CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY:
Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan
David Connery, David Cran and David Evered
Big Sky Publishing, 2013, 159pp
ISBN 9781921941771 (pbk.)
This is the second in the Army History Unit’s Australian
Military History Series, which has been added to the Campaign Series and the
Combat Support Series of short, well illustrated, books on aspects of
Australian military history. All three series provide excellent introductions
to the Army’s history. Some are genuine ‘condensed books’, being edited
versions of full-length books, aimed at a different readership.
The authors (all named David, can Goliath be far away?) use
‘the experience of Reconstruction Task Force 4 (RTF4) … as the basis for …
analysis’ of the principles of counterinsurgency. They do not claim that the
operations of RTF4 were ‘textbook examples’ of those principles, but ‘emphasise
the value of the principles … in understanding responses to the insurgency’.
They have succeeded admirably in this aim.
After detailing the principles of counterinsurgency and
providing a summary of the Australian military commitment to Afghanistan, the
authors discuss the principles as they were applied by RTF4. These are
discussed in three chapters, each covering a group of principles.
One chapter covers the political aspects of
counterinsurgency. The differences between Afghan and Western societies are
emphasised, leading into a discussion of the major cultural issues that faced
RTF4. Members of the task force had to work at the local level, discovering
quickly that the influence and relevance of the national government were
limited.
The local population actively resisted some developments
desired by the central government (such as new police stations, which they saw
as means to enforce taxation, rather than elements in an impartial rule of
law). Members of RTF4 found aligning funding to local needs was essential to
avoid waste of money and effort, but experienced frustration when the
definition of ‘need’ was set by the central government, or even by authorities
outside Afghanistan.
The waste of a million Euro on a failed solar lighting
system was an example of poor alignment between local needs and the ambitions
of some aid organisations, as were hospital latrines built in a location locals
did not consider appropriate. The batteries installed for the lighting system
failed in the extreme climate, while the latrines were demolished once payment
was made!
An important chapter emphasises that counterinsurgency is
not primarily a military activity, but requires a comprehensive approach. RTF4
members saw weaknesses here, one commenting that ‘coalition partners weren’t
working together for a common aim’. The final chapter on counterinsurgency
principles focuses on the reality that insurgents exist among the people. RTF4
noted that when the Taliban were not receiving support, they could blend back
in, re-starting active operations once conditions became more favourable. This
made assessment of progress difficult.
Physically and morally isolating the insurgents is
essential, but was not a primary role of RFT4, which built infrastructure to
support the Afghan government, while providing its own security. Construction
funds, however, could be used to attract potential insurgents to take up regular
employment on construction projects. For this approach to work, a balanced
force is required, under the mantra ‘Clear, hold, build’.
The key lesson in this book is the need to temper theory
(the principles of counterinsurgency) with reality (the physical, cultural and
military environment in which counterinsurgents are operating). Without this,
the probability is that the counterinsurgency will not be successful.
Two interesting aspects of this book are the comfort that
the Army has with using unit-level combined arms task forces, and the degree of
integration of female soldiers into units that, if not in the forefront of
battle, are deployed into areas where the probability of face-to-face combat
exists.
JOHN DONOVAN
