FORMATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH INFANTRY DIVISIONS, FIRST WORLD WAR
While preparing the article on a separate page (see page list on right) on the
Over-Expansion of the AIF in 1916, I needed to get a benchmark on the necessary
timetable for deployment of a division. I used the formation and deployment of
British infantry divisions for that purpose.
I looked at the British New Army, First-Line and
Second-Line Territorial divisions, using Martin Middlebrook (Your Country Needs You, Pen and Sword,
2000) as the base source. He has some anomalies, and the dates of formation for
some divisions are not clear, however, he has enough detail to give an
indication of time taken from formation to deployment. For the five Australian
divisions, I used Bean, though he also has some vagueness on the dates of
formation.
When counting the time before a division went into
action, I ignored the month when it was raised, then counted months either
until it sailed to France for British divisions that went directly there, or
until it went into action for Australian divisions, and those British divisions
that went via Egypt to the Dardanelles. For the Australian divisions, I ignored
the time lost on sea voyages, and any consequent disruption to training.
On that basis, the average time to get the first 18
New Army divisions into action was around 10.5 months. The quickest was seven
months for the 12th, followed by eight for the 9th and 14th. Five more had ten
months before going into action, the other ten took either eleven or twelve
months.
Formation dates in Middlebrook for some of the last
twelve New Army divisions are a bit vague, as several changed titles in April
1915. However, the lowest numbered of this group formed as the 37th in 'late
1914', becoming the 30th in April 1915, while the 36th (Ulster) Division formed
in October 1914, and the 37th around September 1914, so it is probably
reasonable to interpolate that those numbered in between (the 31st to 35th)
also formed around September/October 1914. The 38th (Welsh) Division (Lloyd
George's Army) also had a number change in April 1915, but its original date of
formation is unclear. The 39th to 41st have firm dates of August and September
1915, when they were formed mostly from existing battalions.
Taking (conservatively) November 1914 as the dates for
the 31st to 35th, and sticking (again conservatively) to April 1915 for the
38th, the average time to get into action for these twelve divisions was also
10.5 months, with the lowest eight and the highest 13 months. Most had eleven
or twelve months before moving overseas. As an aside, Ray Westlake (Kitchener's Army, Spellmount, 1989)
gives dates of December 1914 for the 33rd, September 1914 for the 36th, March
1915 for the 37th (which seems a bit late for deployment in July, certainly
compared to the other divisions), and December 1914 for the 38th, but these do
not change the argument significantly.
Ignoring the two sent to India in late 1914 to relieve
regular garrisons there, the First-Line Territorial divisions had an average of
ten months before being committed, with a minimum of six months (the 46th) and
a maximum of 18 months (the 56th); the 55th also had an extended preparation,
of 17 months. Both the 55th and 56th, however, had been stripped of their
original infantry battalions in late 1914/early 1915, and had to re-gather
their infantry component, delaying their deployment. These two push the average
up noticeably, as without them the average for First-Line Territorial divisions
was 8.5 months. Eight of the twelve that served in action as divisions were
deployed within nine months.
The Second-Line Territorial divisions also have some
anomalies. They were apparently brought into existence in late 1914, to control
new recruits and the Second-Line battalions formed with non-deployable
personnel from the First-Line divisions, but they were given numbers only in
August 1915 (except for the 45th, also sent to India in late 1914, and numbered
early in the First-Line series). I have counted August 1915 as their formation
dates as divisions, 'writing off' the earlier period as draft finding duties
only.
Those Second-Line divisions that went into action took
an average of just over 16 months to prepare. The only two to deploy early were
the 60th and 61st, after ten and nine months (in June and May 1916
respectively). The performance of the 61st at Fromelles in July might have
discouraged early deployment of the others, as no other Second-Line Territorial
division was deployed in less than 18 months. The 66th took 20 months. Five
never left Britain, the number of one of these (the 63rd) being re-allocated to
the Royal Naval Division after the original 63rd was broken up in July 1916 to
provide reinforcements.
Turning to the Australian divisions, I think it is
reasonable to equate them to New Army divisions, as they were formed ab initio. While the 4th and 5th have
some similarities to the Second-Line Territorial divisions, being formed from
cadres (albeit the cadres had some experienced personnel, unlike the
Second-Line Territorial divisions), their supporting arms and services,
particularly their artillery, were raised ab
initio, so I think the New Army comparison remains broadly valid.
The 1st Division had about eight months from its
formation to the Gallipoli landing. The 2nd was formed in Egypt in June/July
1915, but its brigades were formed in Australia around February/March, giving
its component brigades about six months preparation before they moved to
Gallipoli. The 3rd Division was formed in Australia in about February 1916, and
went into the line in France that November, nine months later. All three lost
some effective training time during their sea transits to Egypt/Britain.
The 4th and 5th Divisions had the shortest preparation
periods, four and five months respectively. The average for the Australian
divisions was six months, well below the 10.5 months average for the British
New Army divisions, and even the 8.5 months for the First-Line Territorial
divisions. Indeed, only the 1st and 3rd Divisions received more than the seven
months for the fastest deploying New Army division.
Even accepting that the training time available to
divisions, and their leadership, varied, these figures suggest that the 4th and
5th Divisions needed extra time before being sent into the line, and particularly
into major offensive action. Leadership might have helped with the gap, but the
5th had McCay, who doesn't seem to have been one of the best and brightest. The
4th was luckier, getting H.V. Cox, formerly of the 29th Indian Brigade, and it
could be argued that this explains some of the difference in the two divisions'
performance in their first actions.
What does this mean? For the British, the delays in
forming the last three New Army divisions (in August/September 1915), and the
problems experienced deploying the Second-Line Territorial divisions, suggest
that Britain probably could not maintain in action more than about 55 divisions
on the twelve infantry battalion establishment. Either the Fifth New Army (the
36th to 41st Divisions) or the Second-Line Territorial divisions were 'a bridge
too far'. Given that the Fifth New Army was deployable more quickly than the
Second-Line divisions, and included the 36th (Ulster) and 38th (Welsh) Divisions,
each of which had a strong political support base, I am inclined to consider
that the Fifth New Army should (or certainly would) have proceeded.
All of the Second-Line Territorial divisions should
probably have remained as draft finding organisations and/or static garrison
formations (as some did), perhaps retaining their territorial designations rather
than receiving numbers, to emphasise their restricted role. That said,
there were a couple of 'dodgy' divisions among the final twelve New Army
divisions. Both the 35th and 40th 'Bantam' divisions needed drastic change to
become effective formations.
Britain could have followed the French and Germans to
divisions of nine battalions, to gain the flexibility provided by more, but
smaller, divisions. If implemented in early 1917, this change would have
allowed the extra battalions to be used to raise additional divisions, as the
French and Germans did. Whether they could have been maintained during 1918
might, however, be questionable. When the change to a nine battalion
organisation was made in 1918, it was under pressure to reduce personnel, not
to raise new formations.
For Australia, while the twelve battalion
establishment was in place, the 5th Division should not have been formed, and
the 3rd should not have been committed to the Western Front after the failure
of the first conscription referendum. By the end of 1916, the trend in recruitment
without conscription was clear. It might have been possible to maintain four
divisions on a nine battalion establishment with voluntary recruitment, but it
is unlikely that five divisions could have been maintained at full strength without
conscription, even on the lower establishment.
JOHN DONOVAN