Margin of Victory

MARGIN OF VICTORY: Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War

Douglas MacGregor

Naval Institute Press, 2016, 270pp

ISBN 978161251968

Reading a book by retired US Army Colonel Douglas MacGregor is a challenging experience. It is not necessary, however, to agree fully with MacGregor to gain valuable insights from the research and analysis behind his proposals.

In this book, MacGregor studies five battles to glean lessons relevant to army reform in the 21st Century. He differentiates between wars of decision, choice and observation, focussing particularly on wars of decision, and seeks reforms to ensure that the US is victorious in the first battle in such wars.

The first battle studied is Mons in 1914. MacGregor attributes British success during the retreat from Mons through Le Cateau largely to reforms implemented before 1912 by Richard Haldane, Secretary of State for War. Despite budget constraints, where priority was given to the Royal Navy, these reforms prepared the British Army (just) enough for a continental war. Resistance within the Army diminished the effect of the reforms, but MacGregor notes that sufficient remained to provide a margin of victory when needed, despite deficiencies in British leadership.

The next study is on the Japanese capture of Shanghai in 1937. MacGregor introduces General Ugaki Kazushige, who in the 1920s attempted to move the Japanese Army from a focus on infantry numbers towards greater mobility and firepower. Reaction to Ugaki’s proposals arose, however, and opposition was more successful, delaying many reforms until the 1940s. Shanghai was a battle between masses of infantry, with limited mobility and fire support. While Haldane had given the British Army a margin of victory in 1914, opposition to Ugaki’s changes left the Japanese Army strong enough to prevail in individual battles, but not able to win against China.

These first two case studies emphasised the need to implement reform before a war, as more immediate priorities might constrain implementation during one. In his next two case studies MacGregor introduces command arrangements.

The third study, on the destruction of Army Group Centre in 1944, differentiates between German military reforms between the wars, which ‘focused on marginal, tactical changes to … [a] …World War I army’, and Soviet reforms implemented during the war, which focused on ‘integrating and concentrating combat power … for strategic effect’. MacGregor also compares the polyglot German command system unfavourably with the integrated, joint, Soviet system. The Soviet reforms were based on theoretical concepts developed in the 1930s, but temporarily abandoned after Stalin’s purge of the Red Army. They became the basis of the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex of the 1980s.

The fourth study is on the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. MacGregor compares Egyptian military reforms, implemented with deep understanding of Egyptian culture with Israel, which learned incorrect lessons from earlier wars. The Egyptians specifically planned to counter known Israeli tactics. While the Israelis eventually prevailed using maneuver, the victory was costly, in part because Israeli supporting firepower and infantry were not closely integrated with tanks. MacGregor considers that Israel’s unified military command structure provided the necessary margin of victory.

MacGregor’s final case study is of the US Battle of 73 Easting, against Iraq in 1991. He sees the 1991 conflict as perhaps the ultimate expression of World War I tactics. He considers this war a lost opportunity to move ‘beyond industrial-age warfare to … highly mobile, joint, integrated, aerospace and sensor dominated forces’. Instead, the US services each fought their own wars, in their preferred manner. MacGregor notes that airpower was not able to defeat the Iraqi army in the field, but did prepare the way for the ground attack. He criticises the failure to combine the air and ground efforts in an early joint operation, which might have produced a clear victory.

The final chapter is the core of the book. In it, MacGregor proposes a way forward for the US in the 21st Century. He sees little use for light infantry (or even special forces) in conflicts with a peer or near peer opponent, dismissing them as ‘[a]thleticism in uniform’. Rather, MacGregor favours fully mechanized ground forces, operating with air support as a strike/maneuver force under a joint and integrated command structure. Whether such a force is affordable by any nation other than an economic giant is a question for non-American readers to ponder.

One element of MacGregor’s thesis that is relevant to Australia is defining the nation’s ‘core, existential interests’. MacGregor does not see nation building/counterinsurgency in the Third World as core for the US. Without US support, there can be little realistic belief that these could be core functions for Australia.

JOHN DONOVAN

The Battles Before

THE BATTLES BEFORE: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership After the Vietnam War

David Connery (ed)

Big Sky Publishing, 2016, 124pp

ISBN 9781925520194

This compilation provides a look into the bureaucratic performance of Australian Army leaders from the early 1970s to the 2000s. In his Introduction, David Connery describes the peacetime work of generals as ‘battles’. While this could seem pretentious, it highlights the frequent failure of generals to apply their training for and experience of combat operations to the peacetime ‘battles’ described in the case studies. The appreciation process and Principles of War can be applied to such ‘battles’, and might have obtained more productive results than some recorded here. Indeed, as the book moves forward in time, it demonstrates a greater application of military skills to achieve peacetime objectives.

Connery shows in Chapter 1 that the senior officers of the early 1970s ‘did not accurately identify the key features of their risk environment’. Their first proposals for the future Army, including maintaining nine infantry battalions, were rejected. The development of specialised brigades that followed retained a range of capabilities, but ultimately led the Army down a cul de sac, limiting its ability to rotate forces. The five division objective force, some 250,000 strong, that the Army set as its expansion target was not accepted either in Defence or by government. Resources for such a force were unlikely to become available in foreseeable circumstances.

In Chapter 2, Connery demonstrates that the generals learned from their earlier failure. They persuaded Dibb to compromise on the threat environment, warning time, and levels of conflict, allowing them to obtain their basic objectives for the service. However, one result of winning these points was to retain the specialised brigades, leaving the Army to continue as a core force ‘army of ones’ with its disadvantages. The Army’s most important win from the Dibb Review was control of battlefield helicopters.

Chapter 3, on the East Timor crisis, shows the generals preparing for operations, confident in their training and skills. This was, after all, their true métier, where they could be expected to perform at their best, and mainly did. Officers at all levels took quiet initiatives before formal decisions were made, shortening action times when formal approval to prepare was given.

Bob Breen discusses in Chapter 4 the development of the future Adaptive Army after the period of peak operational activity between 1999 and around 2008. This led to the most significant changes in Army organisation in decades. The specialised brigades and ‘army of ones’ were swept away, command responsibilities for ‘Raise, Train and Maintain’ clarified, and combat support capabilities brought together.

Chapter 5, on making generals, follows the development of the officer education system from the Regular Officer Development Committee through to Project OPERA. Recommendations were not always followed through, however, and some proposals, particularly for career streaming (described by one senior officer as ‘career suicide’), partly fell by the wayside. Even after major changes, one prominent general argued that the ‘ADF is not fully capable of running a modern joint battle or campaign’.

One element notably missing from the discussion on making generals (perhaps it is so obvious that no need was seen to mention it) is self-education. Patton, for example, was a voracious reader of military history. He did not just read, however, he studied, annotating his books, and applying his studies to his duties. If, as stated, many career courses remain ‘significantly undersubscribed’, however, this suggests some lack of interest in personal career development among officers.

Lieutenant General Leahy’s summary section notes that ‘it is often easier to command an army at war than in time of peace’. His assessment of the case studies suggests that the Army experienced peacetime command difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s. East Timor showed the Army reacting well to a crisis, as should be expected, while the Adaptive Army initiative showed how much improvement has occurred in peacetime processes.

This is a valuable collection, which should encourage further consideration of the development of Australia’s military leaders. Regrettably, the Endnotes for the Introduction are missing, while those listed as belonging to the Introduction seem to belong to Chapter 1.

JOHN DONOVAN