal experiences of the soldiers there. However, the battle is also placed in its wider context, as a diversionary element of the last Allied attempt to resolve the Gallipoli impasse by offensive action.

Cameron describes clearly the debilitated state of the men of the 1st Division before the attack. The similarly debilitated state of the men in the brigades making the main attack from ANZAC on Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 probably contributed significantly to the failure on Sari Bair, for which Lone Pine was a diversion.

The descriptions of the attack and defence of Lone Pine are well set out. When they are linked with the many maps, it is easy to gain a clear picture of events. Cameron’s use of anecdotes also gives a good sense of how the battle affected the individual participants on both sides. Cameron records the part played in the battle by the Ottoman Major Zeki Bey, who later helped Bean to understand the course of the battle from the Ottoman side when Bean was researching his Official History.

Personalities such as Chaplain McKenzie, said to have buried some 450 men at Lone Pine, are featured, as are men who rose to fame in the Second World War, such as Leslie Morshead and Iven Mackay. The delightfully named Lieutenant Everard Digges La Touche (an ordained minister with a PhD from Trinity College, Dublin, who had originally enlisted as a private soldier) features briefly, before being killed. More junior soldiers are not neglected.

Cameron makes the case that Lone Pine was a success because the Australians held part of the ridge after the attack (but not the part overlooking The Cup, in which the Ottoman forces concentrated for counter-attacks), and that significant Ottoman forces (‘three regiments from the reserves of the northern group’) were sent to Lone Pine, and thus were unavailable to counter the attacks further north.

As a simple statement this might be true, but in the absence of success on Sari Bair, success at Lone Pine was nugatory. Even Cameron concedes that the ‘ground itself offered little advantage … since [it] … did not [provide] a commanding view of Owen’s Gully and Legge Valley’. The new Australian position was a salient vulnerable to fire from three sides.

Bean records some 2277 Australian casualties at Lone Pine during the battle, of whom Cameron estimates around 900 died during or in the immediate aftermath of the battle, with more succumbing in later years. To quote one of Rome’s many enemies, Pyrrus of Epirus, after a particularly bloody victory over Roman forces, ‘One more such victory and we are lost’.

Cameron’s account of the origin of the name of the battle site as ‘Lonesome Pine’, from a pre-war music hall melody, is interesting. I had always assumed that the name was based on the single Aleppo pine tree that once grew on the ridge, however, the contemporary evidence that Cameron quotes clearly indicates the then-widespread use of Lonesome Pine, which was later shortened. Bean even used the name in an early report on the battle.

The maps are generally useful aids to comprehension. That said, it is unfortunate that Map 1 has the key reversed, so that the feint attacks are shown as the principal objectives, and the principal objectives as the feints. Fortunately, the adjacent text clarifies the issue. Leslie Morshead also has his name occasionally spelled incorrectly as ‘Morsehead’ or as ‘Moreshead’.

JOHN DONOVAN

The Landing at ANZAC 1915

THE LANDING AT ANZAC 1915

Chris Roberts

Big Sky Publishing, 2013, 192pp, $19.95

ISBN 9781922132208 (pbk.)

Chris Roberts’ book had an extended gestation, starting as an Army Staff College paper in 1978, and developing via articles in the Journal of the Australian War Memorial and Wartime. The wait, however, has been worthwhile.

Roberts has provided a clear description of the landing at Anzac and its immediate aftermath, concentrating on the first day. He has resolved some misconceptions about the landing (to the extent that these can be resolved definitively at this remove). The issue of Ottoman artillery, however, remains unclear, with markedly different accounts in this book and Peter Williams’ The Battle of ANZAC Ridge (AMHP, 2007).

Roberts describes the limited training received by pre-war members of the Australian citizen forces (and the New Zealand equivalent, the Territorial Force). RMC Duntroon, founded in 1910, was intended to provide professionally trained officers for both nations, but the short time available before the war restricted its immediate effectiveness. He compares the rushed training of the AIF with the systematic training provided to Australian soldiers preparing for deployment to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Roberts discusses the actions of the principal leaders of the ANZAC: half of the eight brigade commanders and above were British regulars, Bridges was an Australian regular, who had partially completed training at the Canadian RMC, the other three were Australian citizen soldiers. The battalion commanders were all citizen soldiers. Apart from Johnston of the NZ Brigade, who was ill, the influence of most of the more senior officers on the battle, including Johnston’s replacement ‘Hooky’ Walker, another British regular, was negative.

Sinclair-Maclagan made the fatal decision to change the plan soon after the landing, without referring to Bridges. McCay accepted this change, deferring to the regular soldier. Sinclair-MacLagan’s ‘actions, rather than the misplaced landing’, destroyed the plan. Bridges let this decision stand, and Godley later supported Bridges’ recommendation to evacuate the force. Birdwood supported them, and the force was saved only by Hamilton’s refusal to consider evacuation. Walker sent the Auckland Battalion by a roundabout route to Baby 700, ‘seriously affect[ing] their eventual deployment’. MacLaurin remained on the beach, and Monash did not come ashore until 26 April, neither having any impact on 25 April.

Some battalion commanders, including Braund, Weir and Elliott, performed well, others ‘lost control of their units’, collapsed under the strain, or were simply ineffective. In contrast, Roberts shows that many of the junior soldiers and officers fought hard, despite their limited training, often showing a higher level of discipline, resolution, and initiative than their seniors. While stragglers did drift back to Anzac Cove, others held their ground, often unto death.

Roberts explains satisfactorily the misplaced landing and incorrect reports of Ottoman machine guns opposing the landing. In the latter case, inexperienced soldiers probably confused rapid rifle fire for machine guns, a common error. Further confusion came from the fire of Maxim guns mounted on the steamboats towing the landing boats.

The issue of Ottoman artillery support remains unclear. Roberts and Williams come to different totals of Ottoman artillery pieces available by the evening of 25 April (44 for Williams, 16, increasing during the night to 32, for Roberts). By the end of 26 April they have similar totals (44 for Williams, 40 for Roberts, the difference probably being the guns at Gaba Tepe and behind Palamutlu Ridge, apparently not counted by Roberts). On balance, Roberts seems more likely to be correct. Given the difficulties of moving artillery into the broken terrain, not all those guns present might have been brought into action.

There is some confusion in the book between the Ottoman 2/27th and 2/57th Battalions, with the latter seemingly the battalion that slipped from First Ridge down to the beach near Fisherman’s Hut, although the former, the original defenders of the Anzac Cove/Gaba Tepe area, sometimes appears in that position. Also, the 1/27th is referred to in one map caption (but not on the map) as being on Baby 700, when the 1/57th seems intended.

A minor point, Major Henry Bennett of the 6th Battalion is more commonly known by his middle name, Gordon.

JOHN DONOVAN

Note for Readers

Note for Readers

The previous 61 posts are the reviews I wrote before the end of 2012.  Future posts will depend on when I receive books to review, but I hope that I will be able to post up to four of five reviews each year.  Please keep visiting, as I cannot forecast when reviews might be posted.

John Donovan

Avoiding Armageddon

AVOIDING ARMAGEDDON: From the Great War to the Fall of France 1918-40

Jeremy Black

Bloomsbury, 2012, 304pp

ISBN: 978-1-4411-5713-3

Professor Jeremy Black has written a very interesting book. Unfortunately, his writing style buries the analysis in complex sentences and paragraphs.

Black presents a strong argument for parallels between the present day and the period between the two World Wars, with low-level conflicts underway around the world during both periods. Statesmen between the wars would not have found credible the idea that the ‘war to end all wars’ had achieved that Utopian objective. From 1919 until 1939, internal and international conflicts were endemic in the vast area between the Rhine and the Pacific Ocean, and south to North Africa and the Indian Ocean. In Latin America, as well as internal conflicts, the Chaco War was a major international conflict.

As Black demonstrates, using the Second World War to judge the correctness or otherwise of British military policies between the wars ignores reality. For most of the period British forces were focussed on events in British colonies, or on protecting those colonies from attack, not on a resurgent Germany or an aggressive Japan. The Indian Army, for example, which was criticised by reformers between the wars, performed the tasks required of it effectively.

Black shows that ‘as the number of “players” in [a] conflict rose, the notions of a clear-cut definition of military forces, and of war as the prerogative of the state, were put under severe strain’, as now. The objectives of specific conflicts, and the actual opposing sides, were often obscure. This is familiar now, as is the importance of tribalism in Afghanistan.

The correct balance in armies between men and machines was not as clear between the wars as hindsight might suggest, nor was the appropriate balance between protection, firepower and mobility. The end of dominance by the battleship was not obvious when carrier aircraft were flimsy biplanes. Claims by air power enthusiasts between the wars were not borne out by events, and military power remained hostage to economic fortune. Lessons from the Great War experience aimed to ensure that another major war would not be fought like the Great War, not that there would never be another world war.

As Black reminds us, Hitler was a political failure in the 1920s, with the 1923 Munich putsch being promptly suppressed. In the 1920s Germany was planning against a Polish invasion, not to conquer Europe. The Soviet Union was contained, and France was the dominant land power in Europe. The British, Dutch and French empires retained control of their territories, largely using locally recruited forces. The Islamic world then, as now, caused much difficulty.

Reviewing the early campaigns of the Second World War, Black concludes that the German forces were not prepared for a blitzkrieg in 1939, but learned from the Polish campaign. The German Army remained largely dependent on railways and draught animals for mobility, and infantry and artillery provided essential support to its armoured spearhead. The quality of German tactical and operational leadership was not matched by strategic acumen at the highest level, and early German success owed much to errors by Poland, France and Britain. Given time and experience, other armies learned to defeat blitzkrieg tactics.

Black concludes that ‘variety and unpredictability, the importance of the Far East, and the significance of civil wars’, major themes between the World Wars, are again important. In this context, he sees the rise of China complementing the development of China’s modern identity in the civil and international conflicts of the 1920s and 1930s. Black sees parallels between the issues facing Britain then and those facing the US now, including difficulties with allies and the influence of ‘small wars’ on military development.

JOHN DONOVAN

The Hard Slog

THE HARD SLOG: Australians in the Bougainville Campaign, 1944-45

Karl James

Cambridge University Press, 2012, 319pp

Karl James has written a comprehensive account of the Bougainville campaign. Unlike some earlier historians, he rejects the notion that this was an ‘unnecessary’ campaign, arguing that Australian leaders of the period, unlike their later critics, did not know that the war would end suddenly in August 1945. Rather, they expected that it would continue into 1946, if not beyond, and that success in Bougainville would release ‘manpower for future operations against Japan’, and for the economy. However, some contemporary critics are not as easy to ignore, including at least one brigadier serving on Bougainville (Hammer), and a battalion commander who was relieved of his command for his negative attitude to the campaign.

James’ account gives greater detail of the operations on Bougainville than the Official History. A key personality in the Bougainville operations was the commander of II Corps, Lieutenant-General Stan Savige. His role as a moderating influence on his more enthusiastic brigadiers is covered well, supplementing the work of Gavin Keating in The Right Man for the Right Job. Savige was ably supported by Major-General Bill Bridgeford, commanding the 3rd Division.

Interestingly, like some other critics of the campaign, many Japanese thought that an offensive against them would be pointless. Their commander, Lieutenant-General Hyakutake, thought that a ‘slow, fanwise advance from Torokina’ would also be pointless, but this was the technique used by Savige. Somewhat unusually, Savige wrote a pamphlet on the Tactical and Administrative Doctrine for Jungle Warfare, which was used as the basis for II Corps orders and instructions.

One of its most interesting aspects of this book is the coverage of the morale and disciplinary issues that arose in the army after more than five years of war. Stress occurred at all levels. Some junior officers and soldiers were at times reluctant to carry out their duty, while a few experienced, but still relatively young, battalion commanders found the strain of a sixth year of operations too much. They had to be relieved of their commands, as did a brigadier, whose planning, judgement and personality were considered inadequate. The brigade commander was replaced by Noel Simpson, who had previously taken command of a battalion in similar circumstances, and seems to have become the ‘turn to’ man for such problems.

The AIF-militia rivalry was a constant background irritant during the campaign. The 55th/53rd Battalion, with its chequered history of the failure of the 53rd Battalion on the Kokoda Trail, responded with resentment towards the AIF, while Noel Simpson was not happy to take command of a militia brigade. Despite this friction, the militia battalions generally performed well, particularly when they had good leaders. When leaders were inadequate, or tired, problems arose.

James describes the failed landing at Porton Plantation well. He had noted earlier the deficiencies in numbers of landing craft, and the failure at Porton illustrates well the consequences of attempting too much with inadequate support. One key lesson of the campaign must be the continuing need for combined arms operations. Regrettably, Savige did not have an adequate range of supporting arms and services.

By the end of the war the Japanese forces were concentrated around Bonis in northern Bougainville, Kieta Bay and Numa Numa Plantation on the east coast, and in southern Bougainville. The 2/8th Commando Squadron and native guerrillas organised by Allied Intelligence Bureau parties operated away from the main lines of advance, where they contributed significantly to the success of the campaign.

There are some minor editorial quirks, such as mention of Gazelle Peninsula in a couple of places, when presumably Gazelle Harbour was intended.

JOHN DONOVAN

Grab Their Belts to Fight Them

GRAB THEIR BELTS TO FIGHT THEM: The Viet Cong’s Big-Unit War Against the US, 1965-1966

Warren Wilkins

Naval Institute Press, 2011, 283pp

Warren Wilkins has drawn extensively on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong records to write this compelling account of the battles between Viet Cong Main Force units and US forces in 1965-66.  While mention is made of North Vietnamese units, the principal focus is on the Viet Cong.  The battle of Long Tan, however, is mentioned as an example of allied use of firepower.

Many western historians discussing the Vietnam War offer a narrative of indigenous Viet Cong fighters, largely part-time guerrillas wearing black pyjamas and sandals made from old truck tyres, and armed with captured weapons, defeating a clumsy US force armed with the latest military technology.  Wilkins demonstrates the falsity of this narrative.

Using North Vietnamese documents, Wilkins traces the North’s involvement and leadership from the earliest stages of the conflict, with deployment to the south of ethnic South Vietnamese who had ‘regrouped to North Vietnam in the aftermath of the North-South division’.  They were armed with modern Soviet weapons, and followed orders from the Central Office for South Vietnam, which was wholly subordinate to the North.  Northern soldiers reinforced even nominally Viet Cong units.

The major limiting factor for the Viet Cong was US firepower.  This caused a Viet Cong squad leader to tell his men to ‘grab the enemy’s belts to fight them’, to close with US forces to prevent them using the full force of their firepower, to avoid causing friendly casualties.  As Wilkins demonstrates, the real difficulty was in passing through the firepower zone to grab the belts!

Wilkins’ descriptions of battles between Viet Cong and US forces highlight the courage of many Viet Cong soldiers, but demonstrate their command structure’s inflexibility, which restricted Viet Cong options once their forces were committed.  US firepower also led the Viet Cong to develop another tactic that became a hallmark of their activities – digging.  Whether for the construction of field fortifications, bunker systems, or tunnel complexes, the spade became a key Viet Cong tool.

Wilkins uses North Vietnamese documents to show that the communist leadership was not unanimous in supporting the big-unit war.  Many, including some southern leaders, preferred to revert to a guerrilla campaign while the north built up its economy, but they were over-ruled.  The result of this debate, and the failure of the big-unit strategy to cause the US to withdraw, was the 1968 Tet Offensive. This cost North Vietnam and the Viet Cong massive casualties, but gained them a psychological victory that paved the way for ultimate military victory, though not as quickly as desired.

Both sides fought a war of attrition, the US intending to use its firepower advantage, the Viet Cong to close with their enemy for hand-to hand combat.  In attritional terms the US should have prevailed; even in less successful engagements, the casualty ratio favoured the US by a factor of three; in more successful battles, ten or more Viet Cong casualties were inflicted for each US casualty.

Had Field Marshal Haig or Marshal Joffre been able to inflict casualties at that ratio on the Western Front in 1915 or 1916, they would probably have won their war of attrition.  The North Vietnamese, however, were prepared to accept heavy casualties to gain victory.  Whether the victory was worth the cost is for them to judge, but the key lesson for western nations might be to choose tactics other than attrition when fighting opponents who place a low value on their subordinates’ lives.

JOHN DONOVAN