Development of the Australian and Canadian Armies

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN ARMIES FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR UNTIL EARLY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

This was not written as a stand-alone book review, but as a summary of my reviews of three books covering this subject in Australia and Canada.

I recently reviewed two books on the development of armies, Australia's (John Blaxland's The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard) and Canada's (Peter Kasurak's A National Force, The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000). Reading them prompted me to re- read Dayton McCarthy's The Once and Future Army, on Australia's CMF between 1947 and 1974. Blaxland's book is published by Cambridge, McCarthy's by Oxford, and Kasurak's, logically, is Canadian - published by UBC Press.

Looking at all of the books, Kasurak is much better than Blaxland on 'his' army overall, while McCarthy (who also perforce covers a fair bit on the regulars) is better on the Australian Reserves than Kasurak is on the Canadian Militia. McCarthy also provides a brief concluding up-date on events in Australia since 1974. McCarthy's book holds up well, even after a decade (as such a book should).

Looking at the two armies, it is notable that each had two 'big army' phases, but with different results. Australia went through its first phase with the 1950s national service scheme, at a time when surplus Second World War equipment was available to equip the part-time force of two infantry divisions, three independent infantry brigade groups an independent armoured brigade, and four Army Groups, Royal Artillery, that the 1950s scheme supported. This was alongside an under-strength regular infantry brigade group and armoured regiment.

Ultimately, demography (the imminent arrival of the baby boomers would have destroyed the universality of the scheme) destroyed Australia’s 'big army' even as the equipment died of old age, with no realistic hope of replacement on the necessary scale. This change led to massive (and traumatic) changes to Australia's CMF, and particularly to huge reductions in its order of battle. This phase is well described by McCarthy.

Australia had a second 'big army' phase in the 1980s, after the period McCarthy describes, when it developed the Army Force Structure Plan and the associated Army Development Guide. These documents went nowhere. Albert Palazzo covers them briefly in his The Australian Army, but Blaxland does not discuss them. Perhaps the Army is still a bit embarrassed about them.

Apart from the matter of resources for the necessary equipment, the reductions in the CMF/Army Reserve force structure during the 1960s removed the 'skeleton' on which a 'big army' might have been constructed, and the Army had spent much time in the intervening period arguing against the 'skeleton' philosophy, leaving it in a logical bind. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Army Reserve (as the CMF had since become), developed a viable future role. While still a bit narrower than might be possible, it is at least realistic. Taking the trauma early seems to have led eventually to a useful outcome.

Canada's army held hopes for a 'big army' for most of the post-war period, but was distracted from attempting to implement it by the NATO commitment and the Canadian political aversion to conscription. This aversion was largely caused by the reluctance of les Quebecois to accept conscription, even in time of war, when la Belle France was actually invaded. After the Second World War, the Canadian Army proposed to its government a 'big army' of two corps supported by conscription into the Militia, akin to that actually implemented by Australia in the 1950s. The proposal was rejected, and NATO became the main game for Canada after Korea.

The Canadians did not start planning again in detail for a 'big army' until the 1970s-1980s, and these plans ultimately collapsed when it became quite clear after the end of the Soviet Union that the Canadian government would not provide funding for the personnel (even if they were predominantly militia) and equipment for a force up to 200,000 strong (there were two versions, Corps 86 and Corps 96, the latter being a slightly reduced version). Students at Canada's staff college also rebelled at having to learn and be examined on organisations that they realised would probably never be implemented.

Through all this, however, the Canadian Militia retained a huge order of battle, which the regulars wanted to keep to provide the 'skeleton' for the 'big army'. (In Australia, the regulars were more willing to cut the CMF order of battle - see some of the quotes in the McCarthy review.) That Militia order of battle seems to exist still, and changing it is likely to be as traumatic for Canada as the 1960s changes to the CMF were for Australia.

One other event stood out in Kasurak's book. After being in Europe for some 35 years, at high readiness for a Third World War, less than two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union the 4th Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group was not able to be deployed to the 1990-91 Gulf War for logistic reasons. One wonders how long it would have lasted against the Soviets? Perhaps not even long enough to see the first nuclear flash! Keeping a 'big army' ready for high-level combat is clearly a very complex business. Whether small nations can do it even at brigade level seems problematic! If you can find it, read Andre Beaufre's 1974 Strategic Studies Centre book Strategy for Tomorrow for an alternative approach.

Of the three books, McCarthy and Kasurak are the pick.

My reviews of all three books are available on this blog

JOHN DONOVAN