AUSTRALIA’S
NORTHERN SHIELD? Papua New Guinea and the Defence of Australia Since 1880
Bruce Hunt
Monash University
Publishing, 2017, 374pp
ISBN 978161251968
Bruce Hunt has written a comprehensive review of the place
of Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the defence of Australia. He relies on primary
source documents, including formerly classified Cabinet Notebooks. His book
gives an insight into the development of policy over an extended period, and
the speed with which long established policy could change.
Hunt identifies early concern about the strategic value of
PNG among pre-Federation colonial governments. They pressed Britain to take
control of the eastern half of New Guinea, the western portion then being
controlled by the Dutch. British interest was limited until Germany took
control of north-eastern New Guinea and the New Britain archipelago. Britain
then annexed Papua.
The Japanese victory over Russia at Tsushima ‘elevated Japan
to the role of a direct military threat’, focussing attention on PNG as a ‘shield’
for eastern Australia. Hunt describes the fraught negotiations after the First
World War leading to an Australian mandate over the former German New Guinea,
though control of German possessions north of the Equator went to Japan.
Between the wars, Australia saw PNG as a defensive shield. After the Nazis took
power, suggestions were made that German New Guinea should be returned,
‘correcting the harshness of … the Versailles Treaty’. Unsurprisingly, this
proposal was not greeted with enthusiasm in Australia.
After the Second World War Australian governments both Labor
and Coalition supported the Dutch desire to retain control over west New Guinea
(West Irian to the Indonesians) after Indonesian independence, and Indonesia
was identified as a potential threat. Attitudes changed across the 1950s and
early 1960s, as Australia gradually came to accept the need for change in west
New Guinea, particularly after the US made it clear that it would not support
Australia militarily, while the UK counselled that Australia needed to keep
Indonesian goodwill.
Among the first politicians to change their position were
the prime minister, Robert Menzies, and the attorney general (later minister
for external affairs) Garfield Barwick. However, support for the Dutch continued
almost until the last moment, tempered by the desire to reduce friction with
the Indonesian government of President Sukarno. Although Indonesia repeatedly
stated that it had no claims against PNG, Australian authorities considered the
wording of its claims for west New Guinea capable of being used to justify a
claim for PNG or, indeed, north Borneo.
The start of Confrontation with Malaysia soon after
Indonesia gained control of West Irian elevated concerns in Australia that a
move on PNG might follow. Australia therefore decided to support Malaysia. Hunt
follows the debates about Australian operations during Confrontation, including
whether Australian forces should operate in north Borneo. Although Australia
took a cautious line, Hunt notes that there were direct clashes between
Australian and Indonesian troops. However, the attempted coup in Indonesia in
September 1965, and subsequent purge of the Indonesian Communist Party, eased
tensions.
As Hunt demonstrates, the Australian perception of PNG as a
defence shield largely ended with the fall of President Sukarno. Australia’s
perception then identified Indonesia as our northern defence shield. Relations
between Indonesia and PNG were managed to minimise friction between the three
nations, particularly after PNG gained independence. Hunt describes the process
under which the path to independence for PNG was complicated by secessionist
movements and concern about a possible collapse of law and order there.
Hunt demonstrates how politicians and the Australian defence
and foreign affairs bureaucracy consistently maintained the need for PNG as a
defence shield for over 80 years. What
stands out in his account is the speed with which Australian attitudes then
changed. Within a decade the place of PNG in Australian defence and foreign
policy diminished, with Indonesia becoming the new shield, while potential
internal problems became the principal concerns about PNG. While PNG remained
of ‘unique strategic importance to Australia’, there was no defence agreement
with the independent PNG, only an undertaking with no explicit commitments.
Hunt
records that personalities as different as Edmund Barton, W.M. (Billy) Hughes,
H.V. (Bert) Evatt, Sir Robert Menzies, Sir Garfield Barwick and John McEwen
took remarkably similar political positions on PNG. After federation, Barton
sought unsuccessfully to develop a Pacific empire stretching as far as the Cook
Islands and Tonga! After the Second World War Evatt sought ‘complete and
exclusive power’ over PNG (as well as over parts of Borneo, which could then be
exchanged for Dutch New Guinea[1]).
This book is an invaluable reference on Australia’s
strategic interests in PNG. There might be more information available, but it
is unlikely to change Hunt’s conclusions.
JOHN DONOVAN
