THE BATTLES BEFORE: Case
Studies of Australian Army Leadership After the Vietnam War
David Connery (ed)
Big Sky Publishing, 2016, 124pp
ISBN 9781925520194
This compilation provides a look into the bureaucratic
performance of Australian Army leaders from the early 1970s to the 2000s. In
his Introduction, David Connery describes the peacetime work of generals as
‘battles’. While this could seem pretentious, it highlights the frequent
failure of generals to apply their training for and experience of combat operations
to the peacetime ‘battles’ described in the case studies. The appreciation
process and Principles of War can be applied to such ‘battles’, and might have
obtained more productive results than some recorded here. Indeed, as the book
moves forward in time, it demonstrates a greater application of military skills
to achieve peacetime objectives.
Connery shows in Chapter 1 that the senior officers of
the early 1970s ‘did not accurately identify the key features of their risk
environment’. Their first proposals for the future Army, including maintaining
nine infantry battalions, were rejected. The development of specialised
brigades that followed retained a range of capabilities, but ultimately led the
Army down a cul de sac, limiting its ability to rotate forces. The five division
objective force, some 250,000 strong, that the Army set as its expansion target
was not accepted either in Defence or by government. Resources for such a force
were unlikely to become available in foreseeable circumstances.
In Chapter 2, Connery demonstrates that the generals
learned from their earlier failure. They persuaded Dibb to compromise on the
threat environment, warning time, and levels of conflict, allowing them to
obtain their basic objectives for the service. However, one result of winning
these points was to retain the specialised brigades, leaving the Army to
continue as a core force ‘army of ones’ with its disadvantages. The Army’s most
important win from the Dibb Review was control of battlefield helicopters.
Chapter 3, on the East Timor crisis, shows the
generals preparing for operations, confident in their training and skills. This
was, after all, their true métier, where they could be expected to perform at their best, and
mainly did. Officers at all levels took quiet initiatives before formal
decisions were made, shortening action times when formal approval to prepare
was given.
Bob Breen discusses in Chapter 4 the development of
the future Adaptive Army after the period of peak operational activity between
1999 and around 2008. This led to the most significant changes in Army
organisation in decades. The specialised brigades and ‘army of ones’ were swept
away, command responsibilities for ‘Raise, Train and Maintain’ clarified, and
combat support capabilities brought together.
Chapter 5, on making generals, follows the development
of the officer education system from the Regular Officer Development Committee
through to Project OPERA. Recommendations were not always followed through,
however, and some proposals, particularly for career streaming (described by
one senior officer as ‘career suicide’), partly fell by the wayside. Even after
major changes, one prominent general argued that the ‘ADF is not fully capable
of running a modern joint battle or campaign’.
One element notably missing from the discussion on
making generals (perhaps it is so obvious that no need was seen to mention it)
is self-education. Patton, for example, was a voracious reader of military
history. He did not just read, however, he studied, annotating his books, and
applying his studies to his duties. If, as stated, many career courses remain
‘significantly undersubscribed’, however, this suggests some lack of interest
in personal career development among officers.
Lieutenant General Leahy’s summary section notes that
‘it is often easier to command an army at war than in time of peace’. His
assessment of the case studies suggests that the Army experienced peacetime
command difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s. East Timor showed the Army reacting
well to a crisis, as should be expected, while the Adaptive Army initiative
showed how much improvement has occurred in peacetime processes.
This is a valuable collection, which should encourage
further consideration of the development of Australia’s military leaders.
Regrettably, the Endnotes for the Introduction are missing, while those listed
as belonging to the Introduction seem to belong to Chapter 1.
JOHN DONOVAN
