Proxy Warfare

PROXY WARFARE

Andrew Mumford

Polity, 2013, 141pp

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5183-7

Andrew Mumford, a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, has written a short survey of proxy warfare. He reviews the recent rise of proxy war, covering conflicts from the Spanish Civil War to recent days. Mumford notes that it is not only superpowers that have resorted to proxy war, as non-state actors like Hizballah have also found it useful. With the decline of traditional conflict, he sees an increasing role for proxy war.

Mumford attempts to define proxy war, using the Spanish Civil War as an example. In that case, he sees Germany and Italy fighting a war of intervention, with their own military personnel deployed, while the Soviet Union fought a proxy war through its sponsorship of the International Brigades. His distinction, however, seems to lose its clarity when the early (advisory) period of the Vietnam War and the recent deployment of Chinese personnel into parts of Africa come under discussion, and are both regarded as proxy wars.

Drawing a distinction between the deployment of formed military units and of thousands of ‘advisers’ seems like a debate on the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin – interesting to theologists, but of limited practical value. His dismissal of the potential role of NGOs and the UN as participants in proxy wars also seems to discount too easily the effect of their presence, which allows governments and their opponents to focus on fighting, by relieving them of much responsibility for refugees and other casualties.

Mumford has chapters on the appeal of proxy wars, who engages in them, how they are fought, and the future and continuing appeal of proxy wars. There is some discussion of the rise of private military companies, with their perceived benefit of moving the political costs of casualties away from governments but, surprisingly, no mention is made of forces such as the French Foreign Legion or the Ghurkhas. Such forces also move the political pain of casualties elsewhere, but they provide greater control to their sponsoring government.

Perhaps Mumford’s clear disdain for companies such as Sandline and Blackwater explains his reluctance to look too closely there, albeit he does mention the possibility that the UN might at some stage have to consider the use of private military companies. In this context, some less developed nations already seem to use their armed forces effectively as UN mercenaries, deploying them to gain the payments that accrue from the UN.

Mumford forecasts more proxy wars in the future, as states become reluctant to commit their own troops to conflicts. Also, regional powers are now using proxy war more often. He sees the jihadist use of proxy wars as particularly concerning, because of the ‘perpetuity of the jihadist interpretation of their struggle’. Those commanded by their religion to ensure its supremacy will, in his view, continue to fight an eternal holy war until victory is attained. This is not a happy prospect!

The book would be easier to read if Mumford did not employ numerous multi-syllable words where a few short ones would suffice. His propensity for complex academic language (‘multitheoretical understanding’, ‘relevance of certain tenets from alternative theoretical schools’), and trite statements of the obvious (‘calculations made by states and non-state actors … are predicated upon an inescapable acknowledgement of self-interest’) also doesn’t help. The occasional grammatical infelicity jars (‘hard’ and ‘soft’ are not verbs).

Overall, this is potentially an interesting book, but it is not easy to dig the gems from the surrounding layers of over burden.

JOHN DONOVAN